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ABSTRACT
Since the end of the Second World War, a norm of "border fixity" - a proscription of foreign
conquest and annexation of homeland territory - has become prevalent in world politics. Such
practices are no longer acceptable tools of policy. Has the international norm of border fixity
made international conflict less frequent? Since research has established that territorial issues
have been among the major causes of war, many observers might assume that the norm of
"border fixity" has made war less common. This dissertation argues that the opposite conclusion
is true as far as socio-politically weak states - states that do not possess a reasonable level of
legitimate and effective governmental institutions - are involved. In a world in which it is
illegitimate to change international borders by force, and in which socio-politically weak states
are widespread, international conflict and instability may actually be more common. The border
fixity norm, moreover, perpetuates and exacerbates the weakness of already weak states thus
making a significant decrease in conflicts unlikely.
This dissertation examines the question of the effects of the international norm of border
fixity by studying and comparing four cases. Two cases are taken from the era prior to the
establishment of the border fixity norm: Brandenburg-Prussia from 1640 to 1740, and
Argentina from 1810 to 1880. Two cases are taken from a world in which the norm of border
fixity is present: Lebanon from 1943 to 2005, and Congo from 1960 to 2005. Despite some
variations, the case studies and the comparison between them largely confirm the argument
stated above: Border fixity perpetuates state weakness and, in regions in which most states
are socio-politically weak, good fences often create bad neighbors.
Thesis Supervisor: Stephen W. Van Evera
Title: Professor of Political Science
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Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, a norm of "border fixity" - a proscription of foreign
conquest and annexation of homeland territory - has become prevalent in world politics.' Such
practices are no longer acceptable tools of policy. Have fixed borders made international conflict
less frequent? Since research has established that territorial issues have been among of the major
causes of war,2 many observers might assume that the norm of "border fixity" has made war less
common. This dissertation argues that the opposite conclusion is true as far as socio-politically
weak states - states that do not possess a reasonable level of legitimate and effective
governmental institutions - are involved. In a world in which it is illegitimate to change
international borders by force, and in which socio-politically weak states are widespread,
international conflict and instability may actually be more common.
While territoriality and borders received surprisingly little attention in the international
relations literature up until the 1990's, more recent research has found a very important trend in
the way we treat international borders. Conquest and annexation of one's neighbors' land,
commonplace in the history of the state system, is no longer on "the menu for choice" for post-
WWII leaders and states. A practice that excluded such endeavors gradually developed into a
strong and institutionalized international norm, which I term "border fixity."
Others have called this phenomenon the norm of "territorial sovereignty," and the norm of "territorial
integrity." Both those terms, however, might confuse it with a general prohibition on intervention, which does
not exist. I will further discuss these definitions in chapter 1.
2 Gary Goertz, and Diehl, Paul F., Territorial Changes and International Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1992), Kalevi
J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order 1648-1989 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), pp. 306-13, John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 123-
52.
This norm, no doubt, has contributed much to international peace and stability in regions
such as Europe (save for the Balkans), North America and South America. By contrast, however,
I maintain that in regions where states have been socio-politically weak, such as in the Middle
East, Africa, the Balkans, Central America, as well as large parts of Asia and the former Soviet
Union, the border fixity norm might have adverse consequences for both domestic and
international relations. I posit that this norm is likely to perpetuate and exacerbate state
weakness, since it deprives the state of key factors that were historically motors of state building:
territorial threats and territorial opportunities (henceforth: territorial pressures). In early modern
Europe and elsewhere, these pressures played a fundamental role in creating strong institutions
and strong "in-group" feelings that furthered the cohesiveness of states. Today, states in the
developing world do not face these territorial pressures; thus they are devoid of this crucial tool
for creating strong institutions and internal cohesiveness. Weak states today, moreover, are not
"selected out" of the system, as they used to be, but keep on surviving. In turn, weak or failed
states are more likely to become the source of international conflicts in a world of fixed borders
because (a) they are more likely to be the site of civil strife, which often spills across borders by
increasing incidences of cross-border ethnic intervention, insurgency and counterinsurgency; (b)
they increase the opportunities for other states' predation (in a non-territorial, i.e., economic or
political, sense). 3
Taken separately, each of these relations is an important arena for investigation, to which this
dissertation contributes new arguments. First, it contributes to the understanding of the
perpetuation of state weakness in much of the developing world and the increasing phenomenon
of failed and failing states. It argues that the norm of border fixity has much to do with these
3 As territorial predation is banned in an age of border fixity, predation here means the attempt by one state
to take over and exploit the other state's economic assets or political system of control.
worrisome developments. Second, it contributes new observations on the subject of the sources
of civil conflict, by maintaining that it is often resulting from the combination of state weakness
and border fixity. Third, the dissertation contributes to our understanding of the changing nature
of war from primarily an interstate practice to primarily intrastate or transnational one. It makes
the case that the norm of border fixity and, by extension, state weakness, play a major role here
as well. In this regard, the dissertation adds to existing but limited understanding of the causal
relations between state weakness and interstate and transnational conflict, by spelling out the
mechanisms by which such relations materialized.
These contributions notwithstanding, however, it is the combination of the effects of the
norm of border fixity on the weakness of states and of states' weakness on furthering
international conflict, rather than each of these phenomena by themselves, that is the main focus
of this research. It is the confluence of these processes - the proposition that a norm which
intends to make the world a more peaceful one actually, under some conditions, makes it more
conflict prone - that makes the argument presented here both counterintuitive and theoretically
new.
The dissertation explains, elaborates and tests the causal mechanism discussed above through
a study of four cases. Two of these cases are studies of weak states in a world of flexible borders,
that is, a world in which the border fixity norm is absent. The other two cases are current cases,
of weak states in a border fixity world. These cases are presented in Table 1 below:
Table. 1: Case Studies
Border Fixity Norm
* A note on the use of states' names: Some of the states in this study have changed their official names during
the duration of time studied here. Brandenburg-Prussia has turned into the Kingdom of Prussia in [18?]. I use both
names interchangeably. Argentina was called Rio de la Plata in 1810, then changed to The United Provinces of the
River Plate (or, alternatively, The United Provinces of America), and Finally to Argentina. I use the name Argentina
in general and the other names when appropriate. Congo has been called The Republic of Congo (1960-1971), Zaire
(1971-1997) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997-tody). I was the generic term Congo and the other names
as appropriate. Note the difference with the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).
The criteria for choosing the cases is based on the one hand, on their similarities in terms of
socio-political strength (or, rather, weakness) and, on the other hand, their different setting in
terms of prevailing international norms regarding borders. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, all
the states in this study were, at the starting point, weak, or very weak states. While Brandenburg-
Prussia and Argentina were part of a world in which international borders are flexible and given
to changes, however, the same would not be true for Lebanon and Congo. Thus, using Mill's
method of difference, this research design allows me to examine the effects of the existence or
absence of the border fixity norm on the conduct and outcomes of policies. In addition, within
each group I chose cases that diverge considerably in terms of geography and other factors, so as
to maximize the generalizability of the conclusions.
I pursue the study of the effects of the border fixity norm using two different research
techniques, process tracing and structured focused comparison. Process Tracing is a
methodology designed for focused causal analysis of case studies. The idea is that in order to
Present Absent
Congo (1960-2005)* Brandenburg-Prussia (1640- 1740)*
Lebanon (1950- 2005) Argentina (1810-1980)*
decipher the working of a causal mechanism, one needs to closely examine the process by which
it occurred, and observe congruities and divergences between the theory and the actual empirical
process in the cases.4 This method is especially beneficial for studying a new causal mechanism
that was not studied before, since it can generate observations that can illuminate the working of
such mechanism. In each case, then, I strive to observe and identify the process by which the
border fixity norm relates to eventual policies and outcomes of relations between the state
studied and its neighbors. For this purpose I chose to study cases that include many observation
points, that is, each of them was engaged in long-term relations with at least two neighbors. The
dissertation supplements the process tracing analysis with a structured focused comparison, a
methodology designed to elicit theoretical generalizations from a comparison of several cases.
The comparison is "focused because it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the historical
case... and structured because it employs general questions to guide the data collection and
analysis in that historical case." 5
The dissertation proceeds as follows: The first chapter will examine the subjects and
arguments existing literature on territories, borders and the way they relate to relations between
states. It will then analyze, more specifically, the origins, development, and strength of the
border fixity norm. Chapter Two discusses the concept of the socio-political strength of the state,
a crucial intervening variable in explaining the different effects that border fixity would have on
4On the method of process tracing see Alexander L. George, and Bennett, Andrew, Case Studies and Theory
Development in Social Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 205-32, Peter A. Hall,
"Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research," in Comparative Historical Research, ed.
James Mahoney, and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Stephen Van
Evera, Guide to Methods for the Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp.
64-67.
Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused
Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approached in History, Theory, and Politics, ed. Paul G. Lauren (New
York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68, quotation from pp. 61-62. See also George, Case Studies and Theory
Development in Social Sciences, pp. 67-124.
different states. It then goes on to theorize the relations between the socio-political strength of
the state and its relations with its neighbors, mainly in terms of peace and conflict. More
specifically, it analyzes the effects of a flexible border world - with the territorial threats and
opportunities it produces - on weak states. It then compares these effects to those produced by a
border fixity word. This chapter also lays down five theoretical hypotheses about these effects.
Chapter three's role is to examine the pre-conditions for state building and development of a
socio-politically strong state. It discusses several explanations for the persistence of state
weakness in the developing world, and inspects, in the light of these explanations, the conditions
in the four cases studies here prior to the beginning of the study period. The specific goal of this
exercise is to determine whether the two cases that are taken from the world of flexible borders
possessed features that would pre-conditioned them to success in the process of state building, as
compared to the two border fixity world cases. In other words, it questions whether
Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640 and Argentina in 1810 were more likely candidates, a priori, to
become stringer stated than Lebanon in 1943 and Congo in 1960.
Chapter four, five and six, and seven, then, are the empirical case studies. In each case I
explore, first, the socio-political strength of the state at the beginning of the study period.
Second, I inspect the international environment in which the state resides, with a particular
emphasis on the prevalent territorial norms and practices. I look both at the "big picture" of
territorial norms and the more specific equation of territorial pressures that the state in question
faced. Third, I analyze the effect the international effects of this external international
environment on the process of state building in each case. Forth, in the two current cases,
Lebanon and Congo, I also examine the relations between the border fixity norm, the persistent
weakness of the state and the international conflicts in which the state gets involved. This point
is only studied separately in these two cases, since the absence of significant prospects of state
strengthening in them calls for more emphasis. In the cases of Brandenburg-Prussia and
Argentina this process is studied as a part of the examination of their relations with their
neighbors.
The last chapter compares the effects of the border fixity norm, or it absence, in the four
cases. It utilizes the data and observation drawn from the case studies in order to compare them
along similar lines of inquiry. It examines the differences and similarities presented in the
processes of state building in the various cases and question to what extent were these processes
affected by the border fixity norm. It then compares, as well, the combined effects of border
fixity and persistent state weakness on the relations between a state and its neighbors. The
chapter concludes with an inspection of whether the hypotheses presented in chapter two were
corroborated by the cases and the process discussed in the theory fit the reality of the cases.
Based on the, thorough examination of the cases and the comparison among them, I conclude
that border fixity indeed had and keeps on having profound effects on the way states conduct
their relations with other states. This effect, however, is dependent on the socio-political strength
of the state. In the cases studied here, of weak states, the norm of border fixity exacerbates and
perpetuates the initial weakness, and end up causing more conflict and instability. In many of the
regions of the developing world, therefore, good fences do not make good neighbors. In fact,
they often make bad ones.
Before I proceed, however, a few words of caution are in place. First, the theory of border
fixity is probabilistic, rather than a deterministic. It claims, for instance, that the norm of border
fixity is likely to perpetuate and exacerbate state weakness in already weak states, not that it will
always do so. It argues that for most weak states border fixity is a source of conflicts, not that it
will necessarily be so. Thus, a few counter examples would not necessarily refute the argument
advanced here. Such factors as strong leadership or existing political culture could affect the
currents predicted by the theory, but they would have few incentives to do so, and they would
face formidable obstacles in this task. Second, while the dissertation examines the effects of
border fixity on states in a dichotomous way (that is, the border fixity norm either exists or not,
states are either strong or weak), the actual world is, of course, much more complicated. In terms
of state strength, especially, there are probably more grays than either black or white. While the
dichotomous presentation was chosen for reasons of simplicity and parsimony, I acknowledge
the continuous nature of state strength, and partially deal with it in my case studies and in the
concluding chapter. For the purpose of developing and testing a new theoretical framework,
which this dissertation does, however, the nominally strict differentiation is still valid.
Chapter 1: Perceptions of Borders
"All but gone are a whole serious of terms, such as 'subjugation' and 'the right of
conquest,' which even as late as 1950 or so formed a normal part of legal discourse in a
work on international law..." 6
Territoriality and borders are essential parts of the modern sovereign state and of the state's
international relations7 . The first section of this chapter surveys the arguments on states'
territoriality and borders within and outside the discipline of International Relations (IR), in
order to situate my research in the context of past and present research. The studies of territory
and borders, and especially of different norms that define the way we think about borders, have
been developing in recent years, but they still contain an important gap and leave much to be
desired, as will be discussed below. The aim of this dissertation is to start filling this gap or,
more appropriate to the title, start mending this wall. The first section surveys arguments in. The
second section, then, introduces the concept of the border fixity norm and discusses the
development, status and strength of this norm.
A. Territories and Borders
Throughout history, many, if not most, of the international conflicts between states, as well
as their international agreements, were about their territories and their borders: their location or
their functions. Historically, territory and borders issues are probably the primary underlying
cause of wars, as well as international agreements, between states. As John Vasquez argues,
"territory is a peculiarly sensitive area for human collectives. They will fight over it more readily
than over any other question, and any issue linked with territory becomes subject to violence and
6 Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.
352.
7 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977).
the use of force." 8 Because this knowledge is anything but new, and because modem IR studies
are about interactions (be it diplomacy, trade, war or other kinds) between political entities
enclosed within some territorial boundaries, it is surprising to find how little has been done in
this discipline by way of theorizing territorial boundaries. "International relations scholars rarely
examine how definitions of populations and territories change throughout history and how this
change alters the notion of legitimate authority." 9 As one scholar reflects, "it is truly amazing
that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by students of international politics; its
neglect is akin to never looking at the ground that one is walking at."10
To be sure, discussions of specific territorial conflicts abound, but generalizations and
theoretical analysis of the system that is built of territorial states, and the nature and function of
borders has been scarce." This ignorance is not wholly surprising, though, since one often does
indeed not look at the ground on which he or she walks, or at least not problematize it. Such a
practice is usually justified, since one needs a solid base as a foundation for any human
endeavors. However, when significant changes occur, which transform the nature of this base, it
calls for a serious investigation, which is what the current study aims at.
Since the late 1980's, however, a slow but encouraging development in the writings about
territoriality and borders has occurred. This emerging literature can be broadly divided into three
categories: theoretical conceptualization of territoriality and borders; the relations between
8 Goertz, Territorial Changes and International Conflict, pp. 1-31, Holsti, Peace and War, pp. 306-13, Vasquez, The
War Puzzle, pp. 123-52. Quotation from p. 51.
9 Samuel J. Barkin, and Cronin, Bruce, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and Ruls of Sovereignty in
International Relations," International Organization 48, no. 1 (1994): p. 107.
10 John G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International
Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): pp. 139-74.
11 An exception is John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," in The Nation-State and the Crisis of
World Politics, ed. John H. Herz (New York: David Mckay Company, 1976). And John H. Herz, "The Territorial
State Revisited," in The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics, ed. John H. Herz (New York: David Mckay
Company, 1976). Hertz discusses the centrality of territoriality in the system of modern states and the influence of
modern weapons system on this feature in the 1950's.
territories and identities; and the study of territorial changes. Below, I discuss some of the most
important works in each of these categories. To some extent, the emerging literature in all these
three categories serves as a basis for identifying and studying the effects of the border fixity
norm.
a) Territoriality and the Modern State System
I. Territoriality as a variable
The two main basic theoretical contributions of the literature in this category are, first, the
observation that territoriality, borders, and their relations with populations, are variables rather
than constants, and second, the discussion in the different dimensions of international borders.
Below, I discuss these two issues.
Although the knowledge that territoriality plays a crucial part in the modem world and that it
differs, in that respects, from previous international orders, is not new. This knowledge,
however, was hardly developed in the modem political science literature. One of the reasons for
this lack of interest was the change in focus that the study of relations between territory and
politics took at the second part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth. This
trend, centered on geopolitics and the writings of Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder1 2, was
rooted in the premises that the there are certain geographic constants that determine the value
and character of land in different regions of earth, and that states need to take account of these
characteristics in order to be able to prevail in their struggle with other states. Important German
scholars at the turn of the century and through WW-II made geopolitics the center of their
attention, but also gave it an additional twist: Freidrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer, among
12 See Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History (1904)," The Geographical Journal 170, no. 4
(2004), Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of the Sea-Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Gretna, Louisiana: Pelican,
2003).
others, attempted to create a much more "organic" view of geography and mixed it with racial
theories. Their political geography, eventually, became an important part of the Nazi propaganda
machine. 13
After the defeat of the Nazis the study of political geography was discredited, and for a good
reason. This trend, however, was one of the sources of the lack of interest in the study of
territoriality in human and political affairs noted above. In the 1980's, however, the interest in
the subject of territoriality and borders slowly began to reemerge with a novel approach that
discusses territoriality from a distinctively different approach: as a variable rather than a
constant. Friedrich Kratochwil pointed out the broad historical context, in which political entities
and their ordering principles could have different relations to territories. He distinguishes, first,
between territorial and non-territorial orders and, second, between imperial and state-system
orders within the territorial category. It does so by using the case of Mongolia, which has gone
through the transformation from a nomad society (non-territorial) through being a periphery of
the Chinese and Russian empires, to being part of the state-system. 14 This empirical example
helps Kratochwil to argue that "boundaries are important because of their role in mediating
exchanges." The types of relationships that are mediated, however, depend on the rules by which
societies are ordered. Whether the boundary differentiates between an empire and its outside
("barbarian") environment, between estates of feudal lords with overlapping authority or
between equal and sovereign states, makes a huge difference. 15
13 See John A Agnew, "Global Political Geography Beyond Geopolitics," International Studies Review 21, no. 1
(2000): pp. 91-99.
14 Freidrich Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State
System," World Politics 39 (1986): pp. 29-31.
15 Ibid.: pp. 32-37.
A further development in the understanding of territoriality was the discussion of the
differences in the concept of territoriality in modern and pre-modern systems of political entities.
John Ruggie distinguishes three such differences: first, the modern state, in contrast to some of
its predecessors., is based on disjoint territory; second, in contrast to nomadic societies, this
territory is relatively fixed16; and third, modern territoriality is exclusive. 17 Hendrick Spruyet
adds some more models of relations between the political entity and territoriality in his
discussion of the: Italian city-states and the German city-leagues' 8
The main contribution of this group of authors is the notion that the modern territorial state is
just one of several historical models of relations between a political entity, its territories and its
borders. Grasping this helps us understand the dynamic character of these relations, and thus set
the stage for understanding the changes in the relations we see in today's world.
II. Dimensions of Borders
A second important theoretical observation is that international borders might be
distinguished along two distinct dimensions: their functions and their location. As Kratochwil
notes, a significant part of international relations revolves around the management of these two
dimensions: manipulation of the location of the boundaries and management of the types of
exchanges mediated by them (that is, their function). The European balance-of-power system, for
instance, was based on the former, using consistent attempts to alter territorial boundaries in
order to control great-power rivalry. Changing the boundaries' functions, on the other hand, was
used mainly around the edges of European empires and their colonies. Various institutional
f' Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond." Ruggie, though, use here "fixed" in a looser and weaker sense than I use it in
this study.17 Ibid.: pp. 139-74.
SHendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
arrangements, including spheres of influence, protectorates, suzerainties, and buffer zones were
used to manage the relations between empires and their environment and among the empires
themselves.19
Granted, the division between location and function of borders is somewhat artificial, as
these dimensions are often interdependent. Indeed, as shown by Jeffery Herbst's study of African
borders in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras, the location of borders itself might
serve as their most important function. 20 Nevertheless, the analytical distinction is still useful and
it helps me define more clearly the puzzle of this study. While the dissertation concentrates on
the location of the borders, one should never lose sight of the dimension of borders' function,
since they are closely intertwined. Moreover, since I argue below that significant manipulation of
location of boundaries in the current state system is practically obsolete, the manipulation of
boundaries' function takes an even greater importance, within the limits of legitimate tools, in an
international order based on sovereignty.
b) Identities, Territories and Borders
A second area in which the new literature on territories that emerged since the 1980's has
made a significant contribution, is the intersection between territories and identities. The research
in this subject demonstrates how institutions like "state" and "sovereignty" could take on
different meanings, either territorial or not. This literature also points to the malleability of
territorial definitions of states and ethnic groups, and the content of territorial identities.
One question that is dealt with here is whether the nation is defined in territorial or in
national terms. Rodney Bruce Hall, for instance, demonstrates, using the comparison of France
19 Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality," pp. 37-41.
20 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000).
under Napoleon the HI and Prussia under Bismarck, that "a state" could mean very different
things with different consequences for international relations, depending mainly on historical
societal developments. 21 Similarly, Samuel Barkin and Bruce Chronin argue that the concept of
"sovereignty" is neither fixed nor constant. They maintain that the international system adopts, at
different times, different definitions, some of them based on the state (i.e., territorial), and some
on the nation (i.e., not necessarily territorial), thus changing the context and conduct of
international relations.22
Students of geography, as well, have struggled with similar subjects.23 Some works, for
instance, are focused around the notion that different geographically related identities, on
different "scales," 24 are "nested" within other, broader identities. When cultural and political
identities overlap or are in disjuncture between different scales, one should expect to see tension.
This is true especially when asymmetry exists between the political state and the cultural nation,
both of which are geographical entities. 25 Empirical and historical works in this discipline, too,
started to emphasize more the shifting and constructed nature of geopolitical perceptions, rather
than their natural characteristics.26
21 Rodney Bruce Hall, "Territorial and National Sovereign Identity and Consequences for Security Policy," Security
Studies 8, no. 2/3 (1999): pp. 145-97.22 Barkin, "The State and the Nation." Also discussing changes and continuities in the interpretations of sovereignty
is Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy," (1999). In a similar manner, the various authors in
the volume titled Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, examine the correlations
of identities, borders and orders, with a heavy emphasis on the social process that changes their relations and
connotations. See Mathias Albert, Jacobson, David and Lapid, Yosef, ed., Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking
International Relations Theory (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).
:3 For a review of some recent works see John A. Agnew, "Global Political Geography beyond Geopolitics."
International Studies Review 21,1 (2000): 91-99.
24 The term "scales" refers more or less to what a political scientist would call "levels of analysis."
25 See the various articles in Guntram Herb, and Kaplan, David H., ed., Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory,
and Scale (Lahman, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
26 See, e.g. Gertjan Dijkink, National Identity & Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain (New York:
Routledge, 1996). The book surveys the geopolitical visions of the place a nation occupies (or should occupy) in
the world. By examining visions that were entertained by elites and people in Germany, Britain, the US,
Argentina, Australia, Russia, Serbia, Iraq and India, the author stresses the important role played by these myths
of place and destination in achieving pride and/or legitimizing violence in a world of physical and ideational
constraints
This body of literature, then, serves as my ontological basis, as it shows territories, borders
and identities that are related to them to be social constructs. This conceptualization is important
to the theory of border fixity, as will be discussed below, since it makes clear that the supposition
that borders are, and should stay, fixed is a social construct as well, and not a material reality,
even though it has some very material consequences.
c) Territorial changes
A third thread in the developing literature on borders is the one that focuses on territorial and
borders' changes. This literature is especially important for my research, since it establishes the
empirical anchor for my arguments.
An important part of this literature consists of statistical works, which survey territorial
changes, their frequency, the manner in which they are done, and the conditions under which
they should be expected. Most of the works in this group are part of, or are based on, the
"Correlates of War" project. The main findings that arise in these works are: a) If one examines
the period of the modem state-system (since Westphalia in 1648), territorial disputes are the
most common underlying cause of war.27 b) The two factors that seem to correlate most with
territorial war are (not surprisingly) contiguity (sharing a border), and previous territorial
disputes.2 8
A second group of works on territorial changes tries to analyze the conditions under which
we should expect to see such a change and the process by which the change would take place.
Arie Kacowictz, for example, conducts a survey of territorial changes that were done peacefully,
and goes on to study the conditions that enabled and/or encouraged such changes. He finds that
27 Vasquez, The War Puzzle, 123-52. See also Goertz, Territorial Changes and International Conflict, Holsti, Peace
and War.
28 Goertz, Territorial Changes and International Conflict.
the most important variables for a peaceful resolution of territorial dispute are the distribution of
power (somewhat asymmetric distribution is helpful), regime type (similarity helps), and the
congruence of norms regarding international relations.29
Ian Lustick and his colleagues study the process by which a nation decide to expand or
contract territorially, and the role of hegemonic ideas and their breakdown in such processes. 30
Similarly, Monica Toft, by examining cases in which ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union
are in conflict with their states, discusses the perceptions of core territories, and how perceiving a
certain territory as "indivisible" makes armed conflict much more likely.3 1 Taylor Fravel,
examines China's territorial dispute behavior and argues that leaders tend to delay the resolution
of territorial disputes, unless certain conditions compel them to either compromise or escalate the
dispute.32 All these works are of great value to the study of borders, yet they neglect to notice the
general process by which, over time, territorial changes, and especially violent territorial
expansions, are becoming obsolete. Here is precisely where the literature on the norm of border
fixity, which will be discussed in the next section, emerges.
B. The International Norm of Border Fixity
a) Defining Border Fixity
This section explains and elaborates the meaning and scope of the border fixity norm. After
defining the norm, I discuss its origins and evolvement. I then the examine the existence and
29 Arie M. Kacowictz, Peaceful Territorial Change (Columbia, South Carolina: The University of South Carolina
Press, 1994).
30 Brendan O'leary, Lustick, Ian S., and Callaghy,Thomas, ed., Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving
Borders (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001).
31 Monica D. Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
32 Tylor Fravel, "The Long March to Peace: Explaining China's Settlements of Territorial Disputes " (Stanford,
2003).
strength of the border fixity norm, demonstrating that the norm today is well internalized, in
thought and in practice, over and above the reasons (some of them material) that gave rise to it in
the first place.
What do I mean by saying that border fixity is a norm? While there is no consensus among
social scientists about the meaning of "norms" and their ingredients, the definition that is often
used by political scientists describes norms as "collective expectations for the proper behavior of
actors with a given identity." 33 The focus of the definition above is the word "proper" which I
read as either "the morally right thing to do," or "the commonly accepted thing to do." The first
of these meanings is an ethical one, stressing the "oughtness" of an action, while the second
meaning treats norms as a legal or social convention, thus it is more positivistic 34 in nature.35 I
submit that the norm of border fixity takes both of these values of "proper;" different actors, at
different times, have been playing by the rules of border fixity either because they feel it is the
ethical thing to do, or because they do not want to stand out and suffer the legal or social
consequences of such act.36
By the norm of border fixity, then, I mean the prohibition, on the part of most states and the
international community in general, of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory,
regardless of any internal or external conditions. Basically, I am referring to the same
phenomenon that Mark Zacher has termed "territorial integrity" and Tanisha Fazal calls
33 The definition is taken from Peter J Katzenstein, "Introduction," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and
Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 5.
34 In the sense of positive law, or de-facto.
35 For the definition of norms as moral construct see Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms,"
International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996). For a more practice-dependent approach see Robert Axelrod, "An
Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political science Review 84, no. 4 (1986). Gary Goertz,
International Norms and Decision Making: Punctuated Equilibrium Model (Lenham, Meryland: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2003).
36 For a similar approach, see Arie M. Kacowictz, The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin
American Experience, 1881-2001 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).
"territorial sovereignty." 37 Both of these terms, however, are inadequate to accurately portray the
phenomenon in question, since territorial integrity and sovereignty can be breached without
challenges to the, formal borders.
In order to clarify the term border fixity it is also important to note what cases are not
included under this phenomenon. First, since we talk about conquest and annexation, it should be
clear that political, economic, or even military interventions that do not include annexation or
intent of annexation (e.g., Syrian control of Lebanon and US occupation of Iraq) would not be
categorized as a breach of the norm. Second, since the definition talks about foreign conquest, it
also excludes cases of national unification, such as the German reunification (1990) or Vietnam's
unification (1976). Lastly, since the definition relates to cases of homeland territory, it does not
include the process (now largely finished) of de-colonization. The British did not loose their
homeland when they gave up India and neither did the Portuguese when they ceded control in
Mozambique, and thus these cases are not included as breaches of the border fixity principle.
The issue of secession is a more complicated one. While secessions are not an integral part of
the norm of border fixity, as defined here, they are not unrelated either. Opposition of the
international community to attempts of secession is usually not as fierce as that of foreign
conquests, but the norm against secessions is still a strong one. While in some special cases
certain territories were allowed to secede and create their own country (such as those in former
Yugoslavia and in East Timor), a far greater number of secession movements face a formidable
international opposition to their exit attempts. Furthermore, except for very few cases, the
borders of the smaller new states that are created after the breakup of empires (such as in Asia,
37 Tanisha M. Fazal, "The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm," in A paper presented at
the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association (San Francisco, California: August-
September 2001), Mark W. Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of
Force," International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001).
the Middle East and Africa in the 1940's- 1960's and the former Soviet Union in 1993) are
amazingly similar to existing internal (administrative) borders within the empires. Thus, while
secessions are not a part and parcel of the border fixity norm, they are regulated by a closely
related, although a bit weaker, attachment to the territorial status quo.
b) The Origins and Development of the Border Fixity Norm
The international norm of border fixity is an outgrowth of several distinct factors, some
ideational and some material, which, in the aftermath of World War II, have combined to
produce a new and effective norm. I submit that none of these factors, by itself, is sufficient to
explain the spatial and temporal adaptation and endurance of the norm. Rather, their unique
combination is what makes border fixity a globally accepted strong norm.
I. The Idea of Border Fixity
The idea that a forceful conquest does not entitle one state to annex the territory of another
state has its roots as far back as the 1 8th century, with the beginning of the theory of popular
sovereign rights. Until the 2 0 th century, however, this idea had no real political manifestation.38
This situation began to change by the end of the First World War, with Woodrow Wilson's ideas
of the desired new world order. The quarrel over borders, Wilson thought, was a major cause of
war, and Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, translating Wilson's ideas into a
legal international document, declared that "The Members of the League undertake to respect
and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
38 One exception is the application of the uti-possidetis, the principle that borders should reflect those of the pre-
existing colonial lines, which was implemented since the 19 th century in the limited scale and scope of Latin
American relations. See Kacowictz, The Impact of Norms in International Society.
independence of all Members of the League." 39 The President of the United States was by no
means intent on banning the use of force in international relations, though. In words depicting
precisely the border fixity norm, Wilson told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in
1919, "I understand that article [Article 10 of the League Covenant] to mean that no nation is at
liberty to invade the territorial integrity of another. Its territorial integrity is not destroyed by
armed intervention; it is destroyed by the retention of territory, by taking territory away from
it."40 The Kellogg-Bryan Pact and the advent of the laws of war, which increasingly declared
belligerent occupation to be a temporary condition, as well, contributed to the advance of the
idea of border fixity between the wars.
These ideas about changing the international norms with regard to borders, however, were
working at cross-currents with both power realities and other, more influential ideas (such as
isolationism in the US and fascism in Europe) of the time. Thus, the idea of border fixity utterly
failed to prevent the territorial grabs of the 1930's and War World II. The same ideas, however,
served as the glue that has cemented the new norm of border fixity, once the supporting material
conditions were in place, after the war ended.
II Material Factors and Rational Calculations
One of the most important material factors that have contributed to the development of the
phenomenon of border fixity after World War II is that the nature of the economy has changed
dramatically over time, culminating in the second half of the twentieth century. As the value of
land as a means of production decreases, and as the value of technology and the human mind as
39 http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/www/league-covenant.html
40 "A Conversation with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." August 19, 1919. Arthur Stanley
Link, ed., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966).. Cited in Fazal,
"The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm."
such a means increases, territorial conquest should become less and less important. Within the
context of the debate about the peace among advanced industrial powers, Karl Kaysen made the
case that this fundamental change in the economics of states was indeed a defining factor in
bringing about this peace.4 1 One might extrapolate from Kaysen's proposition and suggest that
the phenomenon of border fixity, as well, might be a result of the decreasing value of land; that
people are no longer trying to conquer foreign land because it is simply not worth it
(economically).
If the argument about the devaluation of land stresses the benefit side of the cost-benefit
equation, the nuclear weapons explanation concentrates on the cost side. This argument, as well,
has also been raised in the context of the debate about the lack of armed conflict among
advanced industrial states (and among the great powers in particular) since the Second World
War. Nuclear deterrence has created a situation in which no rational actor would risk going to
war with another nation who has, or might easily develop, a nuclear arsenal. Nuclear weapons,
and especially thermo-nuclear ones, have indeed changed the rules of the game in Europe and
beyond it- in relations between the nuclear powers. 42
41 Carl Kaysen, "Is War Absolute? A Review Essay," in The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, ed. Sean M.
Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 81-103. Empirically, there are very
few studies of this question, yet the one serious study which examined whether the Nazi conquests of advanced
industrial societies during WW-II paid off, has largely refuted the assertion above: the German's managed to mine
the conquered industrial states (such as France and Czechoslovakia) in a fairly efficient manner and extract
significant portion of their industrial capacity. Indeed, Peter Liberman finds that resistance was much fiercer in
rural areas, as opposed to urban and industrial ones. See Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of
Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton, New Jersy: Princeton University Press). This proposition sounds
plausible, although the empirical evidence is scarce. Yet, even if one agrees with Liberman with regard to the
Second World War occupations, he or she might still argue that in later years, when advanced economies are built
more on knowledge and less on heavy industry, Kaysen's argument would be correct.
42 See, for instance, John L. Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,"
International Security 10, no. 4 (1986), Robert Jervis, The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the
Prospect ofArmagadoon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear
Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
John Mueller, moreover, argues that even without nuclear weapons a modern war between advanced industrial
nations has become unthinkable, and not only in rational terms, but also in sub-rational ones. See John E.
Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Rochester, New York: Rochester University
Press, 1996).
Jeffrey Herbst offers yet another explanation for border fixity, which might add to our
understanding of the origins and development of the norm, in his analysis of Africa's post-
colonial stable borders. According to Herbst, African leaders, in the pre-colonial, colonial and
post-colonial eras, all faced a similar problem: how to project the power of a weak government
over huge distances of scarcely populated land and difficult terrain. The very rational solution of
the states who gain their independence in the 1960's and 1970's was, like that of their colonial
counterparts, to maintain the current (colonial) borders, arbitrary and irrational as they are. This
logic, Herbst maintains, stands at the heart of the phenomenon of Africa's leaders insistence on
clinging to their existing borders.43
The last argument that can contribute to our understanding of border fixity is that it is the
American hegemony over international affairs that created and maintained the phenomenon of
border fixity. This argument, in essence, combines ideational and material ingredients: it
recognizes the power of the norm, only maintains that the "norm entrepreneur" that is
responsible for the origination and maintenance of the norm is the United States of America.
Tanisha Fazal has been arguing along this line and using both case studies and statistical research
aiming to corroborate it.44
All of the above material factors, I submit, played an important role in the origination and
enhancement of the border fixity norm.45 In the same manner that the initial ideas of border fixity
could not be materialized in a hostile material environment, however, the material factors would
not have been sufficient, by themselves and without the "glue" of the ideational component, to
43 Herbst, States and Power in Africa.
44 Fazal, "The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm."
45 For the role of material interests and factors in the development of norm see Martha and Sikkink Finnemore,
Kathryn, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998).
create and maintain a strong norm of border fixity. Importantly, most of the material factors that
might have contributed to the development of the border fixity norm have limited geographical
applicability. The logic of Kaysen's argument about the decline of value of the land applies, for
instance, to only a portion of the states or regions of the world, the advanced industrial ones,
while the phenomenon of border fixity is almost universal. In many parts of the Developing
World land (or what lies beneath it) is still the leading factor of production, more important for
the national economy than industry. Yet, border fixity still holds, even in the oil-rich Middle East
and the parts of Africa that are endowed with gold, diamonds and other precious minerals.
Similarly, the merits of the nuclear factor in understanding the absence of war between nuclear
nations notwithstanding, as an explanation for the rise of the border fixity norm this argument
still suffers from the same limited geographical application. In nuclear-free regions, such as
Latin America and Africa, the principle of border fixity holds in the same manner that it does in
regions in which nuclear weapons have been introduced. It cannot be the case, moreover, that
these regions are protected by "extended deterrence," since war still occurs in the developing
world; just not territorial war. Herbst, on the other hand, may well be right about Africa, and the
same argument could reasonably be made also with regard to South America and some parts of
the former Soviet Union. Yet again, this logic cannot be applied universally. In the relatively
compact and well-governed Europe and in the densely populated Asia, borders nevertheless
remain almost entirely fixed.
The explanation of border fixity as a result of American hegemony is not untrue but is
insufficient. For one, while the US mostly supported the establishment and maintenance of the
border fixity norm, so did other states. Fazal notes, for instance, the difference between the 1965
American intervention in the Dominican Republic and the one in 1916.46 Yet, one could also
point to a very similar difference between Soviet behaviors in annexing the Baltic States in the
1930's and in only intervening (not annexing) Afghanistan in 1979. In addition, in order to
establish American hegemony as the most important factor in instituting the border fixity norm,
one has to see an across-the-board visible American involvement in suggesting, enforcing or
otherwise promoting the norm. While we see some cases of such a behavior (Wilson's promotion
of the principle in the League of Nation, Eisenhower's 1956 pressure on allies in the Suez Crisis,
and the 1990-91 reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), we hardly see any American influence
in other areas. For instance, Germany's recognition of its post-war boundaries was not a result of
US pressure. Similarly, Americans were hardly involved in the drafting of Africa's strong
resolution against border changes.
c) The Norm of Border Fixity: Existence and Strength
To some degree, each of the factors outlined above probably contributed to the emergence
and consolidation of the practice. These forces and logics have acted like distinct vectors
pointing to the same direction. Nevertheless, without the normative "glue," the change in the
way people (and especially elite) think about conquests and annexation, the change of practice
would have been partial and temporary. As this is not the focus of the dissertation, I do not
attempt here to evaluate the weight of the different factors. Regardless of these weights, I
maintain that today the norm of border fixity exists, over and above the factors that allowed it to
rise. By looking at the practice of states, at the institutionalization of the norm, and about speech
evidence, this section shows that border fixity is today a strong and internalized norm. Thus,
46 Tanisha M. Fazal, "From Conquest to Intervention: State, Regime, and Leader Exit," in Annual Meeting of the
International Studies Association (Honolulu, Hawaii: 2005).
even if some of the material factors mentioned above is to change (e.g., the American hegemony)
the norm still stand strong.
L Practice
In order to argue that a norm is strong, one has to show that a congruent practice is in place;
that most actors, most of the time, comply with the commands and rules which the norm
proscribes (or prohibits). To be sure, practice itself does not prove beyond doubt the existence of
a strong norm, since it could be simply a matter of coercion or rational benefit. A norm cannot be
strong, however, without a visible manifestation in terms of practice.
Conquest and annexation of one's neighbor's land was a constant feature of the state-system
since its inception in Westphalia in 1648 (as well as of most other historical systems). When
Frederick the Great of Prussia invaded Silesia (an Austrian province) in 1740, he knew that as
long as he held the power to conquer and control it, his rule in the land would not be questioned
by other states (save, perhaps, the one that lost the territory). Similarly, when the United States
annexed the huge territories on its southern and western frontiers as a result of its victory over
Mexico in the Mexican-American War of 1846-8, it needed to supply few explanations to the
international community. This was just how things were done.
In a sharp contrast to that order of things, today, as Charles Tilly writes, "the continued rise
of war couples with a fixation of international boundaries. With a few significant exceptions,
military conquest across borders has ended, states have ceased fighting each other over disputed
territory..."47 In a similar vein, Donald Horowitz has shown that cases of irredentism are rarities
47 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell,
1992), p. 203.
in our world, although the theoretical potential (for instance, due to cross border ethnic kin) for
irredentist claims is huge. 48
Mark Zacher, however, was the first one to conduct a systematic study of the changing norms
regarding borders. In a 2001 article, Zacher finds that what he termed the "territorial integrity
norm" is a very strong international norm. He finds very few exceptions to the rule that conquest
and annexation of other states' territories is no longer viewed as a legitimate act. 49 Tanisha Fazal
largely corroborates Zacher's empirical findings, though her work advances a different causal
explanation for the rise of this norm, which she calls the norm of "territorial sovereignty." 50
Table 2: Conquest and Annexation of Homeland Territory, 1815-2000
Year Cases of Military Conquest
1816-1850 13
1851-1900 57
1901-1950 34
1951-2000 10
Source: Correlates of War Database, in Tir, Jaroslav, Philip F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz, 1998. "Territorial
Changes, 1816-1996." Conflict Management and Peace Science 16: 89-97. With modification to extend the
data to 2000. The definition does not include brief occupations, which were promptly reversed by either the
belligerents or by other powers (e.g., Iraqi annexation of Kuwait in 1991).
Indeed, as Table 2 shows, there were very few cases of foreign military conquest of
homeland territory since 1950 (in comparison to earlier periods of the territorial state system).
The use of the term "homeland territory" comes in order to control for cases of de-colonization
48 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 229-88. See
also Ian Lustick, "The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political Backwardness in Historical
Perspective," International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): pp. 653-83.
49 Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm."
50 Fazal, "The Origins and Implications of the Territorial Sovereignty Norm." Fazal's causal explanation, the
American hegemony, is discussed below.
and breakup of empires, which are territorial changes but are not included in the norm in
question here. Considering the fact that the first period in the table is only 35 years and that in
1850 the state system included only 39 states, as compared to 197 states in 2000, this data is all
the more impressive, under the assumption that a system with more states in it is likely to
produce more territorial conflicts.
In order to account for these factors, therefore, I take two steps. The first one is to divide the
number of conquests and annexation by the number of the recognized states in the state system
(those which are counted in the data). Thus, one can compute the average number of conquests
and annexations per state for each period. The result is shown in Figures 1.
Figure 1: Conquest and Annexation of Homeland Territory
Per State, 1815-2000
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* Data Source: Correlates of War Database, in Tir, Jaroslav, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Gary
Goertz. "Territorial Changes, 1816-1996." Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 16 (1998), pp.
89-97 (adjusted to include 1997-2000 data and to fit my definitions).
As the number of states in the system does not necessarily reflects the actual chances of
engaging in territorial war, however (Peru and Norway are unlikely, for instance, to engage in a
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territorial war), I take here another step. Figure 2 below portrays the number of conquests per
decade, divided by the number of contiguous dyads (that is, states that share a common land
border) existing in the international system for the same decade. Thus, it presents the average
chances of neighboring states to engage in a war against each other that results in a conquest and
annexation.
Figure 2: Conquest and Annexation of Homeland Territory
Per Contiguous Dyad, 1820-2000
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* Data Source: Data taken from the Correlates od War project. Data on number of conquests and
annexations: Tir, Jaroslav, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz. "Territorial Changes, 1816-
1996." Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 16 (1998), pp. 89-97 (adjusted to include 1997-2000
data and to fit my definitions). Data on contiguous dyads: Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip
Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman. "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data,
Version 3," Conflict Management and Peace Science 19 (2), pp. 58-66.
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As these figures reveal, incidents of foreign conquests and annexations of homeland territory,
declining from the beginning of the 2 0 th century, decreased dramatically since 1950.51 The ten
cases of conquest are: Israel from Syria, 1967; Israel from Jordan, 1967; Israel from Egypt,
1967; Iran from the UAE, 1971; India from Pakistan, 1971; Libya from Chad, 1973; Israel from
Syria, 1973; Turkey from Cyprus, 1973; China from South Vietnam, 1974; and Armenia from
Azerbaijan 1991-4 (a border case between foreign conquest and secession). Since the mid
1970's, moreover, only one case could qualify for this category (Armenia since the early
1990's). The vast majority of the states, almost all the time, then, practice border fixity.
Beyond the direct evidence of state practice, moreover, the reaction to the breach of a norm
can serve as important evidence to its strength. The way states reacted to gross violations of the
norm of border fixity, then, can tell us some important thing about the degree to which the norm
is internalized. In 1956, when Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt after the latter
nationalized the Suez Canal, the reaction of the world was mixed. While the Eastern Block and
most Non-Allied states opposed the tripartite move, of course, some Western states supported it
(notably Germany). What was surprising, however, is the reaction of the United States. Although
an ally of Britain and France, and not on good terms with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-
Nasser, the US condemned the invasion and demanded an immediate secession of hostilities and
(Israeli) withdrawal to the international borders. Britain, France and Israel had to give in to the
American pressure and withdraw their forces.52
The international (and American) reaction to Israel's conquests of 1967 (the Gaza Strip and
the Sinai Desert from Egypt, East Jerusalem and the West bank from Jordan and the Golan
51 Zacher's figures are only slightly different, since he looks for cases which actually resulted in territorial change,
and does include changes in "non-homeland" territories (thus, for instance Iraq's conquest of Kuwait is excluded
while India's conquest of Goa is included). See Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," p. 218.
52 See, for instance, Donald Neff, Worriers at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (New York:
Linden Press, 1981).
Heights from Syria) was much milder, since many perceived it a defensive war on the part of
Israel. This reaction, though, is still instructive. While Israel's allies, and the US in particular, did
not demand an immediate return to the status quo ante, non of them recognized Israel's claims to
these territories. Although Israel officially annexed East Jerusalem 53 and the Golan Heights (in
accordance to its own domestic laws), not a single other state accepted these changes as legal.54
In its peace accords with Egypt, Israel was compelled to return every inch of Egyptian territory.
While it is anyone's guess what future Syrian-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli agreements would
look like, a significant deviation from 1967's borders is unlikely. This is so regardless of the fact
that there is no doubt about Israel's military superiority in the region, a fact that a century ago
would have most likely resulted in a legitimating of its territorial expansion. The international
community has responded similarly also to India's territorial gains in its 1971 war with Pakistan,
to the Turkish occupation of part of Cyprus (1974 to present), to the Chinese 1979 war with
Vietnam, and to Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabach (from Azerbaijan, 1991-present). 55
Indeed, "so strong has the prevalent bias toward the status quo ante become that it prevailed even
in those cases when the defeated plainly did not have any ability to eject the victor."56
By 1990 the norm of border fixity was much stronger, and the international reaction to Iraq's
conquest and annexation of Kuwait was similarly more decisive. What was remarkable about the
reaction to Iraq's invasion, however, was its scope. Not less important is the participation of
most of Iraq's Arab neighbors (17 out of 21 states) within the Coalition forces. To be sure, that
some of the Arab states have joined the international coalition that repelled Iraq from Kuwait
53 Note that Ian Lustick argues Israel never actually did annex Jerusalem, since it decided on a municipal, rather than
the national, Border. See Ian S. Lustick, "Reinventing Jerusalem," Foreign Policy 93 (1993-1994).
54 Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 250-60, Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," pp. 231-32.
55 Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State, p. 352, Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," pp. 228-29.
56 Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State, p. 352.
could be interpreted solely in terms of balance of power. One should not take lightly, however,
the tremendous challenges that an Arab state faces when aligning with the West against a fellow
Arab state. 57 That they were able to do so, I submit, owes at least partially to the strength of the
prohibition against conquest and annexation of other states. Moreover, even those few states that
supported Iraq's move (e.g., Jordan, Yemen, Cuba and Sudan) did not recognize Iraq's
annexation of Kuwait. 58 Both primary and secondary practice, then, confirms the existence and
strength of the border fixity norm.
Finally, American and EU positions in the crisis in former Yugoslavia fit this pattern as well:
while recognizing the secessions, the Western Powers insisted that all sides would accept their
boundaries at the time of secession, which they finally did the 1995 Dayton Peace Conference,
and in the Bilateral treaties signed between Serbia and Croatia and Serbia and Bosnia.59
II. Words
The words of people, and certainly those of politicians, often do not accurately reflect what
they think and definitely not what they do. Words and narrative, however, do play an important
role in public life and they do often represent what is accepted (or normal) to say in a given
society. Speech evidence with regard to the question of borders, therefore, is an important
indicator for the existence and strength of the norm. In this sense, one can observe a striking
historical difference in the way elites understand the reality and the norms with regard to borders,
with the watershed being somewhere in the early 1950's.
57 Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," p. 231. On Arab considerations and difficulties in aligning with the
West see Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): pp. 233-56.
58 Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State, p. 353.
59 Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," pp. 224-28.
In an 1869 speech, answering a plea by a Polish delegation to the Prussian Parliament, the
German Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck, proclaimed, "Gentlemen, if. you contest the right of
conquest, you cannot have read the history of your own country. It is thus that states are
formed."60 Bismarck, uttering these words many years before Charles Tilly's famous dictum that
"war made the state and the state made war,"61 was right. Conquest and annexation of one's
neighbors land was the norm rather than the exception. In a his 1905 book, Frontiers, Lord
Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, reflects on the passing century: "The majority of the most
important wars of the century," Curzon writes, "have been Frontier wars. Wars of religion, of
alliances, of rebellion, of aggrandisement, of dynastic intrigue or ambition ... tend to be replaced
by Frontier wars, i.e. wars arising out of the expansion of states and kingdoms..." 62
At the dawn of the twentieth century, then, it appeared that territorial wars and border
changes were, if anything, on the rise, and certainly legitimate. Yet, it took only a few more
years for ideas to start to change. As discussed before, Wilson and his contemporaries failed, of
course, to bring about the desired change in state practices. Yet, the idea of border fixity has
started to take root and as the guns on WW-II fell quiet, a very different norm was taking shape,
although slowly and gradually. Thus, By 1971, another German Chancellor's words sounded
very differently from those of Bismarck: In his Nobel Prize for Peace lecture, Chancellor Willy
Brandt asserted, "Looking at the matters from the realities of the situation, that meant not
questioning any one's territorial integrity but rather recognizing the inviolability of frontiers."63
Similar sentiments are reflected by the words of other important world leaders, perhaps nowhere
60 Quoted in Korman, The Right of Conquest, p. X.
61 Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in The Formation of National States in
Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).62 George Nathaniel Curzon, Frontiers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907).
63 See Willy Brandt, Peace Policy in Our Time (Nobel Lecture) at:
[http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/peacellaureates/1971/brandt-lecture-e.html]. Accessed: 8/3/2006
more eloquently than in the words of US President Bill Clinton. "This era," President Clinton
asserted, does not reward people who struggle in vain to redrew borders with blood."64
It is often the case that when a norm is internalized to a sufficient degree, one is hard pressed
to see verbal expressions of the normative ideas. When the norm is breached, however, these
expressions are easier to detect. One such rare opportunity was the Iraqi conquest and annexation
of Kuwait in 1990. "If we let [the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait] succeed," Former British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher said, "no small country can ever feel safe again. The law of the
jungle takes over." 65 "Dictators," she declared somewhere else, "must be stopped. They must
not be able to march into other peoples' territory, rule their lives, take away their whole mode of
existence and just get away with it."66 James Baker, the American Secretary of States, expressed
similar feelings: "Let no nation think it can devour another nation and the United States will
somehow turn a blind eye. Let no dictator believe that we are deaf to the tolling of the bell as our
fundamental principles are attacked."6 7 Baker also responded in a similar way to the war in
former Yugoslavia: "The United States and the rest of the international community will reject
any Serbian claims to territory beyond its borders."68
II. Institutionalization
Ideas do not fly in the air, however, and even a very good and convincing idea needs some
form of institutionalization in order to spread and take root. When one assesses the strength of
norms, their degree of institutionalization is, therefore, a crucial factor. Without being
64 William J. Clinton, "Remarks by the President in Greeting to the Peoples of Pakistan," ed. the Office of Press
Secretary White House (March 25, 2000).
65 Tanisha M. Fazal, "Violating the Norm against Conquest: The Iraqi Annexation of Kuwait," (Columbia
University, 2003), p. 40.66 "Front Line", PBS, Oral History- on Gulf War, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gultforal/thatcher/1 .html
67 Fazal, "Violating the Norm against Conquest: The Iraqi Annexation of Kuwait," p. 40.
68 Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," p. 228.
institutionalized, norms are more fragile and easier to change. Institutionalization, especially of
the formal kind, makes the norm more "sticky" and resistant to alteration.
The UN Charter (1945), its system of trusteeship and later resolutions (mainly those
regarding de-colonization and self-determination) gave the principle powerful legal backing.69
Article 2(3) in Chapter I of the UN Charter, for instance, declares that all members should
"refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state..." and the General Assembly Resolution 2625 of
1970 declares that "No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat of use of force shall be
recognized as legal." Note that war and the use of force per se are not completely prohibited by
the UN Charter (under certain circumstances, notably self -defense and collective security, war
is permissible). Territorial annexation, however, is prohibited even as a result of a just war- that
is, a war of self-defense. 70
Regional agreements echoed these principles, and, in some instances, went beyond them.
Early post-war regional charters, such as these of the Arab League (1945) and the Organization
of American States (1948) mention the territorial integrity of members, but do not emphasize it.
Later declarations of regional organizations, however, make this principle a center stage. The
1963 Organization of African Unity (OAU), includes article 3, which strongly support territorial
integrity. At the OAU's Assembly of Heads of States and Government at the following year, a
resolution was accepted, as a reaction to Moroccan and Somali breach of the border fixity
principle, which called all members "to respect the borders existing on the achievement of
national independence." All the African states, apart from Morocco and Somalia, supported the
69 Korman, The Right of Conquest, pp. 133-99.
70 For such an interpretation of the international low, see Ibid., pp. 199-214.
resolution. 71 The successor of the OAU, the African Union (AU), in its 2000 constitutive act,
lists the respect of the borders existing on achievement of independence as one of its most
important principles (second only to independence and sovereignty). The CSCE's The Helsinki
Final Act, which was signed in 1975 by 35 European and North American states, including both
NATO and Warsaw Pact states, declares that "The participating States regard as inviolable all
one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will
refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain
from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any
participating State."72 Both the EU and NATO demanded that East European states that aspire to
join the organizations in the 1990's will peacefully resolve and conclude accords with
neighboring states about any outstanding territorial conflicts, prior to their acceptance. 73
Let me sum up the argument made thus far. Even though it is a relatively "young," in terms
of human history (about half a century), border fixity is today a strong international norm. The
vast majority of the states, with very few exceptions, adhere to this norm. While a number of
economic, political and technologic factors have contributed to the creation of conditions
amenable to the rise of the norm and its maintenance, the change of ideas and perceptions about
borders has been the critical factor. To wit, the practice of border fixity today does not rely
anymore on any of the material conditions that might have been part of its development.
Territorial expansion is just not on the menu of choice for the 2 1st century state.
71 Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," p. 222.
72 See Helsinki Final Act, Chapter III, Available at: [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdfJ
accessed on 8/3/2006
73 Zacher, "The Territorial Integrity Norm," p. 222.
Chapter 2: Weak States and Norms of Borders
A. The Socio-Political Strength of States
The international norm of border fixity has very significant effects in terms of international
relations. These effects, however, are hardly similar across the globe. This chapter argues that
variations in states' socio-political strength greatly influence the way they are affected by the
border fixity norm. It argues that for these states the norm of border fixity has negative effects on
the prospects of state building and subsequently also on their relations with their neighbors. I
first define and discuss the term "socio-political strength" of the state. Second, I discuss the
effects of territorial threats and opportunities on the process of state building in a flexible borders
world (i.e., in the absence of the border fixity norm). Lastly, I explore the differences that result
from the introduction of this new norm to international politics. In this vein, I look at both the
effects on the state building process and on the state's relations with its neighbors. In the course
of this chapter I also present five hypotheses, which will direct the course of the investigation in
the empirical chapters.
All states share some common features. Yet the sense in which states are "like-units" is very
restricted. 74 Apart from a thin layer of ostensibly similar form, state's internal characteristics
vary in a way that often affects the way in which a state reacts to its external environment.
Domestic characteristics that influence a state's conduct towards its external surrounding are
74 Structural (or Neo) realism, a strong tradition in the study of international relations, treats states as "like-units," in
the sense that they are all autonomous political units that face similar tasks (though they differ markedly in their
abilities to perform these tasks). First and foremost among these tasks is safeguarding the survival of the states in
an anarchic world. See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2001), pp. 29-54, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 93-97. This approach to the study of world politics certainly has its merits. It is
highly parsimonious and based purely on structure and therefore one does not need to bother oneself with the
intricacies of the politics of agents and with interaction between structure and agents.
many, and may vary from military, to economic, to social structures.7 5 Without discounting the
importance of these features, the current research focuses on a different internal attribute of
states, and one that is crucial to their relations with their neighbors: socio-political strength.
There is no consensus in political science about the concept of state strength. Among
scholars of international relations, state strength is often synonymous with power: military,
economic, or otherwise. In comparative politics literature, the term state strength usually
signifies the comparative position of the central government's institutions vis-a-vis their civil
society. Joel Migdal, for example, defines the strength of states according to their "capacity to
penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use
resources in determined ways."76
Both of these conceptions of state strength are useful and often justified by the nature of the
research in which they are applied. Both, however, are too narrow for my purposes. The
international relations definition is narrow in the sense that it does not include all relevant
subjects of strength/weakness. Thus, for instance, present-day Russia would be a stronger state
than the Netherlands according to the IR definition, but not to mine. The definition of
comparative politics, on the other hand, is narrow in the sense that it does not conceive the civil
society as a part of the state. In this literature, for instance, the United States is considered a
75 Realists stress the importance of military capabilities, e.g. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
Others emphasize the importance of the economic structure. See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern
World System, 3 vols. (New York and Orlando, Florida: Academic Press, 1974-1988). Still others stress the
differing cultures, see, e.g., Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,"
in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J Katzenstein (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996).
76 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 4-5. See also Peter J Katzenstein, Between Power and
Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1987).
weak state, 77 a notion that does not fit my purposes either. I suggest marrying the more holistic
view of the state in international relations literature with the deeper view of comparative politics
(and sociology). The result should include the entirety of the state, but also look at relations
between the different components of the state in order to determine its strength.
Barry Buzan suggests a simple model of the state that is more in this line of thinking. His
model consists of three basic components. The first component is its physical base: its
population, territory, natural resources and man-made resources. The second is the state's
institutional expression: its governmental machinery, including executive, legislative,
administrative and judicial bodies, as well as the norms, laws, and procedures by which they
operate. The third component is the idea of the state. "In a properly constituted state," Buzan
tells us, "one should expect to find a distinctive idea of some sort which lies at the heart of the
state's political identity. What does the state exist to do? Why is it there? What is its relation to
the society it contains? Why does a state have a particular size and form, when a glance at any
historical atlas will reveal a variety of possible alternatives?" 78
Kalevi Holsti adds to Buzan's model by maintaining the importance to this scheme of the
notion of legitimacy. Legitimacy is of crucial importance to both the institutional base of the
state and to its ideational one. Legitimacy, Holsti notes, can be summed into two general
dimensions, vertical and horizontal. The first establishes the relations between society, political
institutions and regimes (the 'right to rule'), while the second defines the boundaries and criteria
for membership (who is included and who excluded) in the political community.79 In other
words, in a strong state one should find not only a legitimate and functioning governmental
77 See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, "Policy Making in a Weak State," in American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays,
ed. G. John Ikenberry (New York: Harper Collins, 1989).
78 Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Rienner, 1991), pp. 57-111. Quotation from p. 70.
9 Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 82 -9 8 .
mechanism but also a degree of cohesiveness as a society and identification with the state as
such. Thus, to the extent that a state possesses these two components - functioning institutions
and social cohesiveness - it is a strong state. To the extent that it does not - it is socio-politically
weak.
I define the socio-political strength of the state, then, as the capacity of the state to maintain a
monopoly over legitimate use of force, its ability to rule effectively over its society (including
extracting sufficient revenue and providing sufficient public goods), and its ability to maintain a
reasonable level of social cohesiveness and identification of its residents with the state as such.80
The stronger the state, therefore, the stronger will be its performance in the following criteria: (1)
preservation of a monopoly over the use of legitimate force; (2) the level of taxation and other
means of revenue extraction; (3) efficiency and control of state bureaucracy; (3) reach and
breadth of state institutions, in areas such as courts and education system; (4) extent and
geographic location (i.e., distance from center) of public spending; (5) cohesiveness of the
society and level of identification of the residents with their state as such. The following two
sections discuss the way socio-politically weak states are affected by different perceptions of
borders, or different international norms regarding borders.
B. International Conflict and State Building in a Flexible Borders' World
One cannot fully comprehend the effects of the border fixity norm on weak states in today's
world without grasping the crucial effects that territorial wars have played in the process of state
building since the early modern period (as early as the 16 th century for some parts of Europe).
Hence, this state system, in which foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory was a
so For fairly similar use of state strength see Ibid., Definition in pp. 82-83. and Robert I Rotberg, "Failed States,
Collapsed States: Causes and Indicators," in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I.
Rotberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003).
legitimate practice (henceforth "flexible borders' world ") is the subject of this section, while the
following section is devoted to the effects of the change in border norms, i.e., the border fixity
world. It is, then, time to present the first hypothesis (The paths a state can take and their likely
consequences are illustrated in Figure 3 below):
Hypothesis 1: A world in which there is no normative prohibition on conquest and
annexation (flexible borders' world) is likely to result, over time, in socio-politically stronger
states.
Figure 3: Flexible Borders' Word- Effects on Weak States
E!eState
Why should a flexible borders' world affect the process of state building? I posit that such a
world provides states with incentives and opportunities to develop stronger and more capable
institutions, and that it creates pressures that often translate into the achievement of a more
cohesive society. Moreover, when states do not react in keeping with these incentives and
pressures, they frequently have to face "punishments," in the form of territorial losses or even
elimination of the state altogether. These three components of the Hypothesis 1 are discussed
below.
a) Flexible Borders and the Strength of the State Institutions
In terms of the institutional facet, state strength can be greatly enhanced by external
territorial threats. The "bellicist theory,"8' which served initially to explain the political
development of states in early modem Europe, can serve as our starting point. Although the
original argument of the theory comes from Otto Hintze, it was mainly developed by the work of
Charles Tilly, and further elaborated in several other important studies. 82 Put simply, the idea is
that external geopolitical pressures- war and the threat of war - on a territorial entity, requires
mobilization, and the larger and more comprehensive this threat, the greater the degree of
mobilization needed. Mobilization means more extraction of resources and more recruitment of
soldiers. While this new stream of power might enable the central authority to thwart the external
threat, it can also serve as a means to ensure future financing (often by coercion) and greater
centralization of power. Moreover, a bigger military needs a larger and more effective
administrative capacity that might, especially given the newly acquired power of the state,
spillover to civilian functions as well. This process, then, is a self-enforcing one, and possessed
of a powerful internal logic. Note that this logic is not limited to external threats. It might as well
apply, although perhaps to a lesser degree, to opportunities of territorial expansion, which could
also supply the needed incentives and means for mobilization. 8
81 I borrow the name from Miguel A. Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America
(University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 2002).82 Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early
Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building
States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Otto
Hintze, "The Formation of the State and Constitutional Development: A Study in History and Politics," in The
Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), Tilly, Coercion,
Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992, Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making."
83 Max Weber makes such an argument in Max Weber, "The Prestige and Power of the Great Powers," in From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).
International war, many students of early modern Europe agree, played a major role in the
political development of the European states and in particular in strengthening these states and
making them more cohesive. As Tilly argues, "war made the state and the state made war."84
State building in early modem Europe was facilitated by the "military revolution," "the process
whereby small, decentralized, self-equipped feudal hosts were replaced by increasingly large,
centrally financed and supplied armies that equipped themselves with ever more sophisticated
and expensive weaponry.""8 This "revolution" occurred in south Europe in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries and gradually expanded westward, northward and eastward, making fighting
wars a more expensive and more intensive business.8 6 The development of standing armies
profoundly increased the need of states to extract resources from their society and, at the same
time, greatly enhanced their ability to coerce their population in order to achieve these means.
This change in the need for extraction necessitated the creation of new and more efficient
bureaucracies to manage taxation and distribute resources. Where these efforts succeeded, they
did not disappear after the war ended. The administrative innovations strengthened the state in a
permanent way, and, in the long run, spilled over to include ever-increasing functions and served
much more than the narrow military function that they were created to fill.87
It is important to note, though, that these changes, this process of state formation, was largely
unintended: "No one designed the principle components of national states - treasuries, courts,
84 Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," p. 42.
85 Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, pp. 10. Revolution and Political Change, p. 10.
86 Ibid., pp. 61-74, Samuel E. Finer, "State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," in The
Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975),
pp. 103-06, Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 20-37,
William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 63-125.
87 Gabriel Ardent, "Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations," in The Formation
of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1975), Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, Tilly,
"Reflections on the History of European State-Making."
central administration, and so on. The usually formed as more or less inadvertent by-product of
efforts to carry out more immediate tasks, especially the creation and support of armed forces."88
b) Flexible Borders and State Cohesiveness
Second, a common external threat could forge a common internal identity. As we know from
extensive research in social psychology and sociology, people often find belonging to a group
(the "in-group") to be a good vehicle for fulfilling their personal needs (such as gaining self-
esteem and affection). Yet membership in one group is also defined in negative terms, i.e., not
belonging to another group (the "out-group"). Moreover, stereotypes, discrimination, and even
hostility among groups frequently develop even in the absence of any substantial grounds.
Hostility towards the "out-group," it seems, is often the preferred strategy that groups develop in
order to bolster their own "in-group" cohesiveness. 89 Of course, the same logic should work even
better when the conflict of interests with outside groups is real and not only imagined. Thus, the
more a group as a whole is faced with threats to their existence from outside, the more they tend
to "rally round the flag" and achieve internal cohesion. 90 On the other hand, opportunities for
88 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992, p. 26.
89 See, for example, Henry and Turner Tajfel, John C., "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior," in
Psychology in Intergroup Relations, ed. Stephen Worchel, and Austin, William G. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986),
pp. 7-24. For a more sociological view, see Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliation (New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955). and Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Illinois: 1956).
90 Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 8 7 -1 10. For the effects of both international and domestic (ethnic)
conflict on group identity, see Janice Gross Stein, "Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict," in
Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Hampson, Fen
Olster, Aall, Pamela (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), pp. 18 9 -2 0 8 . Michael C.
Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?" International Organization 50, no. 2 (1996): pp. 247-48.
One example of such a process is the effect of external threats on Israeli society. Israel, one of the few cases in the
post-WWII world in which the legitimacy of the state's existence is still questioned by its neighbors, managed to
create a strongly cohesive society out of very divergent populations. One of the main reasons for this success of
the Israeli "melting-pot" was the external threat. Once this threat receded, after 1967, the cohesiveness of the
society did not advance much further. Michael N. Barnett, Confronting the Cost of War: Military Power, State,
and Society in Egypt and Israel
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
territorial expansion can also serve to strengthen the bonds of a society, as they can elevate its
view of itself and might be tied to perceptions of "manifest destiny."91
Not every war, though, exerts similar pressure on states. As Lewis Coser tells us, in order for
external threat to induce internal cohesion it needs to be perceived as a threat to the group as a
whole.92 By definition, non-territorial wars cannot endanger the survival of the state as such.
Moreover, even if a territorial war is not aiming at eliminating the state as a political entity
altogether, it is still more likely to be perceived as a threat to the population of the state as a
whole: though the regime or some groups in the population might be in danger, it is much harder
to "sell" this attack as an assault on the collective in-group.
Public and elite acceptance of an increased fiscal burden and increased central control,
critical components of state building, are unlikely to be a result of civil wars, for instance. One
recent study of the political economy of internal wars argues that "Unlike the war economies of
classical war, civil war economies rarely contribute to state capacity and economic
development.""93 Similarly, another recent study, employing statistical methods, finds no relations
between internal war and the states' extractive capacity.94 Similarly, in circumstances involving a
conjuncture of civil conflict with international intervention, people are more likely to view the
outside intervention as hurting some groups but helping others. In other words, the drive for the
regime to try to mobilize resources from its population is still there even in a non-territorial war,
91 See Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I.
Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988). Eugen J. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of
Rural France, 1870-1914. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 159-62.
92 Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 93-95.
93 Karen Ballentine, and Sherman, Jake, "Introduction," in The Political Economy ofArmed Conflict: Byond Greed
and Grievance, ed. Karen and Sherman Ballentine, Jake (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003).
94See Cameron G. Thies, "State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial Developing
Countries Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000," International Studies Quarterly 48 (2004).
yet the ideational component, the "in-group-out-group" collective perception necessary for the
long-term mobilization, might be lacking in such situations.95
The wars in early modern Europe were so effective as an engine of state building precisely
because they threatened the states' territories. As such, these wars accentuated in-group-out-
group emotions and attachments. In the long run, a state that is built solely on coercion is
unlikely to survive, but the wars in early modern Europe, being territorial wars, provided states
with at least a minimal degree of legitimacy and minimal identification of its population with the
state, as the threat they posed was not limited to a certain group or to the ruler (as many wars in
the Middle Ages were). To be sure, talking about national identity prior to the French Revolution
would be anachronistic. Yet a certain degree of identification with the state did exist in some
European societies even prior to this date, albeit predominantly on the elite level. This more
cohesive identity was arguably important to the survivability of the institutional reforms
discussed above.
c) Flexible Borders and "Natural" Selection
In a flexible borders' world, weak states, over time, are more likely to be "selected out" (i.e.,
taken over) by stronger ones. The two reasons that posit external pressures and opportunities as
causes of state strength, the institutional and the legitimation, are not competing; rather, they are
complementary. When a state is under threat, it needs to mobilize both its institutional powers
(create a more efficient bureaucracy, raise more taxes) and its social cohesiveness (in-group-out-
group notions) in order to survive. Moreover, neither of these reasons why territorial war often
95 Here I diverge from the idea put forth by Jeffrey Herbst, "War and State in Africa," International Security 14, no.
4 (1990). and by Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?" Herbst and Desch argue that the lack of
international wars (of any kind) is what weakens the Third World states, whereas I maintain that only a particular
kind of war, a war of territorial conquest, has this kind of effect.
promotes states' strength should be applied automatically in an instrumental way. While war, on
its face, provides incentives to change, the decision whether to do so and in what way is up to
political decision makers, and to their followers. Still, war often is the final arbiter between
correct (self-empowering) decisions and wrong (self-defeating) ones.96
The argument that is made here, therefore, is not a functionalist one. It is not that states
necessarily supply the need, apparent in the modern territorial era, of providing a strong and
centralized security. 97 The external environment of the state system is seldom very transparent or
easy to interpret. Even when rulers do read "correctly" the message sent by their external
environment, they often find it too hard or too costly to implement. The argument is that they
might or might not "read" these signals that their external environment sends; but if they read it
wrongly, they are unlikely to survive the fierce territorial competition.
Students of early modern Europe do not necessarily agree on the precise effects that external
threats and opportunities had on the type of the future regime of the state (or whether such
effects were actually exerted). However, little dissent exists concerning the effect of these
threats, as described above, on state building per se. Even Hendrik Spruyt, who locates the rise of
the: modern state at an earlier era, and places much more emphasis on the economy than on the
military revolution, agrees that military effectiveness served, in the last account, as an arbiter
between the various forms of political organization, and eventually gave the national state an
upper hand over its rival forms, the city-state and city league. 98 In such a way, international war
(and especially territorial war) eventually "made" the decision between the "national state" and
96 Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, pp. 32-33, Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad
990-1992, Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making." pp. 32-33. For a discussion of the
imperatives of the anarchical state system and the ensuing "natural selection" among states, see Waltz, Theory of
International Politics.
97 For an argument of this sort, see Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State."
98 Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, pp.31-32.
its rival political institutions, as well as between states. Those political entities that could master
both the material wherewithal and the ability to mobilize their resources and populations
survived. The map of Europe from the 1 5th century until the end of the Second World War has
seen constant changes and those who could not compete effectively often fell to the sidelines of
history. As Tilly points out, the number of "states," or independent political entities, that existed
in Europe at the start of the 16th century depends on one's definitions of "independent." Tilly
suggests that, regardless of the definition, no less than 80 and no more than 500 such entities
existed in Europe at the time In 1900 there were only 25. 99 Tanisha Fazal finds that the
occurrence of "state death," defined as "a formal loss of foreign policy making power to another
state," has been frequent throughout history. Almost 25% of the states that existed in the system
since 1816 have "died," most of them violently, and this number is much higher for previous
generations. Since WW-II, however, cases of violent "state death" are a rarity. 100
Although the research and theorizing on state building concentrates on early modern Europe,
there is no reason to assume that a similar logic cannot be applied, perhaps with some
modifications, to other times and places. Indeed, what little research that was done outside of
European confines tends to prove the point made above, rather than refute it. Victoria Hui, for
instance, examined geo-political pressures and state mobilization in the "warring states" period
of ancient China, and finds that, far from being oblivious to the threats and incentives of power,
the process of "natural selection" worked even more profoundly on Chinese states of the period,
allowing one (Qin) to conquer the rest and become an empire, by way of self-empowering
99 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992, p. 45. See also Miguel A. Centeno, "Blood and
Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," American Journal of Sociology 102, no. 6 (1997),
Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making."
'00 See Tanisha M. Fazal, "State Death in the International System," International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): p.
320.
tactics.101 Both Miguel Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves examine the effects of war on state
building in 19 th century Latin America. While there are important differences between these two
authors, they agree that war did play a significant role in this process, and that the levels of
geopolitical pressure largely correspond with the levels of state building. 102 In the Middle East,
Michael Barnett studies the (exceptional for this period) territorial pressures and territorial wars
between Israel and Egypt, and notes their profound effects on state building mechanisms in these
two states.10 3 The logic of the bellicist theory, then, does not apply solely to early modern
Europe.
A world in which the norm of border fixity does not exist; in which territorial threats and
opportunities abound, then, is likely to result over time in states that are socio-politically
stronger. What should be the observable implications of this proposition, as put forth in
Hypothesis 1? What are the features, in other words, that we should look for when examining the
empirical cases that are drawn of this world, of 17 th century Brandenburg-Prussia and 19 th
century Argentina? The observable implications that are inferred from the discussion above are
listed here'4:
1. The states should be weak to begin with. Hence, one should observe the state as
having no effective monopoly over the legitimate use of violence; weak state institutions, with
limited geographic reach and limited subject areas of engagement; limited ability to extract
101 Tin-Bor Victoria Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient
China and Early Modern Europe," International Organization 58, no. 1 (2004).
102 Centeno, Blood and Debt, Fernando Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2000).
103 Barnett, Confronting the Cost of War.
104 Note that these observable implications do not include the verification of the process, discussed above, of states
being "selected out" of the state system as "punishment" for their enduring weakness. The reason for this
omission is that the current research is built around case studies of states, not of the system, and it does not
include a study of a state that failed this process in the era of flexible borders. For such a study (of Poland), see
Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, pp. 140-56.
resources from its residents; limited supply of public goods; and a low level of social
cohesiveness and identification with the state.
2. Borders should indeed be given to change and that conquest and annexation should be
common practices in the area and time frame under investigation. Moreover, these conditions
should be translated into strong and consistent territorial pressures: territorial threats and
territorial opportunities.
3. The need of the state to defend or expand its territories should manifest itself in
attempts of the central authority to create an ever-expanding military force, to suppress other
sources of military ability (militia, feudal forces, etc.), and to strive for a monopoly over the
legitimate use of force. Moreover, the central authority should be willing to take considerable
political and economic risks in order to fulfill these conditions.
4. There should be a direct link between territorial pressures and military expansion, on
the one hand, and taxation on the other hand. The greater the territorial threats (and therefore the
need to sustain a bigger military), the greater the efforts given to extraction should be. Moreover,
we should also observe the willingness of the government to usurp the taxation authority of other
bodies (towns, nobles) and place it in its own hand, using force if need be.
5. There should be a link between the degree of territorial pressures and the degree of
bureaucratic innovations and expansion (both geographic and in terms of subject areas) of state
administration. Furthermore, a process in which bureaucratic innovation starts with direct link to
the military but spills over to civilian administration should be observed. Areas of administrative
expansion could include, but are not limited to, the judicial system, public education, and census.
6. The greater burden on the state's residents should be translated into more vocal
demands, and over time also more state consent to, greater provision of public goods. These
public goods would most probably vary with historical era, cultural traits and economic
conditions, but they might include investment in infrastructure, social services, and political
rights.
7. Greater territorial threats and, to a lesser extent, territorial opportunities, should be
manifest in a higher degree of social cohesiveness and identification with the state. We should
observe fewer attempts of secession, rebellion, or internal violent strife, fewer cases of alignment
with outside forces against one's own state, and more manifestations of patriotism and rallying
round the flag.
C. State Weakness and International Conflict in a Border Fixity World
In a flexible borders world, then, weak states face strong territorial pressures, both threats
and opportunities, which force them either to transform themselves into stronger socio-political
entities, or to face the consequences of not having done so. In contrast, weak states face nothing
of the kind in a world in which the prevailing norm is border fixity. In regions where most states
are weak (as defined above), the border fixity norm might have adverse consequences for both
domestic and international relations. I posit that this norm is likely to perpetuate and exacerbate
state weakness, since it deprives the state of a key factor that was historically a motor of state
building: the external threat to its borders and its survival. The norm of border fixity, thus, is at
least partially responsible for the increasing phenomenon of state failure and weakness. Weak
states in a state system that espouse the norm of border fixity, in turn, are often a source of
international conflict. Rather than improving the chances of peace, then, the norm of border
fixity actually fosters conflict in some parts of the word. The logic of this argument is illustrated
in Figure 4 below. As argued in the chapter above, today's world is largely one in which the
norm of border fixity prevail. This section discusses the effects of this norm on states' strength in
regions where most states were weak (or not yet existed) when the new norm started to take
shape, after World War II. It then relates this weakness to international conflict.
Figure 4: Border Fixity Effects for Weak States
Foreign
Predation
a) Border Fixity and the Perpetuation and Exacerbation of State Weakness
Hypothesis 2: The border fixity norm is likely to perpetuate or even exacerbate the weakness
of already weak states.
Fixed borders do not cause states to be weak in the first place, but they might perpetuate this
unfortunate condition in states that are already weak by (a) denying the incentives and coercive
capabilities that came traditionally with the threat of territorial wars and the opportunities of
territorial expansion; (b) supplying counter-incentives to state building through the logic of
"moral hazard;" and (c) preventing the process that used to eliminate weak states and further
strengthen more efficient ones prior to 1950.105
The proposition that state weakness is perpetuated or exacerbated by fixed borders stems
directly from theories the theories of state building discussed above. Since the study of state
building has gained much more attention and acceptance than that of state stagnation and
disintegration, we can generally rely on the fruits of this study and extrapolate for the negative
cases. Granted, state stagnation or disintegration does not necessarily stem from the lack of the
same factors that are available for state building, but I argue that in this case it actually is so.
The pressures and incentives that enabled and encouraged state building in other times are not
available for current-day state builders.
Like states in early modem Europe, most states in the current developing world find
themselves in the early stages of state building.'"1 However, developing states in the 2 0 th and 2 1st
centuries are devoid of the very incentives - the threat to ones' territory and survival as a state,
on the one hand, and the opportunities for territorial expansion, on the other - that made many
European states succeed in that venture. Therefore, it is at least plausible to expect that
developing states will face great difficulties in building strong states out of the initially rather
arbitrary collection of people and communities they incorporate. In most of the few cases in the
Post-WW-II world in which there was a real and significant threat to the territorial integrity and
105 A number of other works agree with my general point here, although they refer to the effects of war in general
rather than a war of territorial conquest, as I argued above. For example, see Desch, "War and Strong States,
Peace and Weak States?", Herbst, "War and State in Africa."
106 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third Word Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the
International System (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 21-46, 193-94.
the survival of the state, such as in Israel, Taiwan and South Korea, there was indeed a process of
healthy state building, much more so than in most other developing states.107
By embracing the idea of fixed borders, the international community agreed, in essence, to
preserve the shell of the state, no matter how hollow it might be from within. This phenomenon
is what Robert Jackson called "juridical statehood."' 0 8 Even without considering the lack of the
"positive" effects of war, the juridical statehood provides rulers in already weak states with
strong incentives to abandon investment and control in the periphery, thus making the state even
weaker. The logic of Jackson's argument is simple. In order to achieve the minimum strength for
the state, rulers must invest many resources in different parts of their countries. They must
invest, first of all, in an attempt to gain the monopoly over the means of violence (policing).
This, by itself, is an expensive project. But coercion alone is seldom sufficient to establish one's
authority over a populated territory. One has to develop a strategy of investment in the basic
needs of the citizens. Building infrastructure and creating viable educational, judicial, and
bureaucratic institutions are all complicated and expensive tasks as well, but without them, the
legitimacy and authority of the state (in the eyes of its citizenry) is doubtful.
Yet the juridical statehood guarantees a state "membership" in the community of nations
(with all the economic and prestige benefits that it includes, e.g., World Bank loans and UN
membership), and as long as one controls the capital city, he or she can be assured of his or her
status as the head of this state. "The system," Jackson concludes, "is like an insurance policy:
The policy holders, and consequently the main beneficiaries, are the rulers and regimes- not the
107 See, for instance, Barnett, Confronting the Cost of War, Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, pp. 142-205.
Though some states that faced territorial threats (such as Pakistan or Jordan) did not grow stronger, they were not
eliminated from the map, as they would have been, in all probability, in previous eras.
108 Robert H. Jackson, "Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of International Affairs 46, no. 1
(1992): pp. 1-16.
people..."; hence the "moral hazard."' 09 In the absence of any juridical or military threats to the
external recognition of a state as such, rulers have few incentives to engage in the costly and
often dangerous role of trying to control (and attract) the periphery. 110 Building the complex
mechanism that is required for a modern system of direct taxation, as well, is expensive,
complex, and politically risky. Whenever rulers could avoid it, either because the lack of strong
fiscal pressure (as the need to defend against a territorial threat would pose), or because of the
availability of cheaper substitutes, they will."' Moreover, the creation and maintenance of a well
trained army and an efficient bureaucracy, two central institutions of state building, is not only
costly, but can be perceived as dangerous to the position of the ruler himself in that they
constitute potential competitors.
Regions that are thus marginalized and neglected can hardly expect any outside support in
their quest for self-determination, not to mention attempts to join neighboring countries. They
have no exit option. To the contrary: the international community is likely to come to the help of
the central government against any attempt to change the territorial status quo."12 The
consequences, again, are the weakening of the state, and sometimes its complete disintegration,
the ultimate form of which is "a failed state" or "a collapsed state," the kind that one might find
at some point in time in Asia (Afghanistan, Cambodia) and the Middle East (Lebanon), and quite
109 A "moral hazard" is a term used in the insurance industry to depict the risk that the existence of insurance would
make the policyholder to behave carelessly about the insured item.
11 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1-12, 40-59, 74-81. Quote from p. 6.
111 For arguments to this effect, see Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1988).
1:2 Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: Weak States, the International Community, and the Perpetuation of Civil War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), William Reno, Warlords Politics and African States
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 1-40. Quote from pp. 8-9.
frequently in Sub-Saharan Africa (Somalia, Chad, Liberia, Sierra-Leone and my case, the Zaire/
DRC are only the most obvious examples)."13
In contrast to what happened in the past (and discussed above), then, states today do not
"die." The mechanism of "natural selection" that eliminated many weak states prior to WW-II
(or enabled stronger states to swallow them) does not operate anymore, thus practically
guaranteeing the survival of the weak states. 114
How large is the phenomenon of weak states? I am not aware of any study that defines state
weakness in similar ways and measures the global extent of the phenomenon over time. That
weak states are pervasive, however, is not in doubt. Robert Rotberg has argued that while in the
last decade only seven states could be strictly defined as failed or collapsed, "several dozen
more, however, are weak and serious candidates for failure." Similarly, the authors of a 2005
comprehensive study cosponsored by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy have compiled a
list of 60 weak and failing states, which include countries from Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the
former Soviet Union, Latin America and Europe. The study identifies 20 of these states as being
in "critical" condition, 20 more "in danger" and another 20 as "borderline."" 5
In the two case studies of weak states in a border fixity world, Lebanon since 1943 and
Congo since 1960, we should observe at least a significant part f the following list:
1. The norm of border fixity should be manifested in words and deeds for the time under
investigation, and perhaps in the specific region of the state as well. It should also be translated
113 Rene Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crisis in
the Great Lakes," review of Reviewed Item, African Studies Quarterly, no. 1(3) (1997),
http://web.africa.ufl.edulasq/vll/3/3.htm, Reno, Warlords Politics and African States, pp. 45-79, Rotberg, "Failed
States, Collapsed States.", I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse," in Collapsed
States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman (Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner, 1995).
114 Fazal, "State Death in the International System."
1"5 Robert I Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): p. 85.Fund
For Peace, Failed States Index (Fund For Peace, 2005 [cited); available from
http://www.fundforpeace.org/program/fsi/fsindex.php.
to the absence, or the minimal level, of territorial threats and opportunities the state is facing.
Situations in which neighbor states presumably had both the interests and the ability to annex
part of the state's territories, or to eliminate the state as a whole, but yet avoided this practice,
should present particularly good evidence.
2. The lack of territorial pressures should be translated into a lack of serious efforts to create
and maintain a strong fighting military. The government should be either not interested enough
in this project to confront opposing groups within its own society, or not interested at all, for the
fear of the military as a competing center of power. Instead, various domestic groups with
various resources and agendas should appropriate the use of force in the state.
3. The capacity of the state to extract resources from its residents should be low and its
motivations to struggle to achieve such capacity lacking. Direct taxation, in particular, might be
neglected, as it is the toughest to administer and the most risky politically. The state should
concentrate, instead, on funding opportunities which are easier to achieve, politically, but less
sustainable than direct taxation (such as taxes on imports and borrowing from foreign powers).
4. Administrative innovations and greater bureaucratic control of the society should be
either not attempted or failed for lack of resources and motivations of the central authority to
overcome opposition. There should be no visible links between military and civilian
administration.
5. The provision of public goods should be either very limited or, in case it is more
substantial, shown to be motivated by ideological preferences of the center, not by pressure to
compensate the residents for the burden impose on them by the state. Moreover, the pattern of
public good distribution is important as well. As the borders of the state are immune to change,
we should expect weak states to neglect the periphery, especially that of border area, in terms of
investment and services.
6. We should not see a development of a coherent national identity and increased loyalty to
the state. Instead, wars that are non-territorial in nature should only increase internal cleavages as
they would not be seen as a threat to the whole population of the state, and perhaps even as
opportunities for some.
b) Fixed Borders, Weak States, and International Conflicts
Thus far I have presented the argument that border fixity is a major cause of perpetuation and
exacerbation of state weakness. This section goes a step further and argues that socio-politically
weak states, and the combination of such states with the norm of border fixity, are a source of
many international violent conflicts.
Clausewitzian wars, in which two regular armies meet each other in the battlefield, are rarity
in today's world. The Israeli-Arab wars of the 1960's and 1970's or the Ethiopian-Eritrean war
of 1998-2000 are the exception, not the rule, of the post World War II world. Instead, the wars of
today look strikingly different. These "wars of the third kind," •1 6 are made mainly of two types:
civil conflicts, such as the one going on intermittingly for several decades in Sri-Lanka, and
transnational conflicts - wars that involve both states and non-state actors. The multifaceted
conflict in western Africa in the 1990's and early 2000's could serve as a good example. Of all
wars between 1945 and 1995, 77% were internal wars. Of the reminder, the so-called interstate
wars, moreover, many were in fact transnational wars, such as the one between Armenia and
'
16 Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, pp. 19-40.
Azerbaijan in the early 1990's. In short, although war is still very much a part of our life, its
nature (and where it is fought) has transformed dramatically in the last sixty years. 17
As this chapter argues, and as the empirical chapters corroborate, much of this trend could be
attributed to the combination of socio-politically weak states in a border fixity world. Like in
earlier eras, security and opportunism remain important factors in the instigation of conflicts in
regions of weak states in an era of border fixity. The mechanisms by which they operate in these
circumstances, however, are profoundly different from the "traditional" ones. These mechanisms
are specified below.
I. Border Fixity, Weak States and Internal Strife
Hypothesis 3: Weak states in a world that embraces the border fixity norm are rife with internal
violent conflicts because they create conditions favorable to "emerging anarchy" and to
motivate the practice of "internal scapegoating."
The first mechanism through which weak states might be a source of international conflicts is
through spillover of internal strife, and such strife is frequently spurred by state weakness. Since
the end of the Second World War, internal wars have been much more common than
conventional state vs. state wars." s One study, for example, counted 126 such conflicts out of a
total of 164 wars fought from 1945 to 1995.119 Another finds that about three quarters of the
117 Data from Ibid., p. 22. See also Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free
Press, 1991).
""8 Ted R. Gurr, "Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in the New Century," in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of
Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Hampson, Fen Olster, Aall, Pamela (Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace, 2001), pp. 163-88.
"9 Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, p. 22.
armed conflicts in the 1990's were wars between organized communal groups or governments.' 20
These figures are even more impressive when one considers the fact that civil wars tend to be
much more prolonged than interstate wars. 121 Communal wars are a common feature in regions
occupied by relatively young states, such as Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.122 That some
regions are more prone to civil and communal wars than others cannot be explained solely by the
existence of ethnic or other minority groups within the region's states. Most states in the world
contain such groups, but the distribution of civil or communal strife is still uneven. What
explains this pattern of internal conflicts is often the strength of the state. The weaker the state,
the more likely it is to be involved in civil or communal wars.
The outbreak of communal fighting is often the result of two processes, both of which are
characteristic of weak states: "emerging anarchy" and "internal scapegoating." The first,
emerging anarchy, is a condition that arises as the state's ability to enforce order and provide
internal security decreases, the potential danger that one group poses to another increases. Under
such circumstances, groups within the state, whether affiliated by ethnic, religion, or other source
of identity, might start to fear for their security. This fear could be a result of calculations about
motives and capabilities of other groups, or simply a result of the uncertainty built into the
situation. In the absence of a higher policing authority, groups might be inclined to use a worst-
case scenario as their guide of action. Not doing so might be perceived as imprudent. 123
120 Peter Wallensteen, and Sollenberg, Margarita, "Armed Conflict, 1989-98," Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 5
(1999): pp. 593-606.
121 Hironaka, Neverending Wars.
122 Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, pp. 19-21. Civil wars were common in Latin America as well, but
there, the motives, at least during the Cold War era, were more often ideological rather than ethnic.
123 The latter is the logic behind the "security dilemma," a situation in which the action that one group takes for
defensive purposes is inevitably perceived by the other group as offensive, and vice versa. For the original
argument about the "security dilemma" see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World
Politics 30, no. 2 (1978). For the application to ethnic conflicts, see James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and
the Spread of Ethnic Violence," in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation,
ed. David A. and Rotchild Lake, Donald (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 115-25, Stuart J.
At the same time, the weakness of the state's authority enables some groups to believe in
their ability to win a civil war or to gain from predatory behavior. Although the post-Cold War
literature on internal security dilemma largely neglects the importance of greed and opportunism
in explaining the eruption of violence in failing states,' 24 these are important factors in the
equation of civil strife, and they are both closely related to state weakness. James Fearon and
David Laitin, for instance, find that state weakness the most important factor that creates
opportunities for insurgency, and thus the best predictor of the existence of civil wars in the post-
World War II world.125
Although fear and greed (or opportunism) are theoretically distinct sources of internal
violence, it is often hard to tell them apart in practice since they might have similar
manifestations. It is also reasonable to assume that the same actors could be motivated by both at
the same time. This difficulty of telling security considerations from predatory ones
notwithstanding, however, both are clearly results of the emerging anarchy, and both clearly
increase the likelihood of the eruption of civil war.126
The second process that might relate state weakness to internal fighting is what I term
internal scapegoating. Politicians' attempts to compensate for the lack of institutionalized ways
to attain legitimacy in weak states by "playing the ethnic card" might have threatening
Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Inter-Ethnic War," Review of International Studies 22 (1996): pp. 150-52,
57-59, David A. and Rotchild Lake, Donald, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,"
International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): pp. 48-52, Sarah K. Lischer, "Causes of Communal War: Fear and
Feasibility," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, no. 22 (1999): pp. 331-35, Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma
and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35 (1993).
124 On this point, see Nelson Kasfir, "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation: Cuases
and Failures," in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004).
125 James D. Fearon, and Laitin, David D., "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political science
Review 97, no. 1 (2003). See also Ballentine, "Introduction."
126Kasfir, "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation," pp. 53-76.
consequences for inter-communal relations. 127 In order to gain the support of some segments of
the population without having to resort to expensive practices of state-building, leaders might
choose to incite or promote internal conflict, with the hope of riding an ethnic wave to political
and economic gain. These practices might take the form of "divide and rule" tactics or an explicit
or implicit siding with one group against another, for instance, by an exclusion of some groups,
branded as "foreigners" or "foreign agents." This "internal scapegoating" is likely to be more
common in an era of border fixity, since groups that are discriminated and excluded lack an exit
option. Secession and (even more so) irredentism are not viable options in a world in which
borders are fixed. This practice is likely to further increase both communal fear and communal
opportunities for predation, and thus the incidences of civil conflicts. Thus, the weaker the state
is, the greater the likelihood of civil violence to erupt.
Of course, these relations are often circular, where a protracted civil war might magnify the
state's weakness. Yet examples of cases in which a strong state falls into a civil war and emerges
from it as a weak one are few. Yugoslavia is perhaps one such case, but it was considerably
weakened as a single entity even before the war broke out. The fact that civil wars often further
weaken already weak states, in any event, does not contradict the argument made above.
When we look at the cases of Lebanon and Congo, then, we should observe that:
1. As the state gets weaker, groups within the population express increasing fear and
attempt to organize for self-defense against the potential threats from other groups. These
practices, in turn, should be shows to lead to escalation into heightened (internal) security
dilemma or even to outbreak of civil wars.
127 See Janis Gross Stein, "Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict," in Turbulent Peace: The
Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Hampson, Fen Olster, Aall, Pamela
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 93, Lake, "Containing Fear," pp. 53-56.
2. As the state gets weaker, attempts to use the state's absence for predatory gains by
some groups should be observed.
3. As the state gets weaker and institutional ways to obtain legitimacy disappear,
politicians revert to a practice of internal scapegoating, and in effect excluding some groups from
the national whole in order to attract the support of other groups. These practices should not be
influenced by proximity of the excluded group to the state border, as these politicians are aware
of the fact that territorial changes are not an option.
II. Border Fixity, Weak States and Spillover of Conflict Across International Borders
Hypothesis 4: Internal strife in weak states in a world that embraces the border fixity norm tend
to spillover and turn into international conflicts and possibly international wars, through the
mechanisms of refugee insurgency and kin-country syndrome.
Weak states tend, then, to supply a fertile ground for civil and communal strife. These
struggles, in turn, are frequently not contained within the state and tend to affect neighboring
states, often even leading to international conflicts. 128 Spillover of internal conflicts might occur
in two ways, both related to fear and insecurity. The first has to do with refugee flows and cross-
border insurgency, the second with "kin-country syndrome." Refugee flows are often the vehicle
through which internal fighting spreads to neighboring countries. Internal wars, most notably
128 Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 1-32. These dynamics are significantly different than those often
described in the literature of the causes of war, as this literature often concentrates on the Western world and on
great power relations in particular. On these differences, see Brian L Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National,
Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World
States, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 17-19. See also Ayoob, The Third Word
Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System, David, "Explaining Third
World Alignment," pp. 233-56.
ethnic conflicts, tend to produce more refugees than interstate conflicts. 12 9 These refugees,
especially those settled in camps not far from the borders of their homeland and those with
relatively high group cohesion prior to the expulsion/flight, are often the source of cross-border
infiltrations and attacks. When their home country reacts with retaliatory strikes, the conflict
might well escalate into a full-scale international war. It is worth reiterating that the threat the
insurgency and the counterinsurgency pose is not to the survival of the states or to their legal
territorial integrity but, rather, to individual or group security and, in many cases, to the security
of the regimes in both countries.
This process, though, does not develop in all cases, but only under certain circumstances.
Refugee flows are more likely to result in international conflicts in cases where weak states are
involved. The governments of such states lack the capacity either to resettle refugees (thus
supplying them with incentives to integrate with local populations, rather than continue targeting
their home countries) or to force them to abandon their armed struggle to avoid retaliation by
their state of origin.' 30 The Afghan refugees in Pakistan during the communist rule there can
serve as one example.' 3 1
The second mechanism that might lead from internal civil war to an international one is what
has been called the "kin-country syndrome," which develops when ethnic fault lines do not
129 For such findings, see Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of
Refugee Flows," International Security 21, no. 1 (1996): pp. 5-42. See also Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma," pp. 3-
7, Kathleen Newland, "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael
E. Brown (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 143-63.
130 See especially Sarah K. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of
Humanitarian Aid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 28-31. Also see Ted R. Gurr, "The
Internationalization of Protracted Communal Conflicts since 1945: Which Groups, Where, and How," in The
Internationalization of Communal Strife (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 4-5, I. William Zartman,
"Internationalization of Communal Strife: Temptations and Opportunities of Triangulation," in The
Internationalization of Communal Strife, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 27-42. In
addition, refugees often create and exacerbate pressures, economic, social or otherwise, in their host country.
Specifically, if the refugees happen to belong to an ethnic group also existing in the host country, it might change
a volatile ethnic balance there. Consequently, the host country might try to block the refugee flow by force,
thereby increasing the likelihood of armed skirmishes with their home country.
131 Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, pp. 42-72.
correspond to international borders, and when ethnic groups in one country are alarmed by the
grievances of their brethren across the border. 132 This syndrome might well lead to increasing
tensions between neighboring states and, ultimately, to an international war and/or
intervention. 133 Saddam Hussein's Iraq, for example, reacted through military means to the
assistance Iraqi Kurds received from their kin in Iran. Turkey, similarly, often intervened in Iraq
to suppress attempts by Iraqi Kurds to assist their co-ethnics inside Turkey's borders. These
conflicts, as well as many similar ones, did not involve demands to redraw the international
borders. They were simply about denial of aid by external states to internal challengers. 134
Although the physical potential for the kin-country syndrome to occur exists everywhere, weak
states are a much more likely venue. This is the case since the populations of these states have
less affinity to their states, and since, as explained above, these feelings are less likely to change
in the absence of external territorial pressures.
To observe the occurrence of a spillover process, one needs to detect the following:
1. That significant movements of refugees across the borders results from civil conflicts
within the weak state or its neighbors (which often are also weak).
2. That the weak state is unable at the minimum and unwilling at the maximum to
prevent the refugees from arming themselves and engaging in guerilla warfare with their
"'sending state" across international borders.
132 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3
(1993): pp. 35-39., Rene Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Failure to Potential
Reconstruction," :in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I Rotberg (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: World Peace Foundation, 2003), pp. 5-6. Stuart Kaufman refers to a more specific phenomenon
that he calls an "external affinity problem," a strategic situation in which a minority in one state is a majority in
the larger region (e.g., The Tamil minority in Sri-Lanka as compared to the Tamil majority if one adds the Indian
state of Tamil-Nadu to the equation). See Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Inter-Ethnic War," p. 153.
133 See Stephen M. Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy & International Conflict (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 1-35, 203-22. For a counterargument, see Michael E. Brown, "The
Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," in The International Dimension of Internal Conflict, ed.
Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 603-27.
134 Gurr, "The Internationalization of Protracted Communal Conflicts," pp. 16-17.
3. That the decision of the neighboring state to engage in international war (or conflict
short of war) with the weak state is directly related to these cross-border insurgency wars with
armed refugees. Evidence could be either verbal or by inference from the conduct of the war and
the diplomacy which might accompany it.
4. That decisions to intervene also stem from concerns to the security and grievance of
communities within the weak states that are excluded and discriminated against and have kin
across the borders.
III. Border Fixity, State Weakness and External Predation
Hypothesis 5: State weakness in a world that embraces the border fixity norm promotes the
possibility of international conflicts because it creates opportunities for external non-territorial
predation.
International wars are not always the product of fear (mutual or unilateral). Some wars are, to
a large degree, a product of opportunism or greed. 135 Obviously, the opportunities for territorial
revisionism are greatly reduced in a world of fixed borders. However, greed might still play a
significant role in this world. Put simply, the fact that one state cannot legally annex its
neighbor's territory does not mean that it cannot abuse this territory for its own economic gains,
or cannot attempt to politically control its neighbor (including changing its regime"36). These
135 Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in Realism: Restatements and
Renewal, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 90-121.
136 On the proposition that territorial conquest was replaced by intervention for regime change, see Fazal, "From
Conquest to Intervention: State, Regime, and Leader Exit."
opportunistic predatory policies are, again, more likely to be found in regions where states are
weak, simply because it is easier to exploit such states.
The reasons weak states are a more likely victim of neighbors' greed are twofold: first,
internal allies are much easier for an outsider to find in weak states than in strong ones. Second,
although it does not have to be the case, many weak states become, with time, also weak in terms
of military power. It is hard to maintain a strong and cohesive military when the state is falling
apart and when taxes are not forthcoming. Furthermore, a strong military is, as argued above, in
itself a potential threat to the central government. The combination of institutional, ideational
and military weakness, in turn, makes the state extremely vulnerable to just this kind of
predatory politics on the part of its neighbors. 137 While these policies may not always bring about
an officially declared war, they do often result in international conflict of some sort, sometimes
involving more outside parties. Libya's intervention in Chad, for example, was based on such
dynamics.
Again, these opportunistic neighbors do not seek territorial expansion, but political and
economic gains. If the "greedy state" is itself weak, we might also expect that the gains would be
personal, or of a limited group, rather than of the state as a whole. The threats that are created by
these predatory policies, nevertheless, are significantly different than those created by
"traditional" territorial threat since they are often perceived as threats to some particular group
within the victim state, rather than to the state as a whole. These incursions on the state's
economic assets or its political independence, therefore, do not generate the expected ingroup-
outgroup dynamics. As Lewis Coser notes, "the relations between outer conflict and inner
cohesion does not hold true where internal cohesion before the outbreak of the conflict is so low
137 Buzan, People, State and Fear, p. 113, Benjamin Miller, "When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential
Theoretical Pathways to Peace," International Studies Review 7, no. 2 (2005).
that the group members have ceased to regard preservation of the group as worthwhile, or
actually see the outside threat to concern 'them' rather than 'us'."' 38
When looking at the empirical cases we should observe these motivations, of greed,
opportunism, and predation, manifested as well. Such motivations can be inferred from speech
evidence (e.g., references to the economic or political potential in internal discussions), from
action (e.g., targeting of areas that are particularly given to economic exploitation, or,
alternatively, the political center) and from the lack of competing explanations for the
interventions.
The next chapter will survey the preconditions of the four cases, while the four subsequent
chapters investigate in depth the four study cases.
138 Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 93-95. Quotation from p. 93.
Chapter 3- Weak States: Preconditions to State Building
At this point in the discussion, before delving into the study of cases of the effects of border
norms on weak states, it might be wise to pause and look more closely at the connection- at the
core of my thesis (and in Hypothesis 1 and 2) - that a flexible borders' world facilitates state
building while a fixed borders' world perpetuates states' weakness.
This chapter looks at the conditions of the four case studies at the start of the period
examined here. It surveys the initial circumstances in which Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640,
Argentina in 1810, Lebanon in 1943, and Congo in 1960 found themselves. It questions whether
the two former cases had not enjoyed, in fact, an initial advantage over the two latter cases;
advantage that a priori positioned them to fare better in the task of state building, regardless of
norms about borders. The chapter draws on existing literature in order to investigate the ways in
which this might be, or might not be, true. It compares the four cases, at this initial stage, along
f'our variables: economic preconditions, arbitrariness of the borders, availability and potential
quality of bureaucracy, and size and population density.
While the results vary, I find that in general neither Brandenburg-Prussia nor Argentina was
better positioned to become a success story of state building. Nor were Lebanon (in particular)
and Congo doomed to fail in this endeavor because of their intrinsic characteristics.
A. Economic Conditions
The first question asked is whether Prussia and Argentina were better situated than their later
counterparts, in economic terms, to succeed in the state building process. In particular, this
questions asks whether Prussia and Argentina were endowed, in advance, with more economic
resources - especially capital - or potential to achieve them, than Lebanon and Congo. 13 9 This
question makes sense, as the project of state building is a capital extensive business; a highly
expensive endeavor that will presumably be harder to achieve if the state does not have access to
capital or commodities it can sell for capital.' 40
Yet the fact is that not only were Prussia and Argentina not in a better position vis-A-vis
Congo and Lebanon, in that sense, but the contrary might be true. Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640
was a very poor agrarian state. While its Rhinish provinces were somewhat more developed,
with prosperous towns and trade, they, too, declined in the 17 th century. The economy of the bulk
of the Hohenzollerns territories, including East Prussia (apart from K6nigsberg) and of
Brandenburg itself was based on poor agricultural land, cultivated by serfs. These lands were
mostly poor (Prussia was termed "the sandbox of Europe") and many were not cultivated for the
lack of human resources. Commerce, to the extent it existed, was very limited in scope and scale.
Although there was no major economic crisis prior to the war, there were also no great prospects
of growth.'41 Finally, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) made matters in the Hohenzollerns'
domains much worse. The war wreaked havoc in Brandenburg-Prussia's villages and towns.
Foreign armies roamed the country, looting and killing whoever crossed their path. Economic
139 Another question that might be asked about the economic preconditions of these states in terms of their place in
the "world economic system." Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that a state's place in this system - at the core,
the periphery or semi-periphery - determines its chances of development, economic or otherwise. See Wallerstein,
The Modern World System. Yet, Wallerstein's theory (and dependency theory in general) does not withstand the
scrutiny of the cases studied here. By looking at the criteria this theory offers for placement in the world system,
that is, the nature of the major commodities the state is specializing in producing, one cannot explain either the
relative success of Argentina (a producer of primary products- mainly meat, wool and grains) or the failure of
Lebanon (a finance and trade center).
140 On the important role capital has been playing in the state building process, see Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and
European States, Ad 990-1992, p. 16-37.
141 Finer, "State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," p. 135, William W. Hagen,
"Seventeenth-Century Crisis in Brandenburg: The Thirty Years' War, the Destabilization of Serfdom, and the Rise
of Absolutism," The American Historical Review 94, no. 2 (1989): pp. 306-14, Jonathan R. White, The Prussian
Army: 1640-1871 (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1996), pp. 2-3.
and Buenos Aires a modem metropolitan city. If anything, however, this growth was the result of
a successful process of state building, not a precondition for it.
In comparison, both Lebanon and Congo were actually endowed with some economic
preconditions that made them better candidates to sustain state growth. Congo, although
predominantly agrarian, enjoyed a high level of natural deposits in its soil. The same factor that
made it a coveted prize for European colonialism could, at least in theory, make it a rich state.
Copper, zinc, diamonds and gold were and still are all found in abundance under the Congolese
soil. These factors make Congo a potentially rich country. If it stays a weak and poor one, then
economic potential is hardly to blame.
While Lebanon did not enjoy significant amounts of natural deposits, it became, by
independence, a center of commerce and financing. The WWII years brought Lebanon an
economic boom, which was sustained by the needs of the British forces in the Middle East. The
economic growth did not stop with the war, however, and generally persisted up to the breakup
of the civil war in the 1970's. With its banks, its trading houses, its vacation attractions for
tourists and its liberal atmosphere, Lebanon came to be termed "Switzerland of the Middle
East."1 46 "By independence Lebanon had the highest per capita income in the Arab East, the
lowest rate of illiteracy, the best developed infrastructure and, for all its emphasis on banking
and services, the largest share of manufacturing within national income."'147
Clearly, then, the availability of either capital or commodities that could be sold for capital
did not favor Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina over Congo and Lebanon. Capital, though,
may interact with other aspects that affect state building (including border norms) in a more
146 Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal
Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 151-69, Roger Owen, "The Economic History of
Lebanon, 1943-1974: Its Salient Features," in Toward a Viable Lebanon, ed. Halim Barakat (Washington, DC:
Croom and Helm, 1988).
147 Owen, "The Economic History of Lebanon," p. 28.
activity almost ground to a halt, and hunger and plague took their toll on the population as well.
The population of towns and villages had fallen 20 to 90 percent below their prewar figures. 142
Argentina, as well, was a very poor country at independence. For most of the period of
Spanish colonization of Latin America (from the early 16 th century to the early 19 th century),
what is today Argentina was a backwater province of the Spanish Empire. The economic and
administrative center of the South American colony was Peru, with its Lima port. Buenos Aires,
in fact, was not legally allowed to serve as a port for shipping merchandize across the Atlantic
until the late 1770's. All international trade had to go across the Andes to Lima. 143 In 1810
Buenos Aires was, in fact, growing, but it was a far cry from the prosperous cosmopolitan center
it would become a century later. Export and import was minimal and trade between the city and
its vast hinterland was still done primarily by barter. In other words, Argentina at the time had
"few of the assets considered essential for a Latin American state. It had minerals but no mines,
land but little labour, commerce but few commodities. The economy of Buenos Aires emerged
from its colonial past not as a primary producer but as a pure entrep8t.'" 44 If Buenos Aires was a
poor place at independence, Argentina's interior was even more so. Buenos Aires' rural
hinterland was little developed and accounted for no more than 20% of the meager export of the
port (the larger part was silver from Potosi, in today's Bolivia). The wars of independence,
moreover, disrupted the economic lifeline of Argentina's interior, the trade with the mining
center of Potosi (in current day Bolivia), leaving the region in even more dire economic straits. 145
By the end of the 19 th century Argentina would, indeed, be one of the fastest growing economies
142 Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, pp. 88-89, Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis," pp.
314-15, Howard, War in European History, p. 29.
143 Robert L. Scheina, Latin America's Wars, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2003), pp. 41-42.
144 John Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," in Argentina since Independence, ed. Lesslie
Bethell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 1.
145 Ibid., pp. 7-8, David Rock, Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsin (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1987), pp. 79-96.
subtle way. While capital is a necessary ingredient of state formation, some forms of capital (or,
rather, some sources) can also be harmful for this process. In particular, if the capital comes "too
easy;" if the state does not have to create and maintain sophisticated and efficient administrative
and bureaucratic tools in order to assure the extraction of capital; if the center does need to
confront and coerce (or make bargains with) rival power bases in order to obtain the capital - we
might not see a healthy process of state building.'1 4 As we shall see in the Argentinean case, the
relatively easy profits for the state from tariffs and export taxation, and the availability of foreign
loans, hindered state building and made it less complete. The same could be true with regard to
Congo's mineral resources, but research on the relations between the presence of natural
resources and state weakness is inconclusive. 149 We have, then, to remember the importance of
capital availability, and the fact that it can work in both ways, when the cases are discussed in the
following chapters. Nevertheless, we should also keep in mind that Argentina managed to
construct a fairly strong state despite the avoidance of creating an elaborate and efficient system
of direct taxation, while Congo did not.
B. Legacies of Colonialism: Arbitrary Borders
Probably the most common and popular explanation for the lingering weakness -
institutional, economic, ideational (legitimacy) and otherwise - in developing world states has to
do with the legacies of colonialism. Colonialism, the spike of expansion that made mostly
European powers to take hold of most of the lands in the world and subdue their people, certainly
148 For elaboration of this discussion, see, e.g., Centeno, Blood and Debt, Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of
International Politics.", Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992.
149 For the discussion of the argument that readily available natural resources hinders state building see Fearon,
"Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," pp. 94-115, Nicholas Van de Walle, "The Economic Correlates of State
Failure: Taxes, Foreign Aid, and Politics," in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I Rotberg
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). On the specific case of Congo see Reno, Warlords Politics and
African States, pp. 147-76.
had, and keeps on having, far-flung effects on the societies it colonized. The discussion in this
section and in the following one, however, concentrates on two specific arguments about the
legacies of colonialism; the arguments that relate more closely to the perpetuation of state
weakness. This section discusses the arbitrariness of borders, while the next examines the
administrative legacies of colonialism.
The problem with the post-colonial borders, so the argument goes, is not that they are fixed,
but where they are located. The borders imposed by the European colonists in Africa, Asia and
the Americas were largely arbitrary and did not conform to economic, social or political pre-
colonial realities. Thus, these borders often divided ethnic groups between two or more states
while, at the same time, creating new political units of groups that either had no prior association
or were often bitter rivals. The colonial borders also, in most cases, took very little account of
geographic or economic realities. The pre-colonial states, for the most part, adopted these
arbitrary borders directly, either because of outside pressure to do so, or because of the interests
of their own elites. 150 As John Ravenhill, for example, argues, "the arbitrary division of the
continent by the European powers, with little or no respect for preexisting social and political
groupings or even, sometimes, for 'natural' geographical features, has immensely complicated
the tasks of nation and state building faced by African governments."' 51 The new states, in other
words, encompassed a group of citizens so diverse and not cohesive; ethnic, religious and
economic cleavages so deep that no amount of territorial pressure could force into one strong
whole.
150 Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1972).
151 John Ravenhill, "Redrawing the Map of Africa?" in The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, ed.
Donals Rothchild, and Chazan, Naomi (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), p. 283.
One should only take a glance at the two contemporary cases of weak states studied here to
understand the force of this argument: Lebanon, in this sense, was an artificial political entity,
created by the French mandate in 1920, in order to weaken Syrian nationalists and to foster the
power base of their allies in the region, the Christian Maronites in Mt. Lebanon. Thus, they add
to Mt. Lebanon, in itself a hodgepodge of ethnic groups, the city of Beirut, the predominantly
Shiite Muslim south and predominantly Sunny Muslim Bakaa and Tripoli. The result was (and
is) a state torn by deep ethnic and religious cleavages, in which no group is strong enough to
control the others, but all groups are strong enough to make imposing threats against the others;
hardly a panacea for state building.152 Congo, similarly, was an artificial creation of Belgium's
colonialism, and encompasses a multiplicity of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, none of
them big or strong enough to practically dominate the others.' 53
The logic of the arbitrary borders explanation is strong, and I would not dispute it here. My
argument, rather, is twofold: First, that arbitrariness is the rule, rather than the exception, even in
European states. Second, I also argue that the arbitrary nature of the borders in the Asia and
Africa would not have been such a great barrier to state building if they were subject to territorial
threats, opportunities and changes.
Borders are almost always arbitrary. They are not a natural phenomenon but a social
construct, erected, physically or emotionally, by men. Borders, everywhere in the world, often
divide people arbitrarily, with people on either side of the borders deferring hardly differing, in
the first palace, in terms of culture, language or otherwise. Indeed, as Saadia Touval noted, "in
152 Helena Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 62-64, Eyal
Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 1-8.
153 For a basic source on ethnic divisions and ethnic politics in the Congolese society, see Crawford Young, and,
Turner, Thomas, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press,
1985), pp. 138-48. For data of ethnic and other social divisions see CIA Factbook, at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cg.html
this respect [of arbitrariness] there is probably no great difference between international borders
in Africa and international borders on other continents."' 54
Many international borders in Europe, most notably those that divided Germany prior to
1870, were not "natural" in any meaningful sense. Brandenburg-Prussia in the period studied
here (1640-1740) is certainly a case in point. As Samuel Finer notes, "There was no state of
Prussia. There was a clutch of distinct territories- states if one wishes- which had all come, by
the accident of hereditary descent, under the dominion of George William of the ruling line of
the Hohenzollerns." •ss Arbitrary borders are not necessarily, then, a product of colonial rule.
They can be a product of other social processes, in accordance with the prevailing practices of
the time. Brandenburg-Prussia's borders were, moreover, as far from "natural" as one can
imagine. The state was scattered all across the plains of Northern Germany, from the banks of
the Rhine in the west to East Prussia on the shores of the Baltic Sea, and it was territorially
discontinuous, divided into three main blocks.
In terms of social cleavages, as well, there is no a priori reason to believe that the population
of Brandenburg-Prussia was in 1640 closer to forming a cohesive group (the term nation was not
yet in use, of course) than our more modern cases, Congo and Lebanon. Most residents shared a
common language (albeit with different vernaculars), but so do the residents of Lebanon.
Religious cleavages ran deep and high. The Catholic/Protestant division demarcated political and
social struggle in Europe for centuries. The Thirty Years War, which was still ongoing in 1640,
was primarily a religious war. The majority in Brandenburg-Prussia was Protestant, but it
included a significant Catholic minority, concentrated in the provinces of Cleves and Mark,
along the Western frontiers of the state. One should not assume that this cleavage was less salient
154 Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa, p. 3.
'ss Finer, "State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," 134-45.
or less a potential obstacle to state building than, say, the one between Christians and Muslims in
Lebanon, between Kassaians and Katangese in Southern Congo, or that between Hutu and Tutsi
in its Eastern provinces.
When we look at most European states today we see a relatively homogenous society,
ethnically speaking (excluding more recent immigrants). Yet this picture is more a result of the
process of state 'building (and of war and ethnic cleansings) than the pre-conditions that enabled
it to appear. In the mid-17 th century Brandenburgians saw the Prussians or the people of Cleves
as foreign, not as part of the "self." There was no form of national identity, of course, since the
whole idea of defining one's identity by nation was still unknown to Europeans prior to the
French Revolution. The economic and social structure, as well, differed markedly in different
provinces. Whereas cities in Cleves and Mark, for instance, were the center of economic life and
possessed a great degree of Autonomy, the rural lord, the Junker, was the economic and social
center of society in East Prussia. 156 The population of the different regions could, in other words,
be considered, in many senses, as different ethnic groups. Were Brandenburg-Prussia an African
state, one might suspect that these groups would be called "tribes."
Nineteenth-century Argentina poses no less of a problem for the theory that relates the
legacies of colonialism and arbitrary borders on state building. Argentina, after all, was a product
of colonial rule no less than Congo or Lebanon. The arbitrary borders of the Spanish Viceroyalty
of the Rio-de-la--Plata were drawn to suit the interests of the metropolis, not those of either the
native or local Creole (that is, descendants of the colonizers, who were born in South America)
population. "57 "Bourbon administrators thus ignored the racial, economic, and cultural
156 For a classic review of Brandenburg-Prussia at mid 17th century, see F.L. Carsten, The Origins of Prussia
(Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1954).
157 Carlos Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," Journal of Latin American Studies 20, no. 1 (1988): pp. 152-
53.
distinctions among the regions that comprise the new Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata. The
coherence of the viceroyalty was only apparent, since its territorial boundaries had been
determined by calculations that were external to the conditions of the area." 158 Colonial
arbitrariness, then, should apply to Argentina just as it applies to Lebanon and Congo. The
reason Argentina today seems ethnically and culturally a more homogenous place than many of
the developing world's states is because of processes that occurred after its independence: the
territorial losses of Paraguay, Upper Peru (Bolivia) and Banda Oriental (Uruguay), the
destruction of the Indians in the Pampas and in Patagonia, and the assimilation of numerous
waves of European immigrants.
To be sure, then, one can accept that for a state to possess less arbitrary borders and a more
homogenous population would make the task of state building easier. Nevertheless, these are not
necessary conditions for the creation of a strong state. Strong and continuous territorial pressures
could overcome the lack of such initial cohesiveness.
C. Legacies of Colonialism: Administrative Capacity
A second theory that relates Africa's and Asia's colonial past to the current inability of many
of their states to emerge out of their perennial weakness has to do with bureaucratic and
institutional capacity. The colonial powers, by virtue of their centralization of power in a faraway
metropolis, and by unwillingness to share bureaucratic functions, at least mid-range and high-
level, with locals, created a situation of permanent infancy of the colonies and did not prepare
158 Mark D. Szuchman, "From Imperial Hinterland to Growth Pole: Revolution, Change, and Restoration in the Rio
De La Plata," in Revolution and Restoration: The Rearrangement of Power in Argentina, 1776-1860, ed. Mark D.
Szuchman, and Brown, Jonathan C. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1994). See also Escude,
"Argentine Territorial Nationalism." For a description of the diverse population of the Rio de.La Plata, see Tulio
Halperin-Donghi, Politics, Economics, and Society in Argentina in the Revolutionary Period, trans. Richard
Southern (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 3-40.
them to the kinds of missions they would need for a serious state building project, once the
colonizers were gone. Moreover, the argument also emphasizes the lack of human material able
to perform these bureaucratic tasks, in terms of education and literacy.' 5 9
According to this logic, the fact that the cases of Congo and Lebanon, which are discussed at
length below, owe much of their inability to accumulate significant socio-political strength as
states to their lack of bureaucratic tradition, trained manpower, and an educated pool through
which to develop these capacities. It is certainly the case that Congo was, bureaucratically
speaking, unprepared for independence in 1960. While the Belgian colonizers used local African
chiefs as a form of local state authority, their rule was otherwise direct, brutal, and involved very
little local participation, especially in the upper bureaucratic echelons.' 60 The story is different
for Lebanon, which enjoyed a relatively high level of autonomy from the French mandatory
powers. Although France definitely had the power of the last arbiter in Lebanese politics and
administration, a power that it occasionally used, it did not blocked the development of an
indigenous political leadership and bureaucratic administration. Thus, the (Lebanese-written)
constitution, a parliament and a Lebanese government were all created and functioned, to some
degree, during the 1920-1943 French Mandate. These institutions served as relatively sound
foundations for the independent Lebanese state, once it was established.' 6 1
While the variant of the colonial legacy argument that emphasizes administrative capacity
might, on its face, seem to have some merit with regard to Congo, it applies less to the Lebanese
case. Moreover, an investigation of the two cases of successful state building reveals that
159 See Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, pp. 274-75. See also Migdal's case studies.
160 For a short review of the Belgian colonial policies in Zaire, see Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian
State, pp. 30-41.
161 Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, pp. 61-75, Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon:
Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979),
pp. 33-36, Zisser., Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence, pp. 25-40.
Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina, as well, did not possess significant administrative capacity
in 1640 and 1810, respectively.
Early 17th century Brandenburg-Prussia did not enjoy the existence of a well-trained
bureaucratic machinery simply because such machinery had not yet been "invented." To a
significant extent, it was the innovations of this state (and other parallel developments in Europe)
that created the core concepts of modern bureaucracy in the 17 th and 18th centuries. 162 In 1640,
however, it possessed no statewide administration. Frederick William "merely owned a number
of scattered principalities, each with its own government and institutions."163 The ministers of
the Privy Council, which was supposed to be the government of the entire territory, for instance,
admitted that they know little about what happened beyond the province of Brandenburg. 164
What little local administration existed, was managed by cities and the rural nobility, without
common standards and often on an ad hoc basis.
Joel Migdal argues that "the medieval European town played an important role in the
creation of such an autonomous class [fit for serving as state officials], the burghers, outside the
framework of the feudal society." 165 Yet Brandenburg-Prussia did not have a well-developed
class of town burghers, that, being autonomous of medieval civil society and relatively educated,
could serve as the backbone of a modern bureaucracy. The Prussian administration of the 17th
and 18th centuries was, by and large, based on the nobility and on the output, administrative,
ideological and human, of the officer corps.' 66
162 For classical analyses of this development, See Hintze, "The Formation of the State.", Hans Rosenberg,
Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660-1815 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958).
163 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p.253.
164 Ibid., p. 254.
165 See Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p. 174.
166 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy.
The Argentinean case possesses even more similarities to the two current cases, in that
Argentina was a Spanish colony from the early 16th century to 1810 and, as such, suffered from
syndromes similar to what Congo and Lebanon experienced. The Spaniards did not leave behind
a legacy of developing a strong local administrative capacity. While local creoles ('white'
descendants of Spanish origin who were born in America) were incorporated to some degree into
the local administration, they were systematically excluded from the higher posts. As Benedict
Anderson notes, in the 300 years of Spanish rule in Spanish America, only 4 of the 170
appointed viceroys were Creoles, and the rest peninsulars (born in Spain), despite the fact that
the latter made up only 5% of the 'white' population in the region. A similar ratio is also
observed in the Church's hierarchy. 167 These conditions and policies applied everywhere in the
Spanish empire. 168 In this vein, in 1815 Simon Bolivar described the Spanish rule in their Latin
American possessions to his friend in Jamaica:
We have been harassed by a conduct which has not only deprived us of our rights but has kept us in a sort
of permanent infancy with regard to public affairs. If we could at least have managed our domestic affairs
and our internal administration, we could have acquainted ourselves with the processes and mechanics of
public affairs. 169
Rio de la Plata was no exception; therefore, Carlos Escude is right to argue that "as such, the
Viceroyalty had a structure which could not be maintained without the mediation of a superior
authority and power: the Spanish empire." 170 Clearly, the infant regime in Buenos Aires did not
carry favorable chances of success in creating a strong state in 1810 Argentina.
Another variant of the weak administrative colonial legacy is that the colonial rule did not
leave behind societies sufficiently endowed with an educated manpower that could potentially
167 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (New York:
Verso, 1991), pp. 56-59.
168 On the late colonial administration in the Rio de la Plata, see Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, pp. 59-78, Szuchman,
"From Imperial Hinterland to Growth Pole."
169 Simon Bolivar, Selected Writings of Bolivar, trans. Lewis Bertrand (New York: The Colonial Press, 1951).
170 Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," pp. 153. On the late colonial administration in the Rio de la Plata,
see Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, pp. 59-78, Szuchman, "From Imperial Hinterland to Growth Pole."
fulfill the administrative functions of modem state machinery. The question in this respect, then,
is whether the cases in which one finds a successful project of state building differ a priori from
those in which, eventually, the project fails, in terms of literate manpower able to create a
functioning administration. Hence, one needs to compare the level of literacy in Brandenburg-
Prussia in 1640 and Argentina in 1810 to these of Lebanon in 1945 and Congo in 1960.
A look at the numbers reveals a picture in which the Argentinean case hardly enjoyed better
standards of education prior to the start of their state building project. In fact, Argentina was
probably less well situated in terms of literacy rates. The first fairly reliable number that we have
of Argentinean levels of literacy is from its first national census in 1869, and it shows that only
about one third of the population was literate.'17 This number is roughly equal to the level of
literacy in Congo at independence, which was about 20-25%,172 but significantly lower than that
of Lebanon, which stood in 1950 at about 45-50% literacy. 173 Moreover, though data is not
available, literacy rates in Argentina on the eve of independence are likely to have been even
lower than these indicated in the census, sixty years later. While data for literacy rates in 1640
Brandenburg-Prussia is not available, I find no reason to believe, given the general conditions of
the period and the lack of schools, let alone public schools, that it had a larger pool of educated
people from which to recruit its bureaucrats and administrators.
In short, there are no substantial grounds to presume that Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina
enjoyed preconditions more conducive to state building in the sense that they were better
positioned to create a stronger functioning administration and bureaucracy. While having the
bureaucratic experience and the educated manpower prior to the beginning of the state building
171 Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, p. 118.
172 The data is from 1965. See Peter Flora, "Historical Processes of Social Mobilization: Urbanization and Literacy
1850-1965," in Building States and Nations: Models and Data Resources, ed. Shmuel N. and Rokkan Stein
Eisenstadt (London: Sage, 1973), p. 247.
173 Ibid., p. 246.
process is certainly a plus, it is not a necessary precondition for the creation of a strong state. In
Argentina and Brandenburg-Prussia, these capacities were more a product of the process of state
building (and thus of territorial pressures) than conditions that enabled it to happen. The fact that
Congo did not possess at independence either a working bureaucratic machine or a sufficiently
large human pool with which to man such a machine, did not, therefore, preclude a future
process of state building. The higher level of literacy and the more experienced administration it
had hired from the French, moreover, should have been an asset for Lebanon's state building.
Yet, as we shall see below, they were not sufficient for this process to occur in a satisfactory
way.
D. Population Density
A fourth precondition to state formation that one should consider is based on the combination
of geography and demography. Jeffery Herbst argues that scarce population and vast lands
created the endemic inability of governments in Africa (not only in the post-colonial era, but in
the colonial and pre-colonial as well) to penetrate and control their hinterlands. The logic of this
argument, again, is sound: a low level of population density should make, at least in theory,
territorial conflicts less salient, and cause governments to have both less incentive and less
means to extend their rule much beyond their capital city, or perhaps to a few other population
centers. Thus, Herbst argues that the African states' choice of maintaining weak states, only
loosely controlled by the center, is a rational one, given their preconditions.1 74 At first glance,
indeed, Congo might be almost Herbst's ideal type. It is a vast land (approximately the size of
174 Herbst, States and Power in Africa.
Western Europe), with a relatively low population density, in which transportation and
communication would be hard by any standard measure.
Could population density be, therefore, the crucial variable that differentiates between
successful and unsuccessful cases of state building? A closer at population data reveals a largely
negative answer. When Herbst compares population density in different parts of the globe, he
does so for the same timeframe. Yet a comparison of Europe and Africa in 1975, for instance, is
not relevant to our case (nor to his). The relevant comparison, instead, should be between
today's (or 1960's Africa) and Europe in the 16 th and 17 th centuries. Indeed, according to
Herbst's own data, population density in 1500 Europe (13.7 people/sq. kilometer) is roughly
similar to that of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1975 (13.6). Nineteenth-century's Latin America's
population density, moreover, was significantly lower (3.7-people/sq. kilometer in 1900) in
comparison to Sub-Saharan Africa. These numbers do not suggest any advantage, in terms of
pre-conditions to state building, to Europe or Latin America over Africa, as they should have,
according to Herbst's theory.
Furthermore, if one looks at the specific numbers of population density in the cases studied in
this dissertation, the results are even clearer. Table 3 shows population density in the four cases
studied here at the "starting point" of the research.
Table 3: Population Density at Research Starting Point (people/sq. kilometer)
As becomes clear from Table 1, Herbst's theory cannot serve as a viable alternative
explanation for the perpetuation of state weakness, at least in the cases studied here. While
Congo's population density at independence is roughly comparable to that of 1640 Brandenburg-
Prussia, they are much higher than that of Argentina at independence. 179 Lebanon's population
density at independence is significantly higher than all other cases, and in 1943 it is even higher
than the average for Europe. One cannot argue, then, that low density of population deprives
states of a crucial prerequisite for building a strong state. Population density, in other words,
cannot explain why Prussia and Argentina succeeded where Lebanon failed. 180
175 Population data based on a rough estimate in Sidney B. Fey, The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia to 1786 (New
York: Henry Holt, 1937). Area data taken from Carsten, The Origins of Prussia., p. 202, fn.2 and p. 229, fn. 1.
Area data, which in the original is in Square Prussian Miles, is translated into Square Kilometers. 1 Square
Prussian Mile = 56.74 Square Kilometers.
176 1816 data, population of the Argentine Federation was approximately 0.5 Million people. See Rock, Argentina
1516-1987, p. 114.
177 Population number based on a 1942 partial census (made for war rationing purposes. Reported in Harvey H.
Smith, et. al., Area Handbook for Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1969). Area data
from 2006, CIA World Factbook http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.htmi
178 Population number from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, at
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/ and are data from CIA World Factbook
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html
'1 9Even if one considers population density for the entire Rio de la Plata area, rather than for Argentina alone, the
number is still around 4.5 people per square kilometer- lower than that of Congo. Rio de la Plata had a population
of about 1 million at 1810. See Scheina, Latin America's Wars, p. 41.
Is0 Note, also, that Fearon and Laitin have found that courtiers with higher population density are more likely to be
involved in civil wars, which they closely relate to state weakness. See Fearon, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil
War."
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Vast territories, on the other hand, are probably an obstacle to the maintenance of
government control, and thus to state building. In a world of border fixity, however, these
attributes are likely to be "self-adjusting:" if a state cannot control a particular tract of territory, it
is likely to loose this territory to another, who can. Argentina's experience, indeed, reveals such
practices. 1s
E. Conclusions: No Prior Advantage
The process of state building is complicated and protracted. It is also a varied process, which
can take several paths and is influenced by a multiplicity of factors. This section aimed to discuss
the variables most commonly believed to be the major preconditions for successful state
building. It finds that Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina did not enjoy favorable preconditions
over Lebanon and Congo for developing a strong state, judging by either of these criteria.
Comparing the preconditions in these four cases, the above discussion established that the
argument regarding population density simply does not stand up to the scrutiny of a simple
comparison at the relevant time, and a high population density, therefore, can not be considered
a determinant of state strength. While a literate population, a sound administrative base and a
relatively homogenous population would certainly make state building more likely to succeed,
none of them should be considered a precondition to strong statehood either. Brandenburg-
Prussia and Argentina succeeded despite not possessing most of these characteristics. Lastly, the
possession of capital (or commodities that one can exchange for capital) is crucial to state
building, but it can work both ways. Too easy access to capital can be as harmful to state
building as the lack of such access. As we shall see below, strong territorial pressures can
181 See Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism."
overcome both the relative lack of capital (in Brandenburg-Prussia) and its relative abundance
(In Argentina). The argument, thus, is not that all these variables do not matter when it comes to
state building. They do matter and some of them, in particular, might interact with the norms of
borders in interesting ways. Nevertheless, the argument is that one cannot deduce from the initial
intrinsic conditions of either Brandenburg-Prussia or Argentina that they were destined to create
strong states. Nor can one take these conditions as a proof that either Congo or Lebanon was
doom from the start to stay weak or get weaker.
Chapter 4: Brandenburg-Prussia, 1640-1740
After laying down the theoretical argument about the effects of differing normative
framework with regarding to borders in weak states, and after establishing a" level playing field"
with regard to the preconditions of state building, this chapter studies the first case of a weak
state in a flexible borders' world: Brandenburg-Prussia, from 1640 to 1740.
The case of Brandenburg-Prussia from 1640 to 1740 (from 1701 renamed the Kingdom of
Prussia) is studied here as a case of a state building process in a weak state in an environment in
which borders are flexible (that is, not fixed, amenable to changes) and there are no strong
normative obstacles to conquest and annexation. The time period of 1640 until 1740 was chosen
to fit the requirement of such a case. 1640 is the year in which, in the midst of the Thirty Years
War, Frederick William (later to be called "the Great Elector") accedes to his throne as the
Elector of Brandenburg. His state, at that point, was an extremely weak one. A century later,
after enduring a series of ferocious territorial wars, the King of Prussia (Brandenburg's
successor) ruled over a strong state, which also competed for power among the European Great
Powers.
As the cases of Brandenburg-Prussia 19th century Argentina (explored in the ext chapter) did
not have significant advantage, in terms of state building, over the two contemporary cases
(Congo and Lebanon), and as they faced a significantly different international environment, in
terms of territorial pressures, the historical cases serves me here as a basis for comparison with
the more recent ones. In that capacity, the cases of Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina will serve
to test Hypothesis 1, which stated that a system of flexible borders is likely to result, over time,
in stronger states. The Brandenburg-Prussia case, indeed, strongly confirms this hypothesis:
starting as an extremely weak state and facing a very harsh international environment, where its
territories were often threatened by strong enemies, Brandenburg-Prussia gradually developed
into a much stronger state, in socio-political terms: in 1740 the state had a complete monopoly
over the use of violence, a sound taxation system, an efficient bureaucratic machinery, a
relatively strong record of state services, and a fairly cohesive society, at least at the elite level.
This section, first, examines the weakness of Brandenburg-Prussia at the "starting point" in
1640. Second, it studies the geo-political pressures working on Brandenburg-Prussia during the
period under examination and shows how such an environment creates incentives and supplies
the vehicles through which a gradual process of state strengthening may take place.
A. Brandenburg-Prussia in the Mid 17 th Century: Weakness Across the Board
The 1640's Electorate of Brandenburg hardly enjoyed conditions favorable to a rapid process
of state building. As these preconditions would be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 8,
suffice it to say here that Brandenburg was geographically scattered, economically poor, and
deeply divided along religion and class cleavages. The population was sparse and the devastation
of the Thirty Years War great. Competing claims of sovereignty, moreover, precluded any
centralization.
Indeed, in the mid 17th century Brandenburg was an extremely weak state (if a state is at all
the right expression for this political unit). In geographical terms Brandenburg was a collection
of disconnected territories. "There was no state of Prussia. There was a clutch of distinct
territories- states if one wishes- which had all come, by the accident of hereditary descent, under
the dominion of George William of the ruling line of the Hohenzollerns"' 82 These separate
182 Finer, "State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," 134-45.
provinces with no territorial continuity stretched from the banks of the Rhine River (Cleves and
Mark) in the southwest to the shores of the Baltic Sea in the northeastern province of East
Prussia, more than a thousand miles away. Brandenburg itself, with Berlin as its capital, stood
roughly in the middle. This fragmented geography, as will be discussed later, situated
Brandenburg-Prussia in a maelstrom of geopolitical pressures.
At an age in which transportation was difficult (especially in the winter) and communication
slow, the geographical disparity discussed above was translated, quite inevitably, to political
disunity. The state's institutions were weak, inefficient and challenged from below and from
above. The reach of the prince and the state was almost non-existent. "When the thirty Years
War engulfed Brandenburg and the other Hohenzollern possessions," F.L. Carsten tells us, "no
progress at all had been made toward their unification and the creation of common
institutions." 83 Since throughout most of this war the Hohenzollerns' territories were largely
occupied by either Imperial or Swedish forces, the Elector's George William's control was, if
anything, even weaker during the war than before it broke down. The young Frederick William,
who took over the Hohenzollern's title in 1640, inherited an extremely weak state with a
profoundly limited reach into its own territories.
The challenges to the Prince's authority came first and foremost from below: A lingering
institution from the Middle Ages, the Estates- the representatives of the nobility, the clergy and
the cities' bourgeois- constituted one of the most important foundations of the society of the
European states. Note, though, that the Estates were not a unified statewide institution, but a
local one. In early 16th century Germany, the position of the Estates was as strong as ever.184
183 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, 88.
184 The German Estates at the turn of the 16th century retained two of their traditional components: the nobility and
the towns, while the third, the clergy, gradually disappeared as a consequence of the reformation. Nevertheless,
"They [the Estates], and not the prince, were the real rulers of the country, controlling the
finances and the administration, the Church, and the Universities, as well as all appointments in
state and Church." ' 85 The Estates in the Hohenzollerns' territories- Brandenburg, East Prussia,
Mark and Cleves-- were reluctant, to say the least, to give away any portion of their power to a
central authority.
At the same time that Frederick Williams' authority was questioned from below, it was also
restricted, if loosely, from above. As a German Prince within the domains of the Holly Roman
Empire, Frederick was officially a vassal of the Emperor in Vienna. This dualism of Prince and
Emperor should not be exaggerated. It would probably mean very little if the Austrian Emperor
were a weak power. He was not, however, and the Hohenzollerns' obligation to serve the
Habsburg Emperors played a significant role in many decision in Brandenburg-Prussia. Although
the Hohenzollerns were by no means always loyal to their Emperor, they could not ignore either
the power or the moral authority of the Habsburgs.' 86 Parts of the Elector's domains, however,
were situated outside of the confines of the Holly Roman Empire. In this part, East Prussia, the
Elector of Brandenburg was nominally a suzerain of the King of Poland. Though this
arrangement did not translate into actual Polish authority in the province, it did play into center-
periphery politics in Brandenburg-Prussia. The Junkers (Prussian nobles) often turned to "their
King" (the king of Poland) to counter the ambitious of "their Prince" (the Elector of
Brandenburg). 187
with the division of nobility to higher and lower ranks, the triangular structure of the institution remained intact.
See Ibid., 165-78.
185 Ibid., 66.; George A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1955), 1-3.
186 On the position of the Emperor vis-i-vis the Princes after the Thirty Years War, see John G. Gagliardo, Germany
under the Old Regime, 1600-1790 (New York: Longman, 1991). Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany
1640-1840 (New York: Knopf, 1973), pp. 3-21.
187 See, for instance, the account of the Elector's struggle with K6nigsberg's Estates, in Carsten, The Origins of
Prussia, pp. 202-28.
Figure 5: Map of Brandenburg-Prussia, 1618- 1740
* Source of Map: World History at KMLA [http://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/germany/braabsfor.html]
B. Territorial Pressures in a Flexible Borders' World: 17 th and 1 8t h Centuries
Europe
The geography of Brandenburg-Prussia, no doubt, was an open invitation for international
pressures. Like most German states, it enjoyed little in the way of easily defensible natural
borders. Yet, in addition to these difficulties, the fact that the Hohenzollerns' territory was not
continuous but fragmented into three principle blocks of territory (see map above), presented a
further complication. 188 These scattered territories bordered, furthermore, some of Europe's
188 Dennis E. Showalter, The Wars of Frederick the Great (London: Longman, 1996), 221.
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strongest powers: France and the United Provinces on the west, Austria on the south, Poland and
Russia on the east and Sweden on the north. Indeed, Brandenburg-Prussia was a party to a
significant number of wars in the century from 1640 to 1740, most of them wars that involved
territorial issues. Table 3 shows a list of these wars.
As the military revolution expanded to north Europe (discussed in Chapter 2), the small
German states felt its burnt more than any other: the Thirty Years War (1608-1648) devastated
most of Germany, Brandenburg-Prussia included, and the occupation of Brandenburg-Prussia by
foreign forces made this geopolitical threat clear and omnipresent.
The fact that Brandenburg-Prussia's territory was surrounded by many other small and
vulnerable German states, on the other hand, served as a potential geopolitical opportunity; a
constant temptation to expand. The basic ingredients for strong geopolitical pressures (both
threats and opportunities), then, definitely existed in the Prussian case. The degree of actual
pressure, nevertheless, fluctuated. We need, then, to examine each era more closely.
For the first of the Hohenzollerns state builders, the Great Elector Frederick William, strong
geopolitical pressures did exist and they were perceived as such by the Elector. The record shows
quite clearly that the Electors' relentless efforts to transform the existing social order in
Brandenburg-Prussia during his reign in power were born predominantly because of the urgent
need to defend his territorial possessions (or even the survival of the state) against strong and
competent external forces.
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Table 4: Brandenburg-Prussia's Wars, 1640-1740189
Years Name of War Participants
1626-1648 Thirty Years War Most European States, including the Holly
Roman Empire (Habsburg), France, Sweden,
the Dutch Republic, Poland, and all German
states (Alliances varied greatly)
1655-1660 First Northern War Sweden, Russia and Denmark
Vs. Poland and the Empire
(Brandenburg-Prussia first allied with Poland
than with Sweden)
1672-1678 Dutch War of Louis Brandenburg-Prussia allied with the Empire
XIV and the Dutch Republic, against France,
England, MUnster and Cologne
1675-1679 Swedish- Brandenburg-Prussia allied with the Dutch
Brandenburgian War Republic and Denmark against Sweden
1686-1687 Habsburg-Ottoman Ottoman Empire vs. the Empire, Poland and
War various German states (including
Brandenburg-Prussia)
1689-1697 War of the Grand Brandenburg-Prussia allied with the Empire,
Alliance (Or War of England Spanish Netherlands, and Savoy-
189 Years for war express the years in which Brandenburg-Prussia's troops participated in the war.
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the League of Piedmont against France
Augsburg)
1701-1713 War of the Spanish Prussia allied with the Empire, Portugal, the
Succession Netherlands, England and Sardinia, against
France, Spain and Bavaria
1713-1720 Great Northern War Prussia allied with Russia, France,
Denmark, Saxony and Hanover, against
Sweden, Poland, and the Ottomans
1733-1738 War of Polish Prussia allied with the Empire, Saxony and
Succession Russia, against France, Spain, Sardinia and
Bavaria
** Sources for Table 3: Philip G. Dwyer, "Introduction," in Philip G. Dwyer, ed., The Rise of Prussia, 1700-
1830 (New York, Longman, 2000), pp. 18-19; World History at KMLA, available at:
[http://www.zum.de/whkmla/military/germany/milxprussia2.html], accessed 8/2/2006.
Frederick William's ascendance to the position of the Elector of Brandenburg took place in
the midst of the Thirty Years War, in 1640 (Brandenburg was involved in the war since 1626).
As a teenager, the prince felt the brunt of war directly, as he had to flee Berlin to Kanigsberg (in
East Prussia) for fear of foreign occupation. Most Hohenzollerns' territories (which were
acquired gradually through a combination of diplomacy and marriages) were occupied
throughout the war by the Dutch, the Swedes or the Imperial armies of the Habsburgs. All these
armies, whether enemies or allies of Brandenburg, robbed the country of any possible asset they
could lay hands on; looting, killing and coercing both the towns and the countryside to pay heavy
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taxes. The prince saw his father's futile attempts to relay on diplomatic alliances and foreign aid
to regain his lands' 90
In fact, Frederick William himself, as a young ruler, tried to use the same tactics: he switched
alliances between the Habsburgs and Sweden for the Swedes' promise of leaving his territories.
Without a credible way to enforce it, however, the Elector soon discovered this promise to be
nothing but an empty shell. Sweden's forces left Brandenburg's territory, eventually, only when
they faced a threat to their rear from a Danish assault. As will be discussed below, Brandenburg-
Prussia succeeded, eventually, to survive the war and preserve its pre-war territories, by raising a
sufficiently strong army by 1648.
The peace that followed the Thirty Years War, however, proved short and elusive. The 1655-
1660 Polish War (or the First Northern War) started as Charles X, king of Sweden, intended to
attack Poland, moving through Hohenzollern's land in East Pomerania and the ports of East
Prussia, in his efforts to turn the Baltic Sea into a "Swedish Lake." Had Frederick William
agreed to cooperate with this Swedish plan he stood a reasonable chance of both losing these
territories to the Swedes and alienating the king of Poland, still a significant regional power and
the Elector's nominal feudal lord (as the Duke of Prussia). A policy of passive neutrality,
therefore, was unlikely to profit Brandenburg-Prussia's interests. And indeed, by clever
diplomatic maneuvers, backed by efficient (though still not very large) army forces,
Brandenburg-Prussia was able not only to keep it's lands intact, but to profit from the Polish war
by making Prussia an autonomous state (no longer a Polish vassalage). The army was not kept as
190 Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1-2, Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis.", White, The Prussian Army,
4-5.
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is after the Treaty of Olivia ended the war, though, but was reduced to a skeletal force that
enabled it to mobilize again quickly in case of emergency.'91
Such an emergency, though, was forthcoming. In 1667 Frederick William faced a new threat,
this time to his western provinces, Mark and Cleves. This threat came from the prominent
military force of the era: Louis XIV's France. Louis desired to expand France's borders to the
Rhine River. The main opponents to such an attempt were the Dutch, but in order to fight either
the Spanish Netherlands or the United Provinces, Louis had to cross through German land,
including that of the Hohenzollerns. For the next decade, the "Sun King" would make repeated
attempts at destroying the Dutch and, on the way, their German allies. Louis faced, at the start,
an overwhelming coalition that included the United Provinces, England, Sweden, and the
German Princes (with the reluctant support of the Habsburg emperor). This alliance, however,
did not last long, and Louis was able to isolate the Dutch and their German allies, with Frederick
William at their head.
The Hohenzollern's western provinces suffered greatly under repeated French attacks and
occupation, yet the greatest threat to Prussia was still to come. As Frederick William was trying
to recover from a painful defeat by the French in the winter of 1675, he got alarming news:
Sweden had invaded Brandenburg's lands and was threatening Berlin. Frederick William could
not react immediately but had to wait for the spring to come. Then, with a surprising and
decisive move that bought him the popular title of "The Great Elector," he returned with his
forces to Brandenburg and managed to defeat the great Swedish army before it was able to take
Berlin.' 92
191 White, The Prussian Army, 26-31.
192 Ibid., 32-45.
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The Great Elector's Brandenburg-Prussia, then, faced imminent external threats during his
reign, stemming from both its geographical characteristics and its powerful neighbors. Generally
speaking, this threat was genuine, not an artifact of Frederick William's desire for power. The
Elector definitely took what opportunities he had to expand the state's power but, in light of the
evidence, it would be fair to say that these opportunities were almost always an outcome of the
successful repelling of territorial threats.
Although the reign of the two next rulers of Brandenburg-Prussia, from 1688 to 1740, was a
less turbulent era, their basic conditions did not change much: they still faced a hostile external
environment, in which one's military power was almost the sole guarantee of one's territorial
integrity. Frederick 1H, who reigned from 1688 to 1713 (after 1701, as the King of Prussia, his
name changed to Frederick I), used his army mainly at the service of the Austrian Emperor.
Thus, Brandenburgian regiments were involved on the Austrian side (against France and its
allies) in 1688-1689, in the War of the Grand Alliance, and in 1701-1714, in the War of the
Spanish Succession.193 In that way, he also assured the Emperor's approval to some minor
territorial expansions, which he gained by inheritance, diplomacy or money. Thus, Prussia
gained the Counties of Moers and Lingen in 1702 and the towns of Neuchatel and Recklenburg
in 1707. King Frederick William I (1713-1742) was involved in the Great Northern War (against
Sweden) between 1715 and 1721. Prussia's success in this war gained it a portion of Swedish
Pomerania. All these wars involved both opportunities and risks to Brandenburg-Prussia. Thus,
Philip Dwyer concludes that all of Prussia's wars in the 1 8th century were fought with territorial
acquisition as an important goal. "This does not mean that Prussia went to war only with
193 On these wars and the Prussian Army role in them, see Ibid., 47-62.
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territorial gains in mind, but that at one stage or another territory became an important objective
in whatever war was being fought." 194
Moreover, even if one's army does not take a direct role in territorial conflicts, the fact that
such conflicts are taking place in one's close strategic environment entails a constant need for
alertness, readiness and preparations to war. Thus, the fact that reign of Frederick William I was
a relatively peaceful one does not mean that the sole purpose of his massive military buildup was
for parade ground purposes. The Prussian army was a great deterrent in an age in which the small
German princedoms were still a coveted price in the territorial squabbles of the surrounding great
powers.
One can conclude, then, that in the century under investigation in this chapter, Brandenburg-
Prussia faced continuous external territorial threats. Even though these threats vary in the level of
danger they pose to the state, they were always present. While in the earlier years these threats
manifested in severe wars that reached the heart of the Electorate, the 18th century saw less direct
threats to the core and more general tension and threats to peripheral territory. Part of the change
in the nature of threat, no doubt, could be attributed to Prussia's own acquired military strength,
which made it less an easy pray for stronger powers and more a coveted ally. The Electorate, and
later the Kingdom, also had opportunities for territorial expansion, which they took, though
much more cautiously then Prussia will do in the times of Frederick the Great (after 1740).
194 Philip G. Dwyer, "Introduction: The Rise of Prussia," in The Rise of Prussia, 1700-1830 (Harlow, U.K.:
Longman, 2000), pp. 17-19.
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Territorial Pressure and State Building
At this point, we should recall hypothesis 1, that a flexible borders' world provides incentives
and opportunities for states to become socio-politically stronger. The following discussion is an
attempt to corroborate this hypothesis.
a) Monopolizing the Use of Legitimate Force
As made clear above, the expansion of state power (in essence, at the 17 th century, those of
the Price), were widely resented by local elite in Brandenburg-Prussia. Both the Nobility and the
towns resisted the notion that the state needs a standing army in times of peace. The hitherto
situation was that no such army existed in the service of the state, and in times of need, the
Estates would recruit and finance local militias to defend their lands.' 95 These improvised
military arrangements, as we have seen, were no match for the modernized armies of Sweden,
France, the United Provinces (Netherlands) and the Habsburgs, that roamed the north German
plains in the Thirty Years War. Nevertheless, even under the extreme duress of that war the
Estates were keener to preserve their own power than to submit much needed resources for the
defense of their "state." When, in the final years of the war, the Estates of Brandenburg were at
last willing to provide some funds for Frederick William's army, it was more out of gratitude for
steps the Elector took to purge this army from corrupt colonels and rebellious mercenaries,
which blackmailed and looted towns in which they resided, than out of a need for protection
from outside powers.' 96 By the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, Frederick William, a quick learner,
'95 Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, 89.
196 Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1-3.
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managed to raise an army sufficiently significant to assure the Hohenzollerns their sustained rule
in all the territories they possessed before the beginning of the war. 197
As soon as peace came with the 1848 treaty of Westphalia, the Estates sought a return of the
status quo ante wherein the town's elite and rural nobility enjoyed much autonomy and much
say over both domestic and state affairs. This state of affairs did not include a standing army.
The assumption of the Estates was not that international war in the manner of the one just
concluded was here to stay, but that peace had come back and their prerogatives and leverages
over policy and taxation should be restored as well. Thus, the Estates of Brandenburg argued in a
letter to Frederick William in 1650, "The Swedes...are bound by the agreement [the Treaty of
Westphalia] not to use force against Your Electoral Highness." Rather than increasing the taxes
in order to raise a powerful army, they suggested to the Elector to "place your trust in a friendly
settlement and in your fellow Germans."' 98 Brandenburg's Estates argued, further, that "it was
unlikely that Pomerania, Prussia, or Cleves would help them in a similar contingency: therefore
Brandenburg should not mixed up in the quarrels of foreign provinces."' 199
Frederick William, on the other hand, sought to apply the lessons he learned in the Thirty
Years War and to emulate the Great European Powers by building a standing army in times of
peace, to serve as a permanent deterrent and as an insurance policy for renewed war. In this
endeavor, he faced an uphill struggle against the Estates. The traditional leadership of the towns
(which also represented them in the meetings of the Estates), by and large opposed the measures
of centralization offered by the Elector.200 In East Prussia, a fierce struggle of Kanigsberg's
197 White, The Prussian Army, 5-10.
198 Louis L. Snyder, ed., Documents of German History (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,
1958), 91-92.
199 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p. 185.200 Whereas some elements of the burghers and artisans in the towns of Brandenburg did organize to support the
center's steps, it was purely for economic reasons (namely, the hope that nationalized tax would elevate some of
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commoners and burghers to resist the Elector's sovereignty and taxation (including a call for
Polish intervention on their behalf) resulted in coercion of Frederick William's rule 1653 in. In
the Western provinces of Cleves and Mark, where the towns were traditionally stronger, the
initial result of the struggle did not favor the Elector. He was denied taxes, the right of
recruitment and the right to station troops in the territory without achieving prior consent of the
estates.20 1
The greater challenge for the Elector's centralization designs, nevertheless, came from the
direction of the nobility, the stronger and more important component of the Estates. After all,
"the Junkers were not only the chief holders of power in the economy and body politic; they also
possessed the highest social status in terms of prestige, deference, esteem and honor."202 To the
extent that the newly created absolutist state benefited the Junkers20 3 there is a general agreement
that the initiative was not of the Junkers', and the changes in the direction of centralization of
authority and monopolization over the means of power were more often than not bitterly opposed
by Brandenburg-Prussia's nobility. The "bargain" of 1653, to the extent that it was such, was
more an attempt by the Junkers to constrain the Elector's effort than an initiative to promote
them. 204
As Brandenburg's Estates feared, the next war was forthcoming. The main protagonists at the
1655-1660 Polish War were Sweden and Poland, but Brandenburg-Prussia played an important
role. There are conflicting accounts as to the question of whether Brandenburg's involvement in
their own disproportional burden). These hopes were, in the end, frustrated by the tendency of the Elector to back
the nobility in most conflicts between it and the towns. See Ibid., 193-99.
201 Ibid., 185-252.
202 Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy, 27-34.
203 This is an issue of a debate among historians. The traditional view (see Ibid. ; Carsten, The Origins of Prussia.) is
that the recess of 1653 and similar later agreements represent a modus vivendi between the power of the Prince
and the central government and the of the Junker nobility. Hagan 1989,, on the other side, sees in the recess more
a dictate of the Elector than a compromise between two comparable forces.
204 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis."
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this war between Sweden and Poland was a genuine act of self-defense or part of Frederick
William's plot to guarantee a standing army under his command, despite the Estates'
opposition.205 What is not conflicted is that Brandenburg's involvement in this war was a major
impetus for the consolidation of the state's monopoly over the means of violence. As the war
ended in the Treaty of Olivie, the standing army was reduced in size but not took apart, as was
customary before. 20 6 This army assisted the Elector in finally coercing Cleves and Marks' Estates
and securing his rights of taxation and recruitment in all of his territories. 2  By the end of end of
the Great Elector Frederick William's reign, in 1688, Brandenburg-Prussia had a 30,000 man
strong peacetime army, and the state arrogated to itself the sole right to recruit, finance and train
the military forces within its borders.
Accordingly, while the Elector Frederick III (1688-1713, King Frederick after 1701-1713)
took more interest in the court politics and in promoting the arts than both his father and his son,
he kept on expanding Brandenburg's army to 40,000 troops in 1713. Frederick kept his military
tuned by deploying it in the service of the Habsburg Emperor against Turkey and France.20 8 The
reign of Frederick William I (1713-1740), the next Prussian king in line, was characterized by
massive militarization of Prussia. Frederick William I is often regarded as the "father" of the
Prussian army, because of the increasing power of this institution that he personally was
205 Hans Rosenberg argues that the involvement in this war was an opportunistic move on the side of Frederick
William, who "began to base his shifty policy on the flimsy fiction of permanent state of war, on the 'necessity'
for perpetual military mobilization. Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy, 35-36. Jonathan White,
on the other hand, maintains that Frederick William was "reluctantly drawn into a conflict on his eastern border"
as a consequence of aggressive Swedish policy. White, The Prussian Army, 26.
206 White, The Prussian Army, 26-31.
207 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, pp. 229-52.
208 He used the military, moreover, to increase Brandenburg's (and his own) international standing by gaining the
Emperor's approval to make it a kingdom in 1701, and henceforth, Frederick gain the title of the Prussian King
Frederick I. In fact, the Emperor Leopold, who gave this title only reluctantly to Fredrick, sought to insult
Frederick by announcing him "a King in Prussia" (rather than "the King of Prussia"), but Frederick took this as an
achievement. He was named "King in Prussia" and not in Brandenburg in order to avoid a second title of King
within the realm of the Holy Roman Empire (which Eastern Prussia was not part of). See White, The Prussian
Army, 47-62.
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responsible for, and because of his personal interest in military affairs. The King also initiated a
sweeping reform of the military organization (the Canton System, to be discussed below). Yet,
oddly enough, his was a peaceful era. Frederick William's foreign policy was cautious and
moderate, and he made no attempts to use his formidable army for gaining subsidies (as his
father did) or expanding the realms of his kingdom (as his son will). At least partly as a result of
his military's deterrent effect, he was also spared the necessity to employ his army to defend his
lands, as his grandfather was obliged to do.20 9
Table 5: Brandenburg-Prussia's Military Size
Year End of Reign Size
1640 Elector George William No Standing Army
1688 Elector Frederic William 30,000
1713 Elector Frederick III/ King Frederick I 40,000
1740 King Frederick William I 80,000
b) Extraction of Revenues
Brandenburg-Prussia's changed geo-strategic situation, then, dictated the need for a standing
army, even in peacetime, and for the monopolization of the means of violence. Yet, these moves
were dependent, first and foremost, on the states' ability to extract the resources needed for
maintaining and expanding the army. As indicated above, taxation was, before 1640, the
prerogative of the local Estates: the crown was constitutionally banned and physically incapable
of deciding and implementing an independent taxation policy. The changing of the financial
209 Rodney Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism," in The Rise of Prussia, 1700-
1830, ed. Philip G. Dwyer (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 2000), pp. 59-66, White, The Prussian Army, pp. 63-78.
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landscape in the next 100 years went hand in hand with the process of monopolization of the
means of violence, each of them serving as a necessary condition and as means of
implementation of the other. In this 100 years taxation of Brandenburg-Prussia's population was
centralized, modernized and increased manifolds.
As the Thirty Years War was approaching its end, the Elector wished he could continue the
flow of taxation to its coffers in order to sustain the state's standing army, so as to be prepared
for future wars in a still dangerous area. Through a series of struggles with the Estates in his
various territories, not always successful, Frederick William gradually manage to impose two
forms of permanent taxes on his subjects. In the towns, an indirect tax, the Excise, outgrew from
wartime contributions to mercenary armies. Though initially intending to impose this tax on its
entire territory, the elector gave up to the Junkers demands and imposed the Excise only on the
towns. A direct tax, the Contribution, was collected in the countryside, but this, again, exempted
the nobles.2 0
This dual taxation system endured until the Napoleonic Wars, but the method of their
assessment collection and administration changed significantly. Collection and administration of
the Excise, for example, was under the responsibility of municipal authorities and the town's
alderman until the 1670's. Then, the Elector entrusted the overseeing, collection and auditing of
these taxes to the commissarius loci (the local branches of the Generalkriegskommissariat, the
General War Commissaries). This was initially a military agency, structured in a hierarchal way
and controlled by the crown. 2 11
210 Rudolf Braun, "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia,"
in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1975), 268-70.
211 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, 196-97, Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, 91-92.
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The burden of taxes in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Brandenburg-Prussia was, no
doubt, a very high one, in comparison to the standards of the times. In 1688, for example, Prussia
was extracting from its population twice the per capita sum in taxes than France (with a much
more prosperous population) did. An efficient tax system managed to turn this burden into high
revenues for the state, which, in addition to the taxes, enjoyed a large income from the crown's
domains. 2 12 During the Great Elector's reign, Brandenburg-Prussia's revenues trebled to over 3
million thalers, while its portion that came of taxes (about half in 1688) quadrupled.213 The
grandson of the Great Elector, King Frederick William I, has done much to restructure the
machinery of taxation, making it more efficient and more centralized. He thus managed to do
away with any foreign subsidies (which were still substantial at the time of his father), while
increasing the number of troops in his army from 40,000 in 1713 to 80,000 in 1740 and leaving a
substantial war chest for his successor.214
This financial burden, of course, was not curried equally: the peasants and the towns suffered
much more than the nobility. Even for the latter, however, this burden sometimes seemed
excessive. In 1717, for example, the East Prussian nobility complained in a letter to King
Frederick William I that his new taxes would ruin the country. "The whole country will be
ruined?" the king bluntly replied, "I don't believe, but I believe the Junkers' right to political
opposition will be ruined. I will stabilize the princely sovereignty like a rock of bronze" 215 By
the time of his successor, King Frederick II ("Frederick the Great"), however, little resistance to
the state's internal expansion is evident.
212 Braun, "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia," 295-96,
Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, 97-98, Edgar Kiser, and Schneider, Joachim,
"Bureaucracy and Efficiency: An Analysis of Taxation in Early Modern Prussia," American Sociological Review
59, no. 2 (1994): 187-204.
213 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p. 266.
214 Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism."
215 Quoted in Hagen Schulze, "The Prussian Military State, 1763-1806," in The Rise of Prussia, 1700-1830, ed.
Philip G. Dwyer (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 2000), 207-08.
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The military, indeed, received the lion share of the tax revenues. Systematic data is hard to
find, but some examples could well illustrate the point. The taxes collected by the relatively
inefficient system during the reign of the Great Elector (1640-1688) were never sufficient to
finance his 30,000-man standing army. This fact explains the Frederick Williams' extraordinary
efforts to pursue more payment of taxes, and to manage them more efficiently, as well as his
willingness to risk highly contentious struggles with the Estates.21 6 Even during the reign of the
least militaristic of the Hohenzollerns, King Frederick I (1688-1713), the army got 2.2 million
thalers of the 2.5 million thalers that were collected annually as tax revenue. While this number
does not include data from the domains of the king himself (most of the 1.5 million thalers of
revenue from there went for the court's expenses and for investment in civilian projects, such as
universities and infrastructure), they also not include considerable foreign subsidies (some 14
million thalers during Frederick I reign), which were given in return for military assistance and
were by and large directed back to the military. All in all, then, Frederick I, often regarded as the
one Prussian king who neglected the army, allowed it to swallow more than half of his overall
income.217 By 1740 (the year of Frederick the Great's ascendance to the throne), roughly 80
percent of Prussia's expenditures (of about 10 million thalers) went to the army. The results were
that Brandenburg-Prussia could pitch in the international arena well beyond its relative size,
population or economic development.
c) Development of State Bureaucracy
The development of the highly effective (relative to its time and the existing technology) and
centralized Prussian bureaucracy is connected at its heart to both the military and the taxation
216 Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, 250-52.
217 Linda Frey, and Frey, Marsha, Frederick I: The Man and His Times (New York: Columbia University Press,
1984), 156-57.
115
discussed above. The civilian bureaucracy has gradually developed out of the military one, and
its chief object was the enhancement of the state's revenues, which served primarily for military
purposes. As Otto Hintze commented, "It is no secret that the eighteen century Prussian
administrative organization derived its characteristic features from the commissarial authorities
that had chiefly developed out of the military commissary." 218
Until the Thirty Years War, regular peacetime administration (like the extraordinary wartime
taxation) was the domain of local and provincial nobility. As discussed above, during the reign
of the Great Elector the military authority (and related taxation) were appropriated by the Prince
and his central apparatus. Gradually, the military administration, working under the authority of
royal decrees, rather than under the traditional rule of law, was expanded to include more and
more civilian functions, until it virtually swallowed the old administrative mechanism.
The General War Commissaries was a body that the Great Elector created as an extraordinary
measure designed to mobilize scarce resources "in face of a dangerous military situation in
which the country's sovereignty was threatened." 2 19 However, with the 1672 war against France
(and the later one against Sweden) these functions swelled. The Commissaries (through the
commissarius loci), which at first concentrated on collecting taxes for military purposes,
intervened more and more in local administration, appointments and regulations. By the 1680's
these state officials were already in charge of most municipal tasks, including policing, judiciary
and administrative appointments. The autonomy of the town's traditional authorities was greatly
eroded. "These tax collectors were the standard-bearers of the royal authority in every part of the
218 Hintze, "The Formation of the State," 269.
219 Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, 92.
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Elector's territories, and inevitably their duties led them to encroach upon the jurisdiction of
local magnates and municipal administration." 220
The second wave of administrative reforms took place under the reign of Frederick William I
(1713-1740). This wholesale reorganization of the state apparatus consisted of a few parallel
moves. First, it centralized the organization of administration, under the new name of the
General Directory (at the top level) and the Board of War and Domains (at the provincial levels).
In contrast to the old General War Commissaries, these new bodies were to include also the
administration of the King's personal domains. Second, it deepened even further the authority of
the commissars at every level while, at the same time, broadened the geographical scope of their
authority to include all Prussian territories (some parts, such as East-Prussia and Pomerania were
not included under the Commissaries authority hitherto). Third, the civil administration ceased to
be under the authority of the military command and gained its own relative independence (still
subject, of course, to the decrees of the King).221
When the civilian administration was again separated from that of the military, then, it
already possessed all the characteristics of the latter. Now, by the mid eighteenth century, both
the military and the civilian administrations worked under the same strict and direct control and
supervision of the monarch, and by virtue of secret decrees, rather than open and regular rules.222
Another administrative innovation of Frederick William I was the military organization of
Prussia by the "Canton System," a centrally controlled regional system of recruitment and
administration of the military, which further enabled the penetration of the military into civilian
220 Quotation from Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 14. See also Braun, "Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure,
and State-Building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia,", Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, 196-97, Downing,
The Military Revolution and Political Change, 91-92.
221 Finer, "State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," 143-44, Hintze, "The Formation of the
State," 272-75, Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy, 39, 155.
222 Finer, "State- and Nation- Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," 141, Gothelf, "Frederick William I and
the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism," 61, Kiser, "Bureaucracy and Efficiency," 194.
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affairs and the militarization of the Prussian society. Moreover, the military affected civilian
bureaucracy in yet another way. From the mid seventeenth century until the end of the eighteenth
century, military veterans (and especially wounded veterans) came to dominate administrative
recruitment and gain preferences over any civilian with no military background for bureaucratic
appointments. In that way the Prussian military dominated not only the structure of civilian
administration, but also its spirit. The harsh and disciplined style, which characterized the
Prussian military, came to typify the civilian administration as well.223
d) Services and Public Goods
As discussed in chapter 4, another indicator by which to measure the effects of the pushing
and pulling of geo-strategic territorial pressures is the extent and the distribution of states'
investment and the supply of social services and / or political rights. When a ruler faces a
territorial threat from outside he or she should be willing to bargain with his or her subjects and
reach political and economic compromises in order to gain political support, manpower, or
money for the military.
In the age of absolutism, "giving away" political rights was, of course, not a part of the
Brandenburg-Prussia's Hohenzollerns' agenda.2 24 In the 18 th century this drive for absolutism
might have been predominantly ideological. In 1640, however, the centralization of the state was
chiefly, as discussed above, a reaction to external threat and the perception that the state's
weakness stems first and foremost precisely from the existing political rights of the Estates. In a
limited sense, though, the Great Elector was willing to compromise with his nobility, in order to
223 Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism," pp. 56-66, Kiser, "Bureaucracy and
Efficiency," 194-95, Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy, 64-65.224 For some possible reasons, see Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, Ertman, Birth of the
Leviathan.
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gain their political and financial support. In what is termed "the bargain of 1653," Frederick
allowed Brandenburg's Junkers to enhance their control over their own estates and become, in
effect, almost absolute rulers of their lands and their peasants. The Junkers also were, for the
most part, exempt from paying the Excise tax, which fell disproportionally on the town's
burghers. In return, the Estates (controlled by the nobility) agreed to finance, for a limited time,
Frederick's standing army. As discussed above, this enabled the Elector to coerce his way to an
ever-expanding strength of the military and the state. Yet, the bargain of the crown with the
nobility, which expanded later under more or less similar conditions to other parts of the
Hohenzollern's territory, withstood the test of time and extended until the 19 th century. While the
Junkers were given a great authority over their lands and their peasants, as well as substantial
exemptions from taxation, they served as the backbone of the army and the state bureaucracy. 225
When looking at supply of public goods and economic investment in historical cases, one
should move cautiously, since the concept of the welfare state and the extended role of the state
in investment and in bettering the life of its citizens is a feature of the 20 th century, and thus
hardly fit as a yardstick by which to measure an Early Modern European case. One needs to
examine each historical case in light of its specific historical context.
Taking this into account, we can nevertheless draw some very interesting insights from
Brandenburg-Prussia's investment and social policy. While a very harsh and militaristic society
(especially under King Frederick William I), Brandenburg-Prussia was one of the most advanced
welfare states by the standards of the 17 th and 18th centuries. The rulers of the Hohenzollern
house between 1.640 and 1740 realized that a better educated, healthier and safer society could
serve as the basis of a better army and produce more surplus to sustain this army. "While [King
Frederick William I] sought to bring efficiency to the courts, to civil service, and to business
225 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, pp. 202-28, 70-74, Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis."
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ventures," Jonathan White tells us, "the underlying purpose of his reforms was to create a state
that could support his vast military organization." 226 Accordingly, they invested in various
aspects of public life in their territories. Public safety was a prime consideration, and policing of
both urban and rural setting, although always limited in success, advanced significantly.
Firefighting in the towns developed as well. Urban development was promoted by such measures
as building of roads, wells and street cleaning. Measures were taken to advance the public health
and both private and public schooling, at every level. 227
In terms of economic policy, as well, the Hohenzollern rulers' aim was to create a larger base
for taxation and recruitment. Accordingly, they sought to expand both agriculture and commerce.
They faced huge obstacles in this endeavor, though. The poor soil and the scarcity of labor, the
result of the Thirty Years War, greatly diminished the agriculture in Brandenburg-Prussia. The
rulers tried to overcome these obstacles through restricting the freedom of peasants, but also
through the encouragement of immigration, and providing of incentives to the cultivation of new
(or deserted) tracts of land.228
The position of the industry was even less hospitable. In addition to the chronic scarce of
labor, the towns' industry and commerce suffered from both competition with cheaper and better
quality imports and, most notably, from the result of the state's own taxation system. In order to
solve the issue of foreign competition, Brandenburg-Prussia, in par with the mercantilist dogma
of the day, prevented import of many items. 229 For the Hohenzollerns, economic development
was more important than religious denomination and, thus, they accepted the Huguenots (which
226 White, The Prussian Army, p. 73.
227 For a comprehensive survey of these policies see Reinhold A. Dorwart, The Prussian Welfare State before 1740
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).228 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p. 269.
229 Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism," p. 60-61.
120
were deported from France) and various other immigrants and refugee communities230 to settle in
their towns, and their entrepreneurial spirit indeed helped to create some initial industry. By and
large, however, the heavy burden of taxation virtually stifled economic enterprises, and Prussia-
Brandenburg's towns' commercial activity remained weak in comparison to their counterparts in
Western Europe. 231
As indicated above, not only the extent of government spending is important, but its direction
as well. Continuing territorial threats might promote investments in the periphery, in the form of
military defense or of economic investments. Investment in the center, or the capital city, is, of
course, likely to continue, but is not likely to be very disproportional to investment in other
areas.
Again, systematic data on the distribution of funding and forces in the 17 th century
Brandenburg-Prussia is not available. However, it is clear that the Great Elector was not
concentrating his monies and forces in the center, at the expenses of the periphery (as we will see
happens in today's weak states). Brandenburg's Estates, for example, feared after the Thirty
Years War that by raising taxes to pay for the protection of faraway territories such as the lower
Rhine provinces or those in the Baltics, it would draw itself into war, rather than avoid it, and
further even more the burden on its already improvised population. These lands, they argued, are
foreign and not worthy of their scarce resources. The Prince, however, had his own agenda, and
it did not include the giving up of territory (to the French, in this case). 232 Apart from the
decisive war with the Swedes in 1675 and some crucial battles during the late stages of the Seven
Years War, Brandenburg-Prussia's frequent exercising of its military forces in the period of this
230 These included also Jews that were expelled from Vienna in 1671, Waldensians from Piedmont in 1686, and
Mennonites. www.zum.de/whkmla/region/germanv/braabsdom.html
231 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, pp.267-68.
232 Ibid., 183-84, Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, 246.
121
study was overwhelmingly in defense of peripheral provinces or in attempts to expand territory
(which was, inevitably, also to become a new periphery). Therefore, one can conclude that the
flow of money took usually took a centrifugal shape, rather than centripetal one.
Although Frederick III (later Frederick I) spent much more in Berlin, and especially in his
court, than in other parts of the state, his son, Frederick William I, revert back to the habits of the
Great Elector in terms of investing: the court was again reduced to bare minimum and the army
regained its primacy.
In terms of the public spending, services and investment facets of state building, then,
Brandenburg-Prussia of 1640-1740 portrays a mixed picture. The state of the Hohenzollems was,
compares to its era, a welfare state. It supplies towns with such common goods as public safety,
roads, water sources and cleanliness. In terms of assisting economic development, however, the
Hohenzollerns largely failed in their effort, mainly since it collided with the constant need for
cash to pay for the oversized army. Even the one area in which they failed to promote state
building, then, could be attributed to the Prussian need to both secure their territorial possessions
and augment them.
e) Ingroup Cohesion
As stated in Hypothesis 1, a flexible borders' world should, at least in theory, create threats
and opportunities that are likely to strengthen the socio-political cohesiveness of states. Has this
happened in Brandenburg-Prussia between 1640 and 1740? The answer is yes, but only in a very
limited sense.
As seen from the discussion above, the drive for state building and centralization was
overwhelmingly a top-down process, and not vice versa. However, one can still argue that while
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the territorial pressure did not by itself create a cohesive community out of the scattered
territories of the Hohenzollerns, it facilitated this process in two ways. First, while the Thirty
'Years War and subsequent geopolitical pressures do not seem, by themselves, to bolster the
legitimacy of the Hohenzollern rule, they certainly eroded the legitimacy of the rule of the
Estates. In the towns, the leadership of the alders, the old town nobility, was increasingly
questioned and challenged.233 In the countryside, meanwhile, the war created a sense of anarchy
regarding the peasant-lord relations.2 34 With the legitimacy and power of the Estates thus
decreasing, the new initiatives of the center to gain more and more control over Brandenburg-
Prussia were better positioned to succeed. It is unlikely that the Estates would have given up
their powers without putting up a much fiercer resistance had the war not crippled their
legitimacy already.
Second, while patriotism at the popular level certainly did not exist in 17 th and 18th
Brandenburg-Prussia, the nobility gradually developed a considerable attachment to the state.
Through their service at the army and at the state bureaucracy, the Junkers come to see the fate
of the monarchy as their own fate. By the end of the Great Elector's reign, "the officers' corps
became a reliable, strictly monarchical corporation, animated by common ideas; its members
began to feel themselves not as Pomeranian or Prussian [in the limited sense of coming from
East Prussia], but as owing loyalty to a wider entity, the Hohenzollern state."235 Accordingly,
they could (and were) be used by the crown against the Estates of their own province, even
though being part of it. 236
:2.3 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, pp. 193-99.
234 Hagen, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis."
235 Carsten, The Origins of Prussia, p. 272.
236 Ibid. While in the first part of the 18th there were still remnants of suspicions towards the Crown among the
territorial elite, they never amounted to anything closer to an open rebellion. For a discussion of this issue, see
Gothelf, "Frederick William I and the Beginnings of Prussian Absolutism."
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D. Brandenburg-Prussia: Summary
To sum up the Prussian case: Brandenburg-Prussia of 1640 was a very weak and vulnerable
state in a very rough environment, in which territorial wars and territorial conquests were
becoming the norm. These pressures compelled the Great Elector and his successors to embark
on the costly and often dangerous path of state building. They confronted the resistance of the
Estates, mainly the nobility, and endured this opposition through a combination of coercion and
cooptation. Gradually, the state gained the monopoly over the use of force and the means to
sustain this force. The state penetration of the society deepened as the needs of the ever-
expanding military required bureaucratization and centralization of authority. Thus, Hypothesis
la is strongly supported by the Prussian case: state institutions indeed grew stronger as a result of
the threats and opportunities supplied by an international environment in which territorial
conquests and annexations are prevalent. One could not that easily confirm the role of
Hypothesis lb in this case. While the legitimacy of the old order in Brandenburg-Prussia's
society did weaken as a result of the wars, and while there are some hints for the Prussian elite
developing a stronger affiliation of the state, there is no strong and direct evidence to confirm the
link between territorial pressures and the strengthening of the in-group socio-political cohesion
in this case. Hypothesis Ic, which relates the strengthening of the state to a mechanism of
selection, could not, of course, be deduced from a single case study. One can only say, at this
point, that while Brandenburg-Prussia gathered strength some of its neighbors did not take the
same path, a fact that will cost them dearly, in territorial loss. The ultimate example, though by
no means the only one, is Poland, which lost its independence in the late 18th century.237
237 Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, pp. 140-56.
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Chapter 5: Argentina 1810-1880
The purpose of the case of 19th century Argentina is to add another layer of verification to the
relation between territorial wars and state building in an era in which borders were not fixed. By
:studying a case outside of Europe, and one that is situated in a different time frame and a
different context (post-colonial), this section also broadens the application of the theory and sets
the stage for the study of the contemporary cases, which are discussed in the next chapter.
In the first half-century after its 1810 independence, Argentina as a single state was virtually
non-existent. By the 1880's, however, Argentina was much stronger state. Although probably
still weaker than 18th century Prussia, it saw significant progress in the project of augmenting
state authority, legitimacy, and institutions. In a similar way to the study of Brandenburg-Prussia
that was conducted in the previous section, this section documents the Argentinean case from
1810 to 1880 in order to study the effects of territorial war on the state building process. Again, I
follow the Hypothesis 1, offered above with regard to weak states in a system in which the
border fixity norm is absent, and assess whether the Argentinean case fits this hypothesis. I find
that Argentina largely fits this hypothesis, but with a twist: as the territorial pressures on 19 th
century Argentina were less severe than these endured by Brandenburg-Prussia, the end result of
state building was significant, but still less total than in the former case.
A. Buenos Aires and Rio de la Plata in 1810: A City Aspires to be a State
The Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata was established in 1776 as an attempt by the Bourbon
kings of Spain to reform their South American empire in the face of their declining power vis-h-
vis other European powers, most of all, Britain. The results, however, were both domestic (South
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American) discontent and an escalating international competition in the Atlantic Ocean and its
South American shores. In 1806 this competition led to a British occupation of Buenos Aires.
Eventually, Spain regained control of the Viceroyalty capital, but the force that defeated the
British was a local portefio (natives of Buenos Aires) militia, not the Spanish troops or the
Viceroy, who escaped to Cordoba. This victory gave Buenos Aires a glimpse of independence
and a first experience of the waning power of Spain.238 When, in 1810, news arrived from
Europe that Napoleon Bonaparte has seized control of Spain and deposed the King, Buenos
Aires was first among the Latin American colonies to react: a gathering of influential citizens in
Buenos Aires, the cabildo abierto (open town meeting), seized - in the name of the Spanish
King, Ferdinand MII - power from the Spanish Viceroy of the Rio de la Plata (River Plate). Thus
began the wars of independence of what would later become Argentina.239
As discussed in Chapter 6, the Rio de la Plata, part of which would become Argentina,
enjoyed in 1810 little in the way of favorable conditions for a successful project of state building.
It was a vast land, sparsely populated, and containing within its nominal borders diverse groups
of people, who often had different cultural traits, distinct social systems, and opposing economic
interests.
Geographically speaking, Buenos Aires faced the almost impossible challenge of uniting an
area encompassing about one third of the continent. Rio de la Plata could be divided roughly into
five regions, differing vastly in cultural, economic and geographical traits (See Figure 6). First,
the province of Buenos Aires was characterized by the economic combination of reliance on
238 Lyman L. Johnson, "The Military as Catalyst of Change in Late Colonial Buenos Aires," in Revolution and
Restoration: The Rearrangement of Power in Argentina, 1776-1860., ed. Mark D. Szuchman, and Brown,
Jonathan C. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, pp. 41-53.
239 Johnson, "The Military as Catalyst.", David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonization to the
Falklands War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 73-76, Scheina, Latin America's Wars, pp.
41-43.
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foreign trade (as the entrep6t for the system of rivers of the Parana and the Uruguay), and by the
pastoral economy of its vast hinterland. What became the littoral provinces-Entre Rios, Santa
Fe, and Corrientes (within the colonial borders of Buenos Aires Intendency) and Misiones, to
which one could add Banda Oriental (present-day Uruguay)-were dependent to a significant
degree on the trade over the Parana and Uruguay. The littoral economy, a mix of agriculture,
small industry and livestock, was vulnerable to foreign competition and to Buenos Aires' control
'(and taxation) ,of the navigation of the rivers. Therefore, it was bent on demands for
protectionism. The Intendency of Paraguay was the most isolated region and differed markedly
from the rest of the country in its demographic traits. A large portion of the population was
Mestizos (a mix of Spaniard and the indigenous Guarani) and its economy was based on
agriculture, and especially on the yerba mate crop. The Interior provinces included the
Intendancies of Salta and Cordoba and the Governorship of Chiquitos. While different from each
other, all shared an economic orientation toward the east, whether the mines of Potosi, or Chile,
across the Andes. Lastly, Upper Peru (present-day Bolivia), included the colonial Intendancies of
Potosi, Charcas, Cochabamba, and La Paz, as well as the Governorship of Moxos. It was a
traditional economic center of the Viceroyalty, with its huge silver mines, and an insatiable need
for mules and tools for the mining enterprise. Upper Peru's social structure was different than
that of other provinces, and was based on a more rigid differentiation between the Indian
majority and the small white (Creoles and Peninsulares- Spaniards) upper class. In this sense, as
well as economically, Upper Peru resembled Peru more than it did the rest of the River Plate
area. 240
:140 Halperin-Dongh-i, Politics, Economics, and Society in Argentina, pp. 3-64, Lynch, "From Independence to
National Organization," pp. 1-15.
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Figure 6: The Viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata (River Plate), 1776-1810
VICEROYALTY
OF
RIO DE LA PLATA
MIVITDED ACCOVDINGC
TO ItTENLDANCIlS
* Source: http://www.coloradocollege.edu/Dept/HY/Ashley/HY 104/images/MapKeys/ViceRoyalties.jpg
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As in 1640 Brandenburg-Prussia, here geographical, social, and economic disunity translated
into political disunity. In the first half of the 19 th century, Argentina did not exist as a single
state. Even after the wars of independence subsided in the earlier 1820's and Spain was finally
defeated as an important factor in South American politics, the country (now significantly
smaller, with the succession of Bolivia and Paraguay, and Uruguay under Brazilian control) was
by no means a unified whole. For the next 30 to 40 years, Argentina found itself in the grip of a
constant struggle between the center and the provinces, in which the center never achieved a full
control over the entire territory. "The elimination of the royal authority resulted in fourteen
autonomous provinces based largely on colonial municipalities. In this situation the caudillo241
emerged as the principal element of local order." 242
Argentina was engaged in a constant struggle between the hegemonic pretensions of Buenos-
Aires and the centrifugal drive for autonomy of the provinces. Civil wars and wars among the
various caudillos were commonplace in Argentina in the first part of the 19 th century.243 That
ultimate condition of stateness, a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, then, was clearly
lacking.
The breakdown of colonialism and the protracted wars of independence, moreover, left
Argentina's administration and governing machinery (to the small extent that it existed before) a
shambles. 244 In this area, as well, the reach of Buenos Aires was very limited in the first decades
after independence. Most of the taxes Buenos Aires could extract, because of its strategic
241 Caudillos were semi-feudal ranchers who oftentimes exhibited typical warlord characteristics and commanded
private militias.242 James R. Scobie, Argentina: A City and a Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 91.243 Fernando lopez-Alvez counts at least seventeen such cases of civil war and major revolts against the central
government between the end of the independence wars and 1880. See Lopez-Alves, State Formation and
Democracy in Latin America, pp. 160-61. See also Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 30-
41, J.G. Merquior, "Patterns of State-Building in Brazil and Argentina," in States in History, ed. J.A. Hall
(Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 255-56.
244 Centeno, Blood and Debt, p. 51.
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location, were import and export duties. Other, more direct, taxing, was virtually impossible, first
and foremost because of the lack of territorial control, but also due to the lack of institutions
needed to collect and manage these monies. 245 The judiciary system, as well, was for the most
part given to the administration of the local caudillos, rather than being a part of the central state
administration, and the schools were the sole prerogative of the church. Until 1857 there was not
even a common constitution that applied to the whole of Argentina. 246
The authority of the central government in Buenos Aires was challenged on two different
levels. The first level, until about 1824, was the Spanish reluctance to see its colonies taken.
Spain posed a significant and continuous challenge to the revolutionary regime in Buenos Aires
not only because it was still a formidable military and naval power, that had various degrees of
success against the porteiios' army, and successfully denied Buenos Aires the control of
Paraguay, Upper Peru and, up to 1814 also Uruguay (more details below). Spain also posed a
challenge in terms of the continuous support it received from various segments of the population
in the River Plate provinces.
The second level of challenge was the reluctance of the provinces to accept the superiority
and the control of Buenos Aires. Cast either in the form of attempts to succeed or in federalist
language (and usually both at different stages), the provinces of Paraguay, Upper Peru, Banda
Oriental, the Littoral, and the Interior were in a constant struggle with Buenos Aires over the
legitimate form of relations and political governance in the former Rio de la Plata. As the center
did not possess the power to subjugate the separatist or federalist aspiration of the provinces,
245 Miguel A. Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," American
Journal of Sociology 6 (1997).246 Halperin-Donghi, Politics, Economics, and Society in Argentina, Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, pp. 79-80.
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these challenges often translated into de facto long periods of independence and separate rule for
the center and the provinces.247
B. Territorial Pressures in 1 9 th Century South America
"Looking at the nineteenth century South America...one sees patterns of peace and war,
interventions, territorial predation, alliances, arms-racing, and power-balancing quite similar to
those found in eighteen century Europe." 248 Argentina was no exception and, as can be seen in
Table 6 below, it engaged in international wars almost throughout the entire 1810-1880 period,
with only short respites. Most of these wars involved multiple campaigns and often multiple
adversaries.
The wars of independence, which lingered from 1810 to the early 1820's, were viewed very
differently from different vantage points. From the Spanish point of view these were simple
rebellions, which had to be crushed, by brutal force if necessary. Spain could not afford to lose
Rio de la Plata, not so much because of its intrinsic value as because of the precedent the loss
might set for its entire colonial possessions. For the provinces, it was at the same time a war for
independence from Spain and from the pretensions of Buenos Aires. While some elites in the
provinces still saw the 1810's Spain as a legitimate ruler, they did not think the portefios enjoyed
a similar mandate. What matters most for the purpose of this study, however, is Buenos Aires'
point of view, which depicted the war as being both about asserting the Creole right of
independence from the Spanish empire and about their legal and practical right to inherit the
entire Spanish Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata and as well as preserving its borders. In these tasks,
they faced many challenges and threats.
:247 Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization.", Merquior, "Patterns of State-Building in Brazil and
Argentina.", Scheina, Latin America's Wars, pp. 113-3 1.
:48 Holsti, The State., War, and the State of War, p. 152.
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Table 6: Argentina's International Wars, 1810-1880249
Name of War Year(s) Participates Territorial Results?
Wars of 1810-1824 Rio de la Plata (Argentina) Loss of Upper Peru,
Independence against Spain and Royalists in Paraguay and Banda
Upper Peru (Bolivia), Oriental
Paraguay, Banda Oriental
(Uruguay), and against Brazil
(Portugal)
Cisplatine/ 1825-1828 United Provinces (Argentina) Uruguay gains
Uruguayan against Brazil. Both had independence
Independence supporters in Banda Oriental
Invasion of Peru- 1837-1838 Buenos Aires and Chile vs. Status-quo ante
Bolivia Peru-Bolivia Confederation
Confederation
Guerra Grande/ 1836-1851 Buenos-Aires and some Argentina repels
War of La Plata Argentine Provinces vs. Brazil, invasion attempts and
Bolivia, Uruguay, Britain, survives the naval
France, and some Argentine blockade
provinces
Triple Alliance/ 1864-1870 Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay The Triple Alliance wins
Paraguayan War vs. Paraguay Argentina gain some
territory
War with the Indians Repeatedly Buenos Aires and Provinces Buenos Aires
1810-1979 Vs. Indian tribes expand southward
249 Sources: Centeno, Blood and Debt, p. 44, Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, pp.
160-63, Scheina, Latin America's Wars, pp. 41-53, 93-104, 13-25, 313-32, 67-69.
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The most intense threat to the whole revolutionary project was presented, until spring 1814,
by the Spanish presence and control of Montevideo. Even if one discounts the possibility of the
Spanish forces in the Banda Oriental to pose, by themselves, a threat to Buenos Aires, their base
could have served as a launching ground from two directions. Montevideo, as a port that lies on
the banks of the Plata River, closer to the mouth of the Atlantic than to Buenos Aires, some 125
miles away, could have served as an entrep6t and a base camp for re-conquest expeditions from
Spain. The proximity of Montevideo to Buenos Aires also made it a center of the re-conquest
plans of the Spanish forces in Peru, the center of the South American colony. Indeed, after two
expeditions that tried to wrest Montevideo from the Spanish and failed, by 1814 "it become
critical [for Buenos Aires] to capture Montevideo in order to eliminate it as a base of operation
for the Spanish navy, as a possible port of disembarkation for a Spanish Army, and as a potential
supply center for Royalist army moving southward from Upper-Peru." 250
In May 1814 the Spanish surrendered in Montevideo, but while the city was captured by
Buenos Aires, the countryside was ruled by local (Orientales) caudillos, headed by Jose Artigas.
In 1816, however, Brazil (still a Portuguese colony) entered the fray in the Banda Oriental, and
by 1820 it defeated both the overstretched forces of the United Provinces of South America
(Argentina's name after the 1816 Congress of Tucuman) and Artigas. Portugal annexed Banda
Oriental in 1819., calling it the Cisplatine Province of Brazil. 25 '
Upper Peru, with the declining but still important silver mines of Potosi, was a much-coveted
prize for both Argentina and the Royalists still entrenched in Lima. As early as 1809, La Paz was
the first city in Latin America to declare independence from Spanish rule. Nevertheless, as the
2:50 Scheina, Latin America's Wars, p. 41-50, quote from p. 49.
:' Ibid., pp. 51-52.
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Viceroy's forces soon defeated the rebellion, the region remained a Royalist stronghold for years
to come. Forces from Buenos Aires and other Argentinean provinces tried repeatedly to take
possession of the provinces of Upper Peru. Some of these expeditions indeed succeeded in
conquering significant parts of it, but reinforcements from Peru always managed, with significant
help of the local elites, to restore the Spanish rule. On the other hand, Royalist attempts to use
Upper Peru as a base to regain the east provinces of Argentina failed as well: "Annually between
1817 and 1822 the Royalists in Upper Peru invaded Rio de la Plata... the revolutionaries of Rio
de la Plata felt, therefore, seriously threatened by Royalist forces."252
The repeated failure of the expeditions to Upper Peru persuaded one of the leading figures
who joined the revolution in Buenos Aires to try a different method to deal with the persisting
Spanish threat. Jose de San Martin, who would become second only to Bolivar in the pantheon of
Latin American liberators, figured that the only way to rid Rio de la Plata of the Spanish menace
was to attack the core of the Spanish empire: Lima. He assembled, trained, and equipped a force
of over 5,000 men, who crossed the Andes in 1817, to advance on Santiago (Chile), and
eventually take Lima by sea. Although it was Bolivar who ultimately defeated the Spanish at
Upper Peru, San Martin's forces did much to enable this scenario, allowing Bolivia to declare
independence by 1825. 253 Thus, by the mid 1820's, Buenos Aires lost the hope of controlling
Upper Peru, but was no longer threatened by the Spanish forces operating from this high altitude
base.
Compared to Argentina, the struggle for Paraguay was much shorter and more decisive.
Asuncion was remote, hardly accessible, and offered neither the coveted silver of Upper Peru nor
the strategic location of Montevideo. A combined force of Spanish troops and Paraguayan
252 Ibid., pp. 52.
253 Ibid., pp. 41-70. See also Rock, Argentina, 1516-1982, pp. 80-83.
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Creoles defeated the expeditionary force sent by Buenos Aires and forced its leader, Manuel
Belgrano, to sign a truce. In effect, this truce led to the independence of Paraguay, as an 1811
rebellion led by Jose Francia deposed the Spanish rule. Francia became the dictator of an
independent Paraguay. 254
By the mid 1820's, Spain was routed throughout South America and no longer posed a threat
to the new nation (on paper) of the United Provinces of South America (Argentina). Throughout
the decade and a half of the independence wars, as well as several decades after them, the center
in Buenos Aires was in a constant struggle with many of the provinces in the Littoral and the
Interior. These struggles are dealt with below, in a discussion of the consolidation of power.
The United Provinces enjoyed only a brief respite between the international wars, and in
1825 they were already engaged in another war with Brazil (which was by now independent of
Portugal), the Cisplatine War, or the War of Uruguayan Independence. The United Provinces,
together with their Orientales allies, challenged Brazil's rule in Montevideo. Brazil, as well, was
supported by its share of the local population, although they were probably less numerous than
the supporters of the United Provinces. The war was conducted by land and by sea, and included
a Brazilian blockade of Buenos Aires. After three years of fighting, the war drew to a stalemate,
with neither side managing to claim a decisive victory. Both Brazil and the United Provinces
faced serious internal challenges and thus they agreed to British mediation, which brought the
conflict to an end by creating a new independent state, Uruguay, as a buffer state between the
two.255
The late 1830's saw the abortive attempt by the Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires
(the United Provinces did not function as a single entity at the time) to invade the newly
254 Rock, Argentina, 1516-1982, p. 83, Scheina, Latin America's Wars, pp. 44-45.
255 Rock, Argentina, 1516-1982, pp. 102-03, Scheina, Latin America's Wars, pp. 93-104.
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established confederation of Peru and Bolivia. The main reasons for Rosas' involvement in that
war between the confederation and Chile were a territorial dispute over the province of Tarija
and a perception of the confederation as a possible future threat to the United Provinces. 256
The same years also saw the beginning of what came to be the Guerra Grande, a war which
lasted, on and off, for fifteen years. This was a war that mixed internal and external struggles for
power. The Guerra Grande pitted Buenos Aires (leaded by Rosas), its Federalist allies in the
provinces, and the Blancos party in Uruguay, against the Unitarists (the liberal portefio party,
mostly exiled in Montevideo), the Colorado party of Uruguay, and France and Britain. In the
war's later stages, Brazil also joined the forces opposing Rosas. While involving a prolonged
(and not very effective) naval French and British blockade of Buenos Aires and occasional land
invasions of the province, the protagonists never really threatened the United Provinces as a state
or its borders. The fight was, instead, over political control in both Buenos Aires and
Montevideo. In December 1851, a coalition of forces, led by General Justo Jose Urquiza, finally
defeated Rosas and ended his prolonged and controversial rule over Buenos Aires. 257 Although
internal war between Buenos Aires and the provinces, as well as campaigns against the Indians
persisted (to be discussed below), Argentina was free for the next dozen years from an
international war.
The next international war, the last in which Argentina was involved in the 19 th century, was
the War of the Triple Alliance, or the Paraguayan War of 1864-1870. This war involved an
alliance of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay against tiny Paraguay. Despite the obvious imbalance,
this was a long, protracted war, and the bloodiest in the history of South America since the wars
256 Scheina, Latin America's Wars, pp. 117-18.
257 Ibid., pp. 118-23.
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of independence,.258 For Argentina, now nominally unified under the presidency of General
Bartolome Mitre, the involvement in the war arose from both defensive and expansionist
motives.259 On the expansionist side, Argentina and Paraguay disputed the.control of an area
:36,000 square miles wide. Argentina won this territory after the defeat of the Paraguay. The fact
that gaining this territory was entered into the contract of the Triple Alliance in advance proves it
was not simply an afterthought of the victory, but one of the wars' motives.
The more serious reason for Argentina's involvement in the war, however, was defensive in
nature. Argentina. was threatened by Paraguay for three distinct yet related reasons. The first
reason was that Paraguay, despite its small size and limited resources, managed to field a
formidable military, in South American terms. The "Prussia of South America" had between
.38,000 and 57,000 men under arms, 26 0 and its leader, Francisco Solano Lopez, entertained hopes
of playing a major role in the regional balance of power. Indeed, it was Lopez who brought
Argentina into the war by invading its territory and seizing the city of Corrientes on the Paraguay
River, on his way to Uruguay. Second, even more than the direct threat it posed, Lopez was a
threat to Argentina through his active attempts (and his likely potential) to create alliances with
forces inside Argentina's Littoral and Interior to challenge Buenos Aires once again. The
precarious national unity that Mitre's government was trying to achieve was constantly
threatened by centrifugal forces in the provinces, which sought autonomy and a lifting of Buenos
Aires's burden. Caudillos uprisings, like "El Chaco" in La-Rioja province in 1863, were
common throughout the 1860's. Lopez was a natural ally in those revolts and, thus, a grave
258 Paraguay lost almost its entire male population, about 300,000. Brazil lost 100,000, Argentina 20,000 and
Uruguay about 1,500. See Ibid., p. 331.
259 For surveys of the war, its origins and its causes, see Diego Abente, "The War of the Triple Alliance: Three
Explanatory Models," Latin American Research Review 22, no. 2 (1987), Pelham H. Box, The Origins of the
Paraguayan War (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), Scheina, Latin America's Wars, pp. 312-32.
260 For different estimations, see Abente, "The War of the Triple Alliance," pp. 54-55, Scheina, Latin America's
Wars, p. 3 14.
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threat to Buenos Aires. 26 1 David Rock, therefore, argues: "Mitre needed little inducement to join
forces [with Brazil and Uruguay] as he feared that an alliance between Lopez and Urquiza might
emerge and subsequently support dissident caudillos like Verala [the heir of "El Chaco"] in the
interior".262 Mitre's aim was, therefore, "to remove the internal threat to his regime by kicking
away its external props." 263
Paraguay, though, was a threat in yet another, less direct, sense. It stood as a fairly successful
example of separatism (from the Rio de la Plata) and of caudillo-like anti-liberal rule. It was the
model that the Argentinean Interior was lacking. A war on Paraguay and on Lopez would also
be, therefore, a war upon separatism and upon caudillismo as a socio-political principle, which
Mitre perceived to pose a great threat to Argentina. 264 It is no wonder, then, that Juan Batista
Alberdi (the author of the 1853 Argentinean constitution and a prominent figure in the opposition
to Mitre) argued that "The problem of Paraguay is nothing more then another face of the problem
of Argentina's interior. The question of the provinces is the sole cause and origin of the
Paraguayan war."265
Lastly, one should pay attention to the wars with the Indians. The Indians were, of course,
not a foreign state per se. They were, however, a foreign threat to Argentineans, and a mostly
territorial threat at that. By the early 1800's the Indians of the pampas, known collectively as the
Ranqueles, were not very numerous, but controlled (or at least prevented others from controlling)
huge swaths of land in the southern part of the province of Buenos Aires. Although the Spanish
crown claimed the entire Southern Cone of the continent as its own, it never colonized or
261 William H. Katra, The Argentine Generation of 1837: Echeverria, Alberdi, Sarmiento, Mitre (London:
Associated University Press, 1996), pp. 240-64, F. J. McLynn, "The Causes of the War of Triple Alliance: An
Interpretation," Inter-American Economic Affairs 33, no. 2 (1979): pp. 36-37.
262 Rock, Argentina, 1516-1982, p. 127.263 McLynn, "The Causes of the War of Triple Alliance: An Interpretation," pp. 36-37.
264 Ibid.: pp. 37-38, Merquior, "Patterns of State-Building in Brazil and Argentina," p. 286, Nicholas Shumway, The
Invention of Argentina (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 237-38.265 Shumway, The Invention ofArgentina, p. 237. See also Box, The Origins of the Paraguayan War, p. 276.
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controlled the pampas south and west of Rio Salado (not very far from the city itself), or
Patagonia. These territories were considered by other powers as res-nulius, no-man's land. The
Indians of the plains, as a response to the repeated encroachments on their land, often attacked
villages and towns, killing or enslaving their residents. The Buenos Aires government replied
with almost annual expeditions during the 1820's and the building of border garrisons. Three big
expeditionary forces, in 1828, 1833 and 1879, claimed much of this Indian land for "white"
settlements and ranching.266
By 1980, Seventy years of warring came to an end. The War of the Triple Alliance was the
last international war in which Argentina was engaged for the next one hundred years (until the
IFalklands War). It sealed sixty years of almost constant international wars, which involved a
significant territorial component. While these wars were often protracted and at times intense,
and consisted of significant threats to Argentina as a state (and its earlier manifestations), they
were also somewhat limited. As Miguel Centeno argues, the wars of Latin America (both
international and civil) never reached the level of total war experienced in Europe, North
America (the American Civil War) and Asia. As a rule, they neither involved similar levels of
destruction and death nor entailed similar levels of mobilization. 267
Centeno explains this limited level of warfare as a combination of formidable physical limits
(the Andes and the Amazon forests-- although the latter applies less to Argentina), the scarce
resources with which to fund war, and a culture/ideology that did not include total war in its
vocabulary. "Latin American states," he argues, "did not have the organizational or ideological
266 Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," pp. 150-51, Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization,"
pp. 2-3, Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, pp. 97-98, Scheina, Latin America's Wars, pp. 367-69.
267 Centeno, Blood and Debt, pp. 33-66. Note, however, that the statistics used by Centeno might be somewhat
misleading. As he does not include data for Europe before 1815 and as he aggregates results that include the 20th
century, the important and relevant comparison of 17-18 th century Europe to South America in the 19 th century is
blurred.
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capacity to go to war with one another."268 Yet, this argument is of limited value. As is discussed
below, Prussia in the early 17 th century lacked both the resources and the culture of organized
large-scale warfare. It is precisely the geopolitical reality that caused both these factors to
change. Second, if Centeno's argument is true, we should have seen more war and violence in
2 0 th century than in 19 th century South America, as the state became stronger and better
organized. The case, however, is quite the contrary. While Argentina was involved in war for
most of the 19 th century, it was a party to only one short war in the following century.
What, then, can explain the level of warfare in 19th century Argentina (and South America in
general)-- significant but still somewhat limited? Arie Kacowictz suggests an explanation that
might have more merit than Centeno's in this case. He advances an argument that stresses the
role of international norms of peace, which gradually developed in Latin America after its
independence, but became more pronounced towards the end of the 19th century. The most
important of these norms, as applied to this research, is the legal doctrine of uti possidetis, which
stipulated that the Latin American states were the rightful successors of Spain and Portugal in
exercising territorial authority over the same (administrative) borders at the time of
independence. 269 Formal recognition of uti possidetis (it was adopted by the Panama Congress of
1826, the Lima Congress of 1847-48, and the Caracas Treaty of 1883) did not result in
immediate respite from international wars or, for that matter, territorial wars. 270 Nevertheless,
this principle did apparently impose some constraining effect. From the end of the independence
wars (which, of course, were not subject to uti possidetis), and once the map of South America
was consolidated around the mid 1820's, not a single state was erased from that map. South
268 Ibid., pp. 66-100, quote from p. 66.
269 Kacowictz, The Impact of Norms in International Society, pp. 59-60, 71-124. See also Escude, "Argentine
Territorial Nationalism," pp. 145-46.270 On this point, see Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, p. 153, Kacowictz, The Impact of Norms in
International Society, p. 77.
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America had no Poland, no Burgundy, or, for that matter, no Bavaria (all sovereign European
states which lost their status to an occupying force, temporarily or eternally). Even when the
male population of Paraguay was virtually annihilated, and disputed territories were appropriated
by Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay was not wiped off the map-- it survived. As opposed to wars
in Europe, then, the wars of Latin America, Argentina included, were not all-out wars, but
limited through some common agreements or constraints.
C. Territorial Pressures and State Building
Before examining the effects of territorial wars on state building in Argentina, let us again
recall hypothesis la. The hypothesis claimed that a fluid border system provides incentives and
opportunities for states to become institutionally stronger. What follows is a discussion in the
Argentinean case: to what extent we can observe in Argentina in the period of 1810-1890 the
expected process, which leads from external territorial threats and opportunities to a successful
project of state building.
a) Monopolizing the Use of Legitimate Force
At the start of the struggle for independence in 1810, Argentina did not exist as a nation and
so, by definition, it possessed no national army. The forces that took hold of Buenos Aires and
expelled the Spanish Viceroy were city militia, not a national army. In towns across the Rio de la
Plata, ad hoc militia filled similar roles. The process of building a regular modern national army
took more than half a century and was much less linear than in the above example of
Brandenburg-Prussia.
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For most of this half-century, there was no central control of the state and the various forces
that controlled the towns of Argentina had their own military or semi-military forces. In the
countryside, the local caudillos had their own troops, consisting mainly of their gauchos peons.
Very gradually, however, a more unified military institution emerged from this plethora of
forces. Wars, international and internal, have been among the most important forces that affected
this process.
The wars of independence were fought by a variety of military forces. At the initial stage,
small town militias in the interior of the Rio de la Plata, with or without assistance from Buenos
Aires, seized control of the local government, oftentimes without bloodshed. 27 1 As the Spanish
forces reorganized and seek the help of Lima, the war took the shape of expeditionary military
forces that were sent from Buenos Aires to Paraguay, Upper Peru, and Uruguay. These forces
were mainly of an ad hoc character and included mostly portefios, strengthened some elements
from the provinces. In Uruguay, a local force of gauchos, led by Jose Artigas, fought alongside
the portefios, until their ultimate defeat by Brazil. The one exception to this rule was the army of
Jose San Martin. San Martin was a former officer in the Spanish military, who join the
revolutionaries in Buenos Aires in 1812. Expressing skepticism in the option of re-conquering
Upper Peru in the conventional way, San Martin built an invasion army in Mendoza, which
resembled in many ways more the regular European armies of the time than the semi-regular
forces used in other fronts of this war. San Martin used this army to cross the Andes, take Chile
by force, and then attack by sea the Spanish stronghold at Lima.27 2
The destruction of the independence wars notwithstanding, the revolutionary armies in the
Rio de la Plata were relatively small, as were their opponents'. Belgrano's expeditionary force
271 Scobie, Argentina, p. 90.272 Centeno, Blood and Debt, p. 50.
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that eventually ceded Paraguay included no more than 1400 soldiers and militia. In the three
attempts to conquer Upper Peru, the revolutionary forces never exceeded 5,000 troops, and the
same is true for the campaign in the Banda Oriental. San Martin crossed the Andes to Chile with
fewer than 6000 men. 273 Once the threat of Spanish reconquista receded, the Argentinean army
was demobilized and it shrunk down to 2,500 men (before the start of the Cisplatine War).274
This tiny army could not, by any stretch of imagination, exercise effective control of the means
of violence in a country as vast as Argentina. The independence wars, moreover, accelerated the
emergence of competing forces, the caudillos and their gaucho armies. These local landowners
and warlords, not the national army, came to control the provinces, as well as the countryside in
the province of Buenos Aires.27 5
The core of the urban militia of Buenos Aires remained a basis for future mobilization, and
such an occasion was soon coming. The Cisplatine War, 1825-1828, entailed a larger
mobilization. The United Provinces' military force in the conflict amounted to about 20,000 and
consisted of both land army and navy.276 In the aftermath of this war, the army that fought in
Uruguay came back to a state of anarchy. The attempt of the generals Lavelle and Paz to use this
army to seize power in Buenos Aires and Cordova, respectively, however, was short-lived. Their
forces were eventually defeated by the rising power of Juan Manuel de Rosas in Buenos Aires
and his allied caudillos in the provinces. 277
It was an internal conflict, with caudillos from the Littoral raids on Buenos Aires, that led to
the rise to primacy of Buenos Aires's rural elite, and ultimately to the stabilization of the
province by Juan Manuel de Rosas (governor from 1829 to 1832 and again from 1835 to 1852).
273 Ibid., p. 226, Scheina, Latin America's Wars, pp. 44-52.
274 Centeno, Blood and Debt, p. 227.
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During Rosas' tenure, military pressure, from foreign forces, from opposing forces in the
provinces, and from the Indians at the frontier, led to a monopolization and centralization of
power in province of Buenos Aires. Rosas' fall led to a similar process, though less pronounced,
in the provinces of the Littoral and the Interior.
Rosas established an army that was composed mainly of the rural poor and numbered around
20,000 men. As discussed above, Buenos Aires was engaged in the Gurra Grande for most of
his time in office, and the army was "an active one, constantly engaged in foreign wars,
interprovincial conflicts and internal security."278 Rosas used the occasion of foreign war and
blockades and the threat of invasion to employ his army as an instrument of internal coercion.
"The military establishment," consisting of the regular army and the militia, existed... not only
to defend the country but to occupy it, not only to protect the population but to control it."27 9 In
1830 a British observer noted: "...owing to the system of police established under [Rosas]
government, all, whether rich or poor, who were implicated in the violation of the established
laws of the country were sure to suffer... crimes, robbery and outrage are almost unknown." 280
Rosas, in addition, combined the core of the preexisting urban militia of the city with his own
rural followers to create a more militarized and more centralized state in the province of Buenos
Aires. The campaign against the Indians in the pampas, as well, helped Rosas' centralization of
power. The territorial acquisition provided ample land resources with which he could (and did)
reward his followers, especially the army's officers. Indeed, Rosas exploited his victory over the
Indians and the muscle this campaign created to greatly strengthen his position, and he was
278 Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 27-28.
279 Ibid., p. 27.
280 Quoted in John Lynch, Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel De Rosas 1829-1852 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1981),
p. 117.
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virtually given unrestricted powers to govern the province. 28 1 "External aggression and a high
level of perceived threat," then, "strongly marked the first period of state making, leading to
militarization." 282
Eventually, however, the reaction to Rosas created an alliance of internal and external forces
(the latter including France, Britain, Brazil, and the Colorados in Uruguay) that managed to field
a larger army than that of Buenos Aires. The anti-Rosas alliance, led by Urquiza, had almost
30,000 men in arms in the decisive battle of Caseros, the bulk of them Argentinean, as against
Rosas's 20,000 men.28 3 Resting on the crown of his victorious army, Urquiza established a
:national confederation based on a principle of more balanced relations between the port and the
hinterland. While the union produced by this victory was brief (as Buenos Aires soon vied for
independence), it created in the Littoral and the Interior a state more unified than before and
more akin, in this sense, to the one in the province of Buenos Aires (although not as strong). The
Confederation declared the creation of a "national army" as its top priority (although such an
army never materialized in during the life span of the Confederation).284
Ultimately, though, Argentina was reunited by force in 1859, when the confederation
subjugated the renegade province (and city). Another rebellion by Buenos Aires in 1861
produced the opposite result, as General Bartolome Mitre and his portefio army seized the
military control., and the presidency, of the Argentine Confederation and renamed it the
Argentine Republic. Although years would pass before Argentina would be completely pacified
and before the balance between Buenos Aires and the provinces would become stabilized, 1861
2:81 Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 2-3, Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, pp. 97-98, Scheina,
Latin America's Wars, pp. 367-69.
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signaled an important advance for the notion of Argentina as one state, and this unification was
achieved by military force.
The war that is most tied to Argentina's consolidation as a state is the War of the Triple
Alliance (1864-1870). As argued above, this war was perceived to create a multi-level threat to
Argentina, not least of this threat related to the ties, actual or potential, between external leaders
and caudillos in the interior and littoral. On the eve of the war, the Argentine government
established a standing national army, which consisted of infantry, cavalry and artillery, and was,
at its core, an expansion of the Buenos Aires militia. 285 The beginning of the war, however,
forced (or enabled) Mitre to augment the army to strength of 30,000 men. This army, ostensibly
raised to fight the external war, served, at the same time, to crush internal dissent and rebellions
(some of which, no doubt, were provoked by the burdens of the war itself and the policy of
forced conscription). The most significant revolts occurred in the remote western parts of the
Interior, in which the caudillos "El Chaco" and later Varela were defeated during the war with
Paraguay. So intense was the internal fighting that the some of the casualties of Argentina's
military from these internal conflicts amounted to almost half those of the war itself. 286 "The
army that returns from Paraguay," in short, "is much better equipped to suppress internal
revolts." 287 Indeed, the last of the caudillo challenges to the unity of Argentina, that of Ricardo
Lopez Jordan, a strongman in Entre Rios who assassinated Urquiza and took control of the
province in 1870, was crushed in 1874 by the army.288 The army further consolidated in the
aftermath of the war with the establishment of the Military Academy, the creation of a
285 Ibid., p. 189, Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," pp. 41-42.
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professional officer corps and the Law of Recruitment, all institutionalized within a short time
span after the war's end.289 Argentina would know many more political rebellions and coup
d'etats, but from this point on, the rebellions always attempted to capture the national
government, not to challenge its authority or achieve regional autonomy.
The wars with the Indians also helped the state building project. The success of the national
army in the 1879 "desert campaign" against the Indians catapulted its commander, General Roca,
to the seat of the President, and the troops the national army established and galvanized for these
campaign helped Roca crush an attempted rebellion in the capital. The prestige of the campaign
and the muscle of his troops, then, enabled Roca to disband the provincial militias in 1881 and
place officially the monopoly over the use of violence squarely in the hands of the central
government. 290 The process that started with the consolidation of the monopoly of the use of
force in the province of Buenos Aires, thus, lastly expanded by 1880 to include the entire
country, and this expansion could largely be attributed to the threats and opportunities provided
by external military pressures.
b) Extraction of Revenues
In contrast to the monopolization of the use of force, the process and development of the
state's ability to extract resources from its population differed significantly in Argentina from the
example of Prussia. External pressures did not, as a rule, lead to greater fiscal demands of the
states upon their citizens. This was the case because, as discussed above, the level of external
threat was significant yet still limited, and because Argentina had other, easier, means to finance
its wars. The availability of foreign credit and the possibility of indirect taxes, in the form of
289 Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," p. 42.
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tariffs and export fees, as well as money printing, relieved Argentina of the need to create a
strong system of extraction, thus somewhat crippling, in the long run, its state building efforts.
As in Europe, war and escalating threats greatly expanded the military expenses of the state
in Latin America. These expenses were overwhelmingly devoted to the war-fighting efforts.
Until the mid-1860's Argentina's military and financial expenses (covering the cost of war debt),
for instance, never fell to less than 75% of the government's total budget and often exceeded the
90% mark.29 1 The response to these military expenditures and the way in which Argentina tried
to pay for them differed significantly from the Prussian (or British or French) model. In the early
1820's, indeed, there were some attempts to impose direct taxes, in the form of land taxes on the
new territories usurped from the Indians in the pampas, and capital taxes. These schemes,
however, either did not materialize or were circumvented, and never yielded more than 3% of the
government revenues. 292
Instead, Argentina, in its various forms, used three main tools to pay for the substantial
financial burden imposed on it by war. The first such tool was borrowing money from foreign
sources (mainly private British institutions). This borrowing swelled Argentina's national debt.
By 1841, for instance, the government's debt stood at 36 million pesos, about 21 times its total
income for that year. Although later years saw some decline from this incredible ratio, the debt
was still much higher than revenues. 29 3 The second measure that was commonly used by
Argentinean governments to deflect the costs of war was printing money, thus creating
inflationary pressures. During the Cisplatine War, the value of one ounce of gold in Buenos
Aires rose more than sixfold. As Miguel Centeno argues, this practice represents evidence of the
291 Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," pp. 1571-75. The slight
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strength of the government, as it shows its monopolization of the issuance of money, and also
represents the inability of the government to either agree or enforce its society to carry the
financial burden of war.294
The third way in which Argentina, like some other Latin American states, dealt with the
increasing fiscal burden of war was by imposing indirect taxes, chiefly tariffs and export fees. As
compared to direct taxation on capital, property, or income, custom, the taxation of import and
export is a much less burdensome practice for a government. It requires, first, a much smaller
and less sophisticated bureaucratic mechanism to perform. As Centeno rightly notes, "a few
soldiers in the main port could provide considerable income." 295 While managing cross-border
commerce on Argentina's western and northern borders may have been somewhat difficult, the
volume of this commerce, given the geographic obstacles and Bolivia's mining industry's
decline, was not very significant. International commerce through the Atlantic, on the other
hand, was much more significant and increasing in volume. Buenos Aires was strategically
situated at the mouth of the network of several rivers (Plata, Uruguay, Parana, Paraguay). This
location enabled it to exercise almost a monopoly and situated it in a predominant position in
terms of custom extraction. Politically, as well, taxing international commerce, especially
imports, is a much easier and less risky task than taxing domestic land or capital. As tariffs are
indirect taxes, they are much less likely to result in a popular revolt. It is easier for one to reckon
with not receiving a sum in the first place than with having to depart with money that is already
in one's pockets.. Indeed, for the years for which data is available from 1820 to 1880, Argentina's
customs almost never constituted less than 80% of the government's ordinary income. It was
ý294 Ibid.: pp. 1584-85. See also Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, p. 102.
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149
often more than 90% of the income.296 On the downside, however, customs are a much less
reliable source of income than taxes and widely depend on the fluctuation of international
commerce. More importantly, relying on custom does not enable (or enforce) one to develop the
bureaucratic capacity that was observed in the Prussian case discussed above.
c) Development of State Bureaucracy
The development of the bureaucratic and administrative capacity of the state in 19 th century
Argentina shows a mixed picture. As compared to the Prussian case discussed above,
administrative expansion of the state in Argentina was less linear and somewhat less profound.
The degree to which this development was tied to the pressing needs of the military was also less
obvious. Nevertheless, the state's administrative penetration into the society and its
administrating capacity did improve very significantly by 1880, and these improvements were
often tied to military development and, hence, to territorial pressures. Argentina's record of
administrative development also shows a dialectic quality similar to the one exhibit by its
monopolization of the use of force. The wars of independence led initially to disintegration, and
only through a long and protracted struggle between Buenos Aires and the provinces did a new
political and administrative entity emerge, which gradually became a fairly strong state.
As discussed in Chapter 6, the depth and breadth of the Spanish administration, and the
degree of Creole participation in this bureaucracy were limited, local in nature, and hardly
maintainable without the superior authority of the crown. 297 The wars of independence managed
to secure the Spanish departure from South America. However, as Centeno reminds us, "not only
did the Spanish-American Empire dissolve into several nations (a process that continued through
296 Ibid.: pp. 1579-81. See also Lynch, Argentine Dictator, p. 197.
297 Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," pp. 152-53.
150
the 1820's), but even within the new borders, governments exercised little authority and had
even less control. Civilian administration was destroyed throughout the continent." 298
Through the first decade of the war of independence (1810-1820), political turmoil in Buenos
Aires accompanied the fractured nature of the war. Old colonial institutions, such as the cabildo,
were replaced by new (the Congress), and the original junta by a triumvirate and later by a single
President. The Congress, as well, managed to achieve a declaration of independence of the
United Provinces of the River Plate in July 1816 in Tucuman and acceptance of a constitution in
1819. All this, however, hardly brought political stability, as a widening gulf between Unitarians
and Federalists emerged. This fracture echoed the increasingly obvious disconnect between
Buenos Aires' legal claim as heir of the Rio de la Plata Viceroyalty and the reality, in which
economic and military fragmentation prevailed.29 9 Thus, the "national institutions had
completely disappeared by 1820."300 Not until 1860 did a fragilely unified Argentina again
appear on the map.
This continuous national fragmentation notwithstanding, however, one cannot ignore
institutional and bureaucratic development in those forty years between 1820 and 1860. These
developments, rather than on a national (i.e., Argentine) level, took place in the provinces, chief
among them Buenos Aires. The 1825-1829 war with Brazil accelerated the already very tense
relations between Buenos Aires and the provinces, with the pressure of the provinces' caudillos
bringing about official annulment of the constitution and a declaration of the United Provinces as
a confederation, rather than a unified state. Manuel Dorrego was forced to change his title from
the President of the United Provinces to the Governor of the province of Buenos Aires. This act,
while confirming the disintegration of Argentina, started the consolidation of Buenos Aires.
298 Centeno, Blood and Debt, p. 51.
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Rosas, who was the Governor (and the dictator) of Buenos Aires from 1829 to 1851,
tightened his control over the countryside in the province mainly through the use of the
institution of the "Justice of Peace." This office was established already in 1821, but under Rosas
it was expanded and given much more authority and responsibility. The Justices of Peace (who
often were estancieros-- land owner ranchers) became the agents of the government in all
manners, from policing and judging the population to presiding over (mostly fake) elections, to
administering the census. Yet the judges' most important function, at least for the purposes of
this research, was the role of the militia commander. The military force used by the Justices of
Peace as a tool of coercion and the extreme measures they used brought about the pacification of
the province (as discussed above) and a fairly high degree of state penetration into the province's
territories. 301 The military force that developed to fight wars, then, also facilitated the
centralization and pacification of the province of Buenos Aires. "Under this regime," in turn,
"the gauchos of Buenos Aires evolved into a rural proletariat easily drafted into the army."302 At
least in a limited sense, then, Buenos Aires implemented a policy not far removed from the
Prussian model, a policy built on the concentric functions of the landowner class, the militia and
the state's bureaucrats.
In his relations with the other provinces, Rosas was content to use personal ties and
allegiances as opposed to institutional ones. He adamantly opposed propositions to adopt a new
national constitution or to expand the formal bureaucracy beyond the borders of Buenos Aires.
Only in the field of foreign relations (and, of course, in controlling international trade) did Rosas
insist on a monopoly over the provinces. While his influence, through allied caudillos in the
301 Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, p. 162, Lynch, Argentine Dictator, pp. 116-17.
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Littoral and the Interior, was significant, it never amounted to a real monopoly over foreign
relations matters. In 1840, for instance, the province of Corrientes signed a boundary treaty with
Paraguay (conceding some territories which were later gained back by Argentina in the War of
the Triple Alliance) and, a decade later, Entre Rios under Urquiza allied itself with Brazil against
Rosas himself.30' 3
It was not until the fall of Rosas in 1852, then, that the reorganization of Argentina on a
national scale could start to take place, and even then by fits and starts. Interestingly, in the first
decade after the fall of Rosas (1852-1861), it was the provinces, rather than the center in Buenos
Aires, that attempted to create the institutions of Argentina on a national, though loosely
confederative, scale. The confederation, led by Urquiza, accepted in 1853 a common constitution
and tried to strengthen its hold on the country. However, while the Urquiza had the military
power, he lacked the economic backing that Buenos Aires possessed. The port city, thus, was
able to proclaim its independence. 30 4 While this attempt of the Argentine Confederation at
national consolidation did not succeed, it set the stage for the unification of the country in the
following decade, this time under Buenos Aires's sponsorship.
In 1862, General Bartolome Mitre, after defeating the forces of the Confederation, created
the newly termed Republic of Argentina, and became its first president. As in the area of use of
force monopolization discussed above, the administrative penetration into the society in Mitre's
first years in office was very limited. But here as well, the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-
1870) helped Mitre consolidate the state. The institutional and bureaucratic innovations of this
period included the first nationwide census, which was done amidst the war, in 1869. A national
census proves a relatively high degree of organization, as it requires the authority of the
303 Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," p. 154.
304 Rock, "State Building and Political Systems," pp. 185-86.
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government to ask difficult questions, the apparatus to perform the census, and the ability of the
government to protect this apparatus.30 5
In the 1870's, under presidents Domingo Sarmiento and Avellaneda, Argentina saw a
continuation of the same pattern of building the bureaucracy and enhancing state penetration into
the society, oftentimes through the use, or threat of the use, of military means. Indeed, as
provincial resistance was eradicated, the troops of the national army enforced the authority of the
Justices of Peace in the provinces, the national judicial system (enacted by a 1862 law) and the
Argentine Civil Code (drawn up in 1865-1868). These acts created a situation in which "the
central government was highly visible and was able to extend services to faraway provinces." 30 6
The project of state building, or at least its administrative facet, reached fruition in the early
1880's as the city of Buenos Aires was federalized, a common currency was introduced for the
first time, and other functions, such as primary education and the census, were transferred from
the authority of the church to that of the state. 30 7 As one British minister observed at the time,
"There is hardly a province in the Republic the Governor of which is not accessible to the
suasion of the Chief of the Executive." 30 8
d) Services, Public Goods and Political Rights
The other side of the equation of state building is the supposition that, over time, the need of
the state to impose greater demands on its population as the result of stronger external territorial
305 Centeno, Blood and Debt, p. 110.306 Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, pp. 162, 88-89, Lynch, "From Independence to
National Organization," pp. 41-42.
307 Gallo, "Society and Pollitics," pp. 79-83, 97-98.
308 Quoted in David Rock, "State-Building and Political Systems in Nineteenth-Century Argentina and Uruguay,"
Past and Present 167 (2000): p. 195.
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threat would require some form of compensation. Yet, observing 19th century Argentina, it is
hard to find much supportive evidence that such a compensation process took place.
Government supply of services and public goods seems to be more in line with the
ideological conventions of the rulers than with territorial wars. When president Rivadavia
established the University of Buenos Aires in 1821, for instance, one does not find a direct
relations to war or territorial pressures. 309 While as the governor of Buenos Aires Rosas greatly
increased the oppressive power of the state and its penetration into the entire province, he left the
system of education solely in the hands of the Catholic Church. Rosas did so not as a state
builder but as a social conservative. Similarly, when liberal presidents Mitre, Sarmiento, and
Avellaneda reversed this education policy in the 1860's and 1870's, they seemed to follow their
ideological convictions as well, not a military-driven incentive. 3 10 The federal government's
educational subsidies to the provinces quadrupled in the 1870's, for instance, and helped to
enhance the ties between center and periphery, but there is little evidence of their relevance to
territorial pressures. In terms of political rights, as well, the pattern is similar: liberal Presidents
broadened the suffrage while conservatives either limited it or abolished popular elections
altogether. 311
The distribution of one form of goods in Argentina in this period directly related to the
practice of territorial war is land ownership rights. This form of compensation was given to
soldiers, especially those involved in the wars of conquest against the Indians. Yet rewarding
soldiers with land is more akin to the practice of a feudal society than to modern state building,
and thus not a proof of the thesis in this research. If anything, this practice, which was widely
309 On the Buenos Aires University and Rivadavia's education policy, see Shumway, The Invention ofArgentina, pp.
85-97.
310 Gallo, "Society and Pollitics," p. 82, Shumway, The Invention of Argentina, p. 165.311 See Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization.", Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, p. 130, Rock, "State
Building and Political Systems," p. 42.
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accepted under Rosas, squarely fit the patrimonial form of the Argentine society under his
rule. 312
e) Ingroup Cohesion
Did territorial wars enhance ingroup cohesion on 19 th century Argentina, as is expected in
hypothesis 1(b)? Again, the answer is mixed, although it tends more toward the positive. With
not much of a base to begin with, Argentinean territorial identity gradually developed through
the 19 th century to one, not very coherent but still existing, identity. Despite the long periods of
physical and political divisions, the notion of one Argentina (with different names) nevertheless
was preserved (or created, depending on where one stands).
As discussed in chapter six, Latin American Creole elites were not thinking in national terms
in 1810. Indeed, in 1813 Manuel Belgrano, one of the leaders of the first hunta to lead
independent Buenos Aires, offered rules for schoolchildren's patriotic instruction. Yet in these
rules he emphasizes American patriotism, not an exclusionary Argentinean ideology. The
"other" in his recommendation is Spain or the Europeans, not other South American
neighbors. 313 Although the Creole elite had perhaps some vague concept of regional identity at
the time of independence, it scarcely amounted to a nationalist concept. Discussing Benedict
Anderson's suggestion that such an identity did emerge in the region, Miguel Centeno, then, is
right to assert that "[there is] no evidence that any large part of even the white population
thought of themselves as a nation separate from their Creole neighbors [emphasis in
original]."31 4 Indeed, as the wars of independence proved, at least a significant part of the elites
312 Lynch, Argentine Dictator.
313 Centeno, Blood and Debt, p. 172.
314 Ibid., pp. 171-73, quote from p. 72. See also Shumway, The Invention of Argentina, pp. 1-23.
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of Upper Peru, Paraguay, and Banda Oriental did not see themselves as part of a common
identity in the Rio de la Plata.
The wars of independence did not result in national unity in Argentina, but they did create a
territorial reality that started the creation of an Argentine identity. Bolivia and Paraguay now
acquired the status of independent states, a status that was recognized by most Argentine elites. It
took more time for Uruguay to reach that point, but after the 1828 arbitration, Uruguay too was
considered a separate entity. "The threat of the Spanish reconquest, however, forced the
remaining towns of the Viceroyalty to co-operate for their common defense. The first faltering
steps towards nationhood had been made." 3 15
The political cleavages and the civil war that characterized the next four decades was not, of
course, a site of national cohesiveness. Nevertheless, one should note an interesting fact about
this period: While vehemently defending their autonomy and practical rights, the caudillos of the
Argentine provinces did not attempt, as a rule, to declare official independence. The conflicts
were about federative or Unitarian structure, about economic interests of Buenos Aires versus
those of the provinces, and about the power to make these decisions: not about sovereignty. "By
mid century," David Rock tells us, "a majority of Argentina's political leaders considered
themselves members of an autonomous society and polity forged by the struggle for
independence." 316 The international wars of this period played a fairly minor role in facilitating a
common identity as they were mostly about political or commercial influence, not about
territorial control, and because they were targeted not toward Argentina as a whole but toward
certain provinces or cities. Thus, the French, British and Brazilian blockades of Buenos Aires
315- Scobie, Argentina, p. 91.
316 Rock, "State Building and Political Systems," p. 183.
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could hardly be seen as a threat to Argentina as a whole, and reaction, in terms of forging of a
common identity, was therefore mute.317
Once the country was again united, in 1861, the government did indeed try to use external
threats, or their appearance, as internal "glue." At the beginning of the War of the Triple
Alliance in 1865, President Mitre played on the national sentiments of Urquiza, the strong Entre
Rios caudillo. Mitre managed, in the end, to dissuade Urquiza from allying himself with
Paraguay against his country.318 While the war as a whole was not popular and while it generated
much dissent, Argentina did come out of the war a more united nation.
One indication of the role of external threats (and the defense against them) is the centrality
of the theme of war and territory in national indoctrination, revealed through such practices as
the writing of history, and through erection of monuments and iconization of heroes. In this area,
as well, the picture is mixed. Centeno notes that, as compared to Europe, Latin American
iconography of military leaders (as opposed to other, scientific, intellectual, and artistic figures)
is less salient. In Argentina, accordingly, street names, stamps, public monuments, and other
venues display their share of military heroes (mainly from the wars of independence), but not to
the extent of military iconization in Europe. Interestingly, however, these displays were much
common during the 19th century (with its abundance of wars) than in the following one (with
only one short war).319
The role of war and territorial threats as it relates to opportunities in the writing of official
history is a particularly interesting theme in 19 th century Argentina's attempts to create a stronger
national identity. This is so since two of the Argentina's prominent Presidents were personally
engaged in this endeavor. Mitre, the first President of the republic, organized, researched and
317 Rosas still used these pressures to create more unity within the province of Buenos Aires.
318 On the exchange of letters, see Box, The Origins of the Paraguayan War, pp. 241-48.
319 Centeno, Blood and Debt, pp. 198-209.
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partially wrote an extensive historiographic series of volumes termed "Gallery of Argentine
celebrities." This project, which became part and parcel of Argentina's official history, does
reflect an interest in elevating military figures (it includes the study of three generals and one
navy commander), but they are "balanced" with non-military personals. 320 Domingo Faustino
Sarmiento, who replaced Mitre in office, is considered one of Latin America's prominent writers.
Sarmiento's work, however, emphasizes the domestic-ideological and cultural conflict, rather
the external-territorial one.32 1 The territorial dimension of Argentina's past international wars,
nevertheless, is well ingrained in history books and schools. The perception that Argentina
suffered from great territorial losses (the breakup of Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay, losses to
Chile in Patagonia, and to Britain in the Malvinas/Falklands) is an integral part of Argentina's
political culture even today.3 22 Thus, while territorial wars might not be the most salient factor in
the creation of Argentinean identity, they most certainly are a factor.
D. Argentina: Summary
The Argentine experience of state building through territorial wars is in some respects similar
to that of Prussia and yet significantly different in other respects. As the Viceroyalty of the Rio
de la Plata started to disintegrate in 1810, there was no single candidate who could fill the
authority gap. Out of this very weak (or nonexistent) state gradually emerged a mildly strong one
by the early 1880's. The process by which this transformation occurred was greatly influenced
by strong territorial threats and ample territorial opportunities. These pressures are more
320 On Mitre's "Gallery of Celebrities," see Shumway, The Invention ofArgentina, pp. 188-213.
321 Ibid., pp. 168-87. Sarmiento's prime dichotomies are "civilization" and "barbarism," not national ones. See his
most famous novel, written in 1845, Domingo F. Sarmiento, Facundo, or Civilization and Barbarism (New York:
Penguin, 1998).
322 Dijkink, National Identity & Geopolitical Visions, pp. 72-85, Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism," pp.
152-65.
159
pronounced in the area of achieving a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and building a
functioning bureaucracy and administration. The role of external pressure is less clear in the
areas of state extraction capacity and state provision of rights and services. In terms of forging a
common Argentinean identity, the evidence is mixed. It seems that territorial wars played a role
here, but a limited one.
The reason Argentina displayed a significant process of state building, yet a more limited one
than that in Brandenburg-Prussia, which was discussed above, could be attributed to a number of
factors, such as geographic vastness and availability of financial tools to replace direct taxation.
The main factor determining this process, however, seems to be the limits to territorial expansion
and territorial acquisition established by a still weak but already significant set of regional
norms, chief among them the norm of uti possidetis.
The most common view in Argentina is that during the 1810's and 1820's Argentina suffered
tremendous territorial losses, and Buenos Aires, as the rightful successor of the Spanish
Viceroyalty, could not hold onto or suppress the "renegade" provinces of Upper Peru (Bolivia),
Paraguay, and Banda Oriental (Uruguay). Only very gradually could the capital city recapture its
control of the other Argentinean provinces by 1860. As Carlos Escude aptly notes, though, the
same process could be seen from a very different perspective: If Argentina is not seen as the heir
to the Spanish Viceroyalty (which, in practical terms, it was not) but as a new political entity, the
story of 19th century Argentina could be seen as a gradual territorial expansion. The core in
Buenos Aires acquired, mostly through the use of force, more territorial control until, by the
1880's, it reached the size of present-day Argentina. Looked at from this perspective,
Argentina's story does not seem so much different from most European stories of state
160
expansion. Whether one chooses the expansion or the contraction narrative territories and
territorial wars clearly played an important role in Argentina's state building process.
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Chapter 6: Congo, 1960-2005
The last two chapters surveyed two historical cases of weak states. This chapter and the next
one, by contrast, examine two current cases. The main purpose of these two cases is to explore
and analyze the effects that the major changes in the norms regarding international borders exert
on the strength of the state and, by extension, on its relations with its neighbors. In other words,
these cases test the arguments of Hypotheses 2-5 (in chapter 2 above), which relate between the
border fixity norm and international conflict in regions in which most states are weak.
The findings of this chapter largely corroborate Hypotheses 2,3, and 4. Congo, a weak state
in 1960, further weakened, to the verge of a total collapse in the late 1990's and early 2000's. It's
weakness, combined with the guarantee of border fixity, greatly contributed to the eruption of
communal tensions and fighting. Civil strife spilled across Congo's border to involve
neighboring states, mainly through cross-border insurgency activity and retaliations and through
cross border kin relations. Hypothesis 5, however, is only partially corroborated. Predatory
intervention, motivated by greed or desire for political control, had much less explanatory power
regarding the Congolese case.
A. Congo 1960: Elements of Weakness and Potentials of Strength
When Congo gained its independence in 1960, it showed all aspects of a very weak state,
including regional fragmentation, crisis in central authority, and a high level of political
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3iolence.23
violence: Nevertheless, it was not a hopeless case of weakness, and possessed some apparent
potential to become, with time, stronger.
Figure 7: Map of Congo's
* Source: http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/cross-cutting-programs/transition-initiatives/country/congo/rptO7O5.html
323 Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 41-42.
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Congo was created by Belgium in the twilight of the colonial "scramble for Africa" in 1908,
and was the sight of one of the most brutal colonialist regime. It was, in this sense, an arbitrary
and artificial entity. Indeed, the state's population is divided to around two hundred separate
ethnic groups. The largest four of these groups, combined (Mongo, Luba, Kongo, and mangbetu-
Azande), amount to no more than 45% of the population. Linguistically, the diversity is almost
as pronounced. The languages most spoken are Lingala, Kingwana, Kikongo and Tshiluba, as
well as the colonizer language, French. Religious cleavages also exists, with about 50% of
Congolese are Catholic, 20% Protestant, 10% Muslim and 10% Kimbanguist.324 In addition to
the inevitable hardships this composition imposes on creating a cohesive national state, many of
Congo's groups are much closely related, culturally, socially and sometimes economically, to kin
across the state's border. Hutu and Tutsi tribes in East Congo, for instance, are much more likely
to have social and economic ties to affiliated tribes in Rwanda or Burundi than to Kinshasa.325
Yet, as we have seen in previous chapters, this arbitrariness and diversity of population
within the state is not unique. Although political divisions along ethnic lines (like in Katanga's
secession attempt, which was quelled by the use of foreign troops) were prevalent during the
chaos that followed Congo's independence, this fact might be misleading. In reality, ethnicity
became the primary source of mobilization not because of prominence of multiple rigid ethnic
identities, but because the state as such lacked a significant degree of legitimacy, a unifying idea,
and the institutions to enhance and enforce this idea (to a significant extent, as a result of Belgian
colonial policies). In fact, scholars of Congo note the considerable degree of fluidity of the
Congolese ethnic identities at the time.326
324 Data from the CIA Factbook. Insert source, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cg.html
325 For a basic source on the Congolese state and society, see Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State.
326 See John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 200-04, Young,
The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 40-42.
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In economic terms, Congo in 1960 was a poor state and mostly agrarian, but its soil
contained large amounts of natural resources, that has a potential of sustaining a strong state.
Congo was also a vast state (see map below) with relatively sparse population (6.6 per square
kilometers in 1960), yet not much more so than Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640 and much less than
Argentina in 1810. After Congo's rough and anarchical "entrance" to the world scene with its
independence from Belgian rule, the reins of power in Kinshasa were caught in 1965 by the
Chief of the Army, Mobutu Sese Seko, who established what proved to be one of Africa's most
enduring regimes (1965-1997). Coming as a remedy to the anarchical "all against all" war,
Mobutu's formula of a "nationalist" and highly centralized state initially gained some legitimacy
in Congo (perhaps more an effect of exhaustion than a positive consensus).327 This could have
been, in theory, a beginning of a serious attempt of state building. One should not, therefore,
assume that Congo was, from the get go, a precluded story of failure as a state.
B. Border Fixity and the Absence of Territorial Pressures in Congo
By Congo's 1960 independence border fixity was already a fairly strong norm of world
politics, as indicated in chapter 1. In Africa specifically, moreover, the norm of fixed borders is
deeply rooted. In light of the arbitrariness of African borders in an ethnographic sense and in
historical context, 32 8 one would expect that they would be constantly shifting. Still, as Jeffrey
Herbst argues, "there is widespread agreement that the boundaries are arbitrary, yet the vast
majority of them have remained virtually untouched since the late 1800's, when they were first
327 Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 42-44.
328 See, for example, Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa.
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demarcated." 329 Only two territorial changes have occurred since African states gained their
independence from the colonial Europeans. Yet, even these two cases could be regarded, at least
in some senses, as compatible with the principle of keeping the colonial borders intact. The
Moroccans regard the Western Sahara case, which was a disputed land for a long time, could be
considered as still a part of the de-colonization. The secession of Eritrea in 1993 does not clearly
contradict the principle of preservation of colonial boundaries either, since Eritrea was not a part
of Ethiopia in the colonial age.
Aware as they were of the conflict between the borders they inherited and the geographic and
ethnic realities of their continent, the post-colonial African leaders still chose to preserve these
borders and to sanctify them as unchangeable. This choice was made primarily under the
mandate of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which endorsed the principle of fixed
borders from its 1963 inception. Article 3 in the OAU declaration pledges that all member-states
adhere to the principles of "non-interference in the internal affairs of states" and "respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent
existence." Despite some challenges to these principles, the organization, as well as the
overwhelming majority of its members, have always stood firmly behind them. Many OAU
resolutions correspond to the principle of border fixity. Resolution A.G.H/16.1 of July 21, 1964,
for instance, incorporates the rule of uti possidetis: "All the member States are committed to
respect the frontiers existing at the time of their independence." '33 The AU, which replaced the
OAU, cites similar principles in its 2000 constitutive act.3 3 1
329 Jeffrey Herbst, "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa," International Organization
43, no. 4 (1989): p. 673. See pp. 683-685 on the stability of African borders during the colonial era. See also
Herbst, States and Power in Africa.
330 Cited in Michael-Cyr D. Wembou, "The Oau and International Law," in The Organization of African Unity after
Thirty Years, ed. El-Ayouty Yassin (London: Praeger, 1994), p. 16. See also Herbst, States and Power in Africa,
pp. 109-12.
331 http://www.africa-union.org/rootlau/AboutAUIConstitutive Act en.htm#Article4
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Note, though, that the African norm against changing borders even goes beyond that of the
general international community. Border changes, including secessions, are prohibited by the
African norm. Nevertheless, I consider this a variant of the international norm of border fixity,
rather than a separate phenomenon. The principles are the same, although they took a more
extreme turn in the case of Africa. From the point of view of the individual state, moreover, this
norm is still "international," regardless of whether it originates in the region or in the broader
international community.
Nor was this support of existing borders only a theoretical matter. In the case of the civil war
in Nigeria, for instance, the organization, as well as a great majority of its members, stood
resolutely against Biafra's attempts to secede, and so did the two superpowers. 332
The Congolese, moreover, did not have to venture far from home to understand the
implication of this international norm. Three secession attempts in Katanga (Shaba), one in the
early 1960's and two in the 1970's, were thwarted not by the Congolese army, but by foreign
troops who, in essence, were guarding border fixity. UN forces were responsible for
reincorporating of Katanga in Congo in the 1963. In the 1970's Moroccan, French, and Belgian
troops (with US aid) prevented an offensive by rebels who were supported by Angola to take
over Shaba.333
The rebellion/invasion of 1996-7 was not a challenge to Congo's borders either. Laurent
Kabila, the leader of the rebellion, made that point very clear early in 1997: "The world should
know what are the real issues in Zaire. The integrity of Zaire is not an issue - no one is
332 Herbst, "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa," pp. 686-687.
333 Thomas M Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1984), pp. 206-09, Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 74-75, 248-57.
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threatening that integrity."334 Even in the late 1998, when more than half of Congo's territory
was occupied and practically controlled by foreign forces from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and
Zimbabwe, no attempt was made to challenge Congo's legal status as a sovereign or to annex
any parts of Congo.335
Thus, border fixity in the African continent is a consistent fact, despite interests of some
states to the contrary, and despite the lack of a set enforcement mechanism. Congolese elite
could learn this fact by following the continent's diplomatic conferences and meetings, or simply
by looking at the common practice. They could be assured, in other words, that the location of
their borders does not depend in any measure on their own conduct. 336
C. Border Fixity and the Perpetuation of State Weakness
The fact that Congo, like most other developing states, was a very weak state at its
independence, some 40 years ago, is not surprising. Most states are largely weak as they gain
their independence (though prolonged strife against a foreign occupant can at least furnish a new
state with the needed legitimacy). What is not so self-explanatory is the fact that Congo, again
like many other states in Africa and Asia, has remained an extremely weak state to this date, and
even more so today than in the 1960's. This section will argue that much of this fact can be
attributed to the border fixity norm, so endorsed and strengthened, as we have seen, by the
African states, the OAU, the UN and the international community in general. I will proceed by
334 Cited in Thomas M Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire," in
Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders, ed. Ian S. Lustick and Thomas Callaghy O'leary Brendan
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 124.
.35 Ibid., p. 128.
336 Jackson, Quasi-States, pp. 87-90, Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa': Lessons of a
Continental War," World Politics Journal 17, no. 2 (2000): pp. 11-20. Jackson argues that the OAU, as well as the
UN and the superpowers during the Cold War, practically guaranteed African states that their borders would
remain fixed, regardless of what happens within them.
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examining the efforts of state building, or lack thereof, in five core areas. These areas, as
determined in the definition of state weakness given above, are: monopoly over the legitimate
use of violence, revenue extraction, state bureaucracy and institutions, distribution of public
goods, and ingroup cohesion.
a) Monopolization of the Means of Legitimate Violence
When there is no threat to its external borders, a government can afford to have an
inefficient, weak and corrupt military. In Zaire, "the main role of the armed forces remained
internal security, with little thought or energy going to national defense." 337 Such a military does
not require much investment or sacrifices on the part of both the state and its citizens.
Moreover, a weak military poses less of a potential coup threat to the ruler. Mobutu,
therefore, systematically withdrew resources from Zaire's army, channeling them, instead, to his
loyal (and largely recruited from his home province in the Equator) Presidential Guard.338 It was
"the very importance of the military in Zairian politics ... which results in Mobutu's
extraordinary efforts to divide, control, manipulate, politicize, and otherwise deinstitutionalize
and de-professionalize it."339 When faced with internal rebellion, as was the case in the two
Shaba rebellions in the 1970's, Mobutu was obliged to utilize foreign troops (from Morocco and
France) to cover up for Zaire's deficient army.340 By the 1990's, instead of being paid by the
state budget, Zaire's military got a free hand to loot and seek ransom as a routine way of
337 Edgar O'Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-98 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 114-15.
338 David Sharer, "Africa's Great War," Survival 41, no. 2 (1999): pp. 89-106.
339 Michael Shafer, quoted in Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, p. 274.
340 Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 206-09.
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survival, and its commanders became economic entrepreneurs. Mobutu, rather than trying to
prevent this situation, encouraged it and attempted to benefit from it.341
Nor did things changed much after Mobutu's regime fell. Despite the country being torn by
civil and interstate war, for example, the DRC's military expenditures in 2003 stood at a low
1.4% of the GDP.342 Any ruler of Congo has few incentives to do otherwise: even when foreign
troops controlled much of its territory, Kabila's government was still the official and recognized
sovereign of its entire original territory. Thanks to the norm of border fixity, no enemy from
without could have threatened its juridical sovereignty and no internal secession attempts could
get the crucial international support it needed in order to succeed.343
b) Extraction of Revenues
As discussed above, the ability and willingness of the state to tax its citizenry is both a sign
of a strong state and the means to sustain such a state. Mobutu's Zaire was not one. Zaire's tax
collection system was inefficient, corrupt and extremely weak.344 Zaire's tax revenues
throughout the 1970's and 1980's amounted to merely 6-11% of the GDP, and only a quarter to
one third of that were taxes on income and capital revenues. These figures plunged to about 5%
of the GDP by 1995 and 4% in 2000.345 Already in the mid 1980's, "in most places the state no
longer performed even the basic function of official revenue collection." 346 Moreover, Given the
341 Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 40-41, Reno, Warlords Politics and African States, pp.
159-62.
342 CIA, "The World Factbook, 2004." At http://www.cia.gov/cialpublications/factbooklindex.html 
.The actual
figure is probably much lower, moreover, since the official GDP does not include the huge informal/illegal sector
of the economy.
343 Jeffrey Herbst, "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice: Implications for Policy," in When States
Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
344 Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, pp. 194-204.
345 Data from the World Bank Development Indicators. http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. Compare, for
instance, to 30%-38% for the same years in France and 16%-19% in the United States, with very low levels of
taxation in Western terms.346 Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire," p. 118.
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fact that, by the 1990's, many of the transactions were conducted outside of the formal Zairian
economy, the actual tax burden on the citizens was probably even much smaller.347
Mobutu relied, instead, on short-term policies, external support, and debt, for sustaining the
patrimonial network through which he controlled the state. "Zairianization," the policy of seizure
by the state of vast lands and commercial enterprises of foreign nationals within Zaire, which
was implemented in 1973, is an outstanding example. One of the main aims of this policy was
boosting the President's means of serving his personal clientele. "The cement of clientage was
access to resources. The sudden takeover of this huge zone of the economy offered a vast new
pool of goods for patrimonial distribution to deserving members of the political class." 348
Accordingly, the: majority of the enterprises seized from foreigners were distributed among the
political and economic elite, as a private property, rather than becoming a state property.349
c) Bureaucracy and State Institutions
The first few years of Mobutu's rule saw some ostensibly serious attempts at institution
building. These attempts, however, were largely meant for external consumption. Moreover, they
quickly gave way to reliance on a network of clients for most state functions. The absence of a
process that would lead from the need to create a strong military that would defend the borders,
to taxation efforts, to strong state institution, meant that Mobutu was not compelled to embark on
this costly and risky endeavor. The juridical safety network supplied by the international and
African norms of border fixity served as an incentive for Mobutu not to take the road of building
an efficient and strong bureaucracy. The creation of the Movement Popular de la Revolution
(MPR), as the sole political party in the state, attempted to generate legitimacy for the new
3E47 Ibid.
348 Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, p. 328. See also Reno, Warlords Politics and African States, p.
152.
149 Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, pp. 191-92.
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Mobutu regime, as well as providing it with organizational tools to penetrate the civil society. In
the late 1960's, when Mobutu attempted to expand his institutional control to additional spheres
of influence, this was often done through the vehicle of the MPR. Attempts to wrest the
education system from the control of the church, to secure the MPR's control over the military,
and to monopolize the regional and local authorities were all aspects of this policy.
This appearance of an expanded state in the early days of Mobutu's regime, though, is
misleading. Many of the efforts were made for external consumption. Repeated public relations
campaigns promoted new "ideologies" such as "authenticity" (1971), "Zairianization" (1973),
"Radicalization" and, finally, "Mobutism" (1974).35o Mobutu sought to combine a reality of
dependence on Western interests with an appearance of a Third World leader. In order to get
American and other Western support and loans, Mobutu agreed to serve as a forward base of the
American efforts to overthrow the left-leaning regime in Angola. Yet, he also aspired to be an
African, or Third World, leader, an aspiration likely to conflict with this pro-western stand. His
nationalist rhetoric and presumptuous projects were meant to offset this problem in the eyes of
other African leaders. The campaign of "authenticity," for example, was a cheap strategy to
appear anti-western to the Third World without having to pay the political and economic price
for it. 351 "Zairianization" also came because "with Mobutu at this juncture grasping for
continental leadership, it was uncomfortable to be outflanked in economic self-assertion by
350 Ibid., pp. 233-76, Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 54-71, 185-247, 326-62. While
"Zairianization" and "Radicalization" carried with them an economic policy that allowed the state to seize private
assets belonging to foreign nationals, "Authenticity" (which emphasized the need to replace colonialist and
Western frames with authentic African ones) and "Mobutism" (which in essence was a sanctification of
everything that Mobutu said) resided in a more pure ideological domain.
351 Kevin C. Dunn, "Imagining Mobutu's Zaire: The Production and Consumption of Identity in International
Relations," Journal of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2000): pp. 245-51.
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another giant state [Nigeria] of tropical Africa."352 Thus, policies that on their face seem to
strengthen the means available to the state, were actually geared at external audiences.
Mobutu's Zaire, moreover, "had a dual character: formally institutionalized, in party and
administration, but informally patrimonial and personal." 353 In the mid 1980's, Zaire was "an
early modern leviathan, but a lame one." 354 On the one hand, the state was highly centralized and
authoritarian, much like the absolutist state of 17 th and 18 th century Europe but, on the other
hand, its reach was extremely limited. To the extent that the state exercised its tasks at all, it did
so by an apparatus that was bureaucratic in name but patrimonial in reality.355 In other words, the
whole state system was dependent on Mobutu's personal rule and the personal loyalty owed to
Mobutu (and his money) by so-called "bureaucrats," "policemen," and "soldiers." The state as an
entity separate from its ruler did not exist in any meaningful sense. 35 6 This structure of rule is of
great importance, since it implies that the project of state building will be carried out only so long
as it serves the personal interest of the ruler (and his clientele officeholders). Seen through these
lenses, what appeared first to be an expansion of the Zairian state in the late 1960's and early
1970's could have been, after all, nothing but an expansion of the personal network of Mobutu's
rule.
By 1973-4, even the pretence of efforts to promote state building was abandoned with a rapid
deterioration in all areas of public policy. Faced with a growing debt to external creditors and
352 Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, p. 327.
353 Ibid., p. 397. Max Weber uses the term "patrimonial" to denote a regime that is, for most practical purposes, an
extension of the ruler's household. See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology
(New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 231-32, 1010-44. Such a regime includes, among other features,
"appropriation of public offices as the elite's prime source of status, prestige and rewards; political and territorial
fragmentation through the development of relationships based on primordial and personal loyalties; and the use of
private armies, militias, and mercenaries as chief instruments of rule." Jean-Claude Williame, Patrimonialism and
Political Change in the Congo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 2.
,54 Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, p. 409.
.55 Ibid.
;56 Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 164-84.
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declining revenue base, due to falling prices of copper and the colossal economic failure of
"Zairianization," Mobutu finally had to make some tough choices. When he had to decide
between continued public spending and continued enrichment of his own clientele (and, of
course, himself), Mobutu opted for the latter, opening an era of state decay and collapse. 357 The
proximity of this turn in policy to the end of the secession crisis in Nigeria might be telling.
Although there is no evidence to corroborate these suspicions, one might speculate that once the
commitment of the international community to the fixed borders of Africa was proven beyond
doubt, Mobutu could assume that Zaire's borders are equally as sanctified. He would not have to
pay in territorial currency for the results of his policies.
Mobutu had two main reasons why for dismantling whatever apparatus was still in place,
instead of attempting a hard and expensive project of state building. First, he needed to sustain
his expanded net of personal clients under conditions of ever-tightening resources in the face of a
decline in foreign aid and local production through the late 1970's and the 1980's. At the same
time, when the central authority does not need to uphold some minimal popular legitimacy
(because its sovereignty would not be challenged from without) it does not need to invest in
bettering the life of its people.3 58 Thus, "Mobutu rejected the pursuit of policies or the building
of institutions that would have served the collective good. Instead, he consolidated his own
authority by monopolizing resources... 359. The second reason Mobutu did not attempt to create
a stronger state apparatus is that an efficient bureaucracy, much as a strong army, might serve as
an independent power base that could threaten Mobutu's own rule in times of crises. He chose,
357 Ibid., pp. 71-77.
358 This is not to deny that the regime could be sometimes interested in such an investment for other reasons.
359 Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," pp. 14-15.
174
then, to shrink more and more Zaire's bureaucratic apparatus, relying instead on the network of
clients, mainly through regional strongmen, for continuing revenues. 360
As explained above, the argument is not that the border fixity norm directly creates
incentives for rulers to avoid a healthy building of state institutions. The argument is, rather, that
state building was always a very risky and expensive process that rulers and elites would avoid,
if they could. However, so long as they faced serious and continuous territorial threats, as well as
opportunities for expansion, and so long as they did not have the safety net of the "juridical
state," rulers could avoid state building only at their peril. And if they did, they were often
"punished" by stronger neighbors. Could Mobutu, for example, sustain such a consistent policy
of weakening his own state institutions had he been the ruler of a large country in the heart of
17th century Europe? One might suspect the answer is no.
Mobutu's regime, despite these extreme deficiencies, did not collapse until the mid-1990's.
361 When Laurent Kabila took over Kinshasa in 1997, he "inherited less a state than a fiefdom.
Normal state functions had been replaced by patronage." 362 Though Mobutu's personality (or,
one might say, megalomania) shaped much of Zaire's policies during his long reign, Kabila
faced more or less similar structural incentives: With the fixity of his state's borders underwritten
by the international community, he had little incentive to embark on the tortuous road of state
building. Indeed, Kabila's short term in power revealed some of the same tendencies discussed
above, such as the construction of a clientele network instead of an efficient bureaucratic
360 Reno, Warlords Politics and African States, pp. 149-52.
361 Partly, because Mobutu himself and his regime were heavily subsidized by the US: "for a quarter of a century the
Mobutist state was able to compensate for its lack of internal legitimacy by drawing huge dividends from its
international status as the staunchest ally of the United States in Africa." Rene Lemarchand, "Patterns of State
Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crisis in the Great Lakes," review of Reviewed
Item, African Studies Quarterley, no. 1 (3) (1997), http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/3/2.htm. See also Reno,
Warlords Politics and African States, pp. 151-53.
362 Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 92.
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hierarchy, and playing ethnic groups against each other.363 As a result, Kabila's Congo remained
"an institutional clone of its predecessor."364
d) Services and Public Goods
As discussed above, provision of public goods is also an indicator of the strength of the state.
Moreover, it is not only how much money is spent, but also where it is spent (purpose and
location) that is important. In Mobutu's Zaire, the government spent little on public goods, and it
spent it mostly on extravagant projects, rather on the much more needed public services.
Furthermore, the spatial distribution of the government monies is telling, where large parts of the
country's population were basically marginalized in terms of government expenditures. Had the
government needed to enhance the legitimacy of the state and assure, in particular, the allegiance
of populations closer to international borders (so as to prevent irredentist aspirations), the policy
of public goods distribution might have been different.
In terms of economic investments, Mobutu directed much of the public spending towards
huge, highly visible, and often misguided, projects, such as the building of the Ingha-Shaba Dam
and constructing a high-power grid to transfer the energy produced there to the Shaba mines. On
the other hand, while the portion of the state budget that was given solely to the discretion of the
President grew from 28% in 1972 to 95% in 1992, the state's expenses on social services
dropped from 17.5% in 1972 to virtually nothing in 1992.365 The portion of the budget devoted to
the President went either into Mobutu's own pocket or to the sustenance of his network of
clientele. This pattern of state expenditure points again to a policy that is aimed at gaining
363 See Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire."
364 Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," p. 52.
365 Reno, Warlords Politics and African States, p. 154.
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"cheap" legitimacy, both internal and external, at the expense of a real, and politically less
beneficial, public good.366
Moreover, these characteristics have grown stronger the further from the capital one looks.
Since the control of the capital city is the only condition put by the international community for
the recognition of one's government's sovereignty, it was the only asset that Mobutu's regime
still needed to invest in (apart from sustaining the flow of cash from Zaire's natural resources
through local strongmen). Between 1969 and 1972, for example, Kinshasa, with about 6% of
Zaire's population, was allocated 31% of government-approved investment projects, and Shaba
got about 47% of the investment (which went virtually all to the mineral mining industry),
despite the fact that it was a home to less than 13% of Zaire's population. In contrast, Kivu
province, with 15.5% of the population, was allocated only 1.53% of the investment projects and
Kasai, with almost 20% of the state's population was given virtually no investment.367
The extent to which the periphery was neglected can be best exemplified by the fact that, in
1996, until Kabila's forces conquered Kisagani (the third largest city in Zaire) the Kinshasa
government was unconcerned about the rebellion in the Kivu province. 368 It was hardly a
challenge to the state borders and it did not at all affect the position of Mobutu's government in
any international body.
366 Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, pp. 184-94.
367 For this data, as well as various other measures and analyses that portray the marginalization of any province
beyond Kinshasa and the "copper belt" region in Shaba, see Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp.
78-91..
368 Christain R. Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War: The Breakdown of the International Order in Central
Africa," review of Reviewed Item, African Studies Quarterley, no. 4 (1) (2000),
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4ila2.htm.
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e) Ingroup Cohesion
In many African states, the identification of the population with the state is tenuous at best.36 9
Congo is no different, although it is very hard to determine the level of loyalty to the state in the
absence of multiparty elections, reliable polling or other accurate measures to gauge the degree
of support of the citizens for their state, and the location of its borders. Moreover, with an
extremely authoritarian regime like that of Mobutu, it is often hard to tell whether resistance is
directed at the political power of the dictator, or at the state as such.
Bearing these factors in mind, one can still detect a few signs of the overall low legitimacy of
Mobutu's Zaire in the eyes of its own populace. One such sign might be the rebellions that aimed
explicitly at secession from the state. There were three such rebellions in the Shaba (Katanga)
region, in the early 1960's and, again, in 1977 and 1978, in the short history of Congo since its
independence. A second factor that might indicate a low level of state legitimacy is the size of
the unofficial (or parallel) economy. Smuggling, tax evasion, unregulated trade and extensive use
of the black market, as well as the withdrawal to non-commercial agriculture, all can be seen as
forms of disengagement and disapproval of the state. All these practices abound in Zaire, and got
more pronounced with time. 370 "The informal sector," the US State Department analysis
concluded in 2005,"now dominates the [Congolese] economy." 371 Lastly, one can infer the level
of illegitimacy of the basic structure of the state from the practices of its leaders. Mobutu,
369 For some general discussion of this aspect, see Michael Bratton, "Civil Society and Political Transition in
Africa," in Civil Society and the State in Africa, ed. John W. Harbeson, Rothchild, Donald, and Chazan, Naomi
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 51-82, Naomi Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation
and Disengagement in Africa," in The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, ed. Donald Rothchild, and
Chazan, Naomi (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 121-48.
370 For the general argument, see Victor Azarya, "Civil Society and Disengagement in Africa," in Civil Society and
the State in Africa, ed. John W. Harbeson, Rothchild, Donald, and Chazan, Naomi (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
Rienner, 1994), pp. 83-100. For the case of Congo, see Janet MacGaffey, "Civil Society in Zaire: Hidden
Resistance and the Use of Personal Ties in Class Struggle," in Civil Society and the State in Africa, ed. John W.
Harbeson, Rothchild, Donald, and Chazan, Naomi (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 169-89.
371 See the US Department of State country background profile at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm . See also
Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the Congo/Zaire," p. 118.
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specifically, "has occupied just about every possible ideological position in a whirl of
legitimating eclecticism." 372 The fact that he has spent so much effort on such campaigns,
suggests exactly the lack of genuine legitimacy and loyalty of the population to the state. While
these are non-direct measures of legitimacy, they are as good indicators as one could expect in a
case of a state run by an authoritarian regime.
Kabila's DRC, like Zaire before it, was threatened by external intervention, but these threats
were not translated into a process of state building since they were not territorial threats and
especially since the survival of the state as such was not endangered. As explained by Lewis
Coser, in order for external threats to produce internal cohesiveness, the threat has to be
perceived as a threat to the whole.37 3 The external threat in Congo, rather, was perceived in
ethnic terms: a threat to some, an opportunity to others, as it could change the internal balance of
power but not Congo's borders. Therefore, the 1998 invasion could not generate a genuine
process of creating a more cohesive society in Congo, much like previous foreign
interventions. 374
f) Conclusions: Border Fixity and State Weakness in Congo
Mobutu's Zaire was a weak state at its inception, and it did not get any stronger. On the
contrary, after a few encouraging signs in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the state began a long
and gradual decline into the status of a failed (or collapsed) state in the 1990's. The method of
governing Zaire, from the utter disregard to the creation of strong civil and military institutions,
to the meager efforts to extract resources from the population and, on the other hand, to distribute
372 Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, pp. 410-14. Quotation from p. 12.
373 Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, pp. 93-95.
374 On the way different ethnic groups in Congo allied themselves with the different external interveners, see
Thomas Turner, "The Kabila's Congo," Current History 100, no. 646 (2001): pp. 215-18.
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goods, and the patterns of this distribution, is telling. This behavior, though not directly proving
the relationship between the ever weakening of the state and the norm of border fixity,
nevertheless points to the absence of any concern for the survival of the state as such (as opposed
to the regime itself), and to the viability of its territorial boundaries.
D. State Weakness, Civil Conflict, and Conflict Spillover in Congo
This section explores the proposition, drawn in hypotheses 3, 4 and 5, which connected state
weakness to international conflict through the expansion of internal conflict across borders. This
expansion, it concludes, greatly contributed to the outbreak and the protracted nature of war in
Congo. Spillover of the genocidal ethnic conflict from Rwanda to Zaire/DRC and back played a
major role in the eruption of this conflict. Somewhat similar processes (although on a smaller
scale) were also evident in relations between Zaire and Burundi, Uganda, and Angola. Predatory
motivations, enhanced by Congo's weakness, were also present. Yet, these were in most of the
cases secondary to security motivations in neighboring countries decisions to intervene in
Congo. This section outlines the process of the spread of these ethnic wars over the African
borders and explains why the weakness of the region's states, and mainly Congo, facilitated this
process.
Throughout its independent existence, Zaire was a nuisance to its neighbors, frequently
interfering with their internal affairs and backing guerilla movements fighting the regimes in
Angola, Uganda, Rwanda and other states in the region. What brought the massive interventions
of 1996 and 1988, however, was first and foremost a spillover of internal strife across the Great
Lakes region of Africa. Towards the end of 1996, an armed rebellion against Mobutu's regime in
Zaire began at Kivu province, by the Alliance des Forces D6mocratiques pour la Lib6ration du
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Congo-Zaire (ADFL), backed by Rwandan forces and supported by most states in the region.
The rebellion, which was led by Laurent Desire Kabila, rapidly defeated the collapsing Zairian
armed forces. By May 1997 the ailing Mobutu fled into exile and Kabila took over Kinshasa and
established the state under a new name: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However,
this proved to be only the first phase in a protracted war. Kabila soon alienated a significant
number of his former allies, both internal and external. A new rebellion began in August 1998 in
eastern Congo and a massive intervention by Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian forces pushed
rapidly towards the capital. This time, however, Kabila turned to other foreign forces to save his
collapsing regime, and soon Zimbabwean, Angolan, Namibian, Sudanese and Chadean forces
counter-intervened and managed to prevent Kinshasa from falling. Nevertheless, the war did not
end there. For over four years foreign troops and local rebels controlled much of the vast
Congolese territory. Casualties were immense, with estimates run as high as 3.8 million dead as a
direct or indirect result of the war.3 75 The economic and health situation, bad as it was, has
further deteriorated. With famine and diseases being abundant, the ongoing instability serves as a
permanent impediment to any prospects of a better future.
Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and was replaced by his seemingly more
rational and flexible son, Joseph Kabila, as the DRC's president. After numerous previous
attempts at reaching a negotiated settlement failed to materialize, the December 2002 Pretoria
Accord has been a significant stride toward the end of the conflict, achieving a withdrawal of all
-foreign troops and the creation of a transitional government which includes rebels and opposition
parties. What has been labeled "Africa's Great War" reached its end. The fighting between the
375 According to the most comprehensive survey, conducted by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in 2004.
This number includes both military and civilian casualties, as well as death caused directly by the violence and
those caused by indirect consequences (e.g., famine and epidemics) of the fighting. See
http://www.theirc.or2/pdf/DRC MortalitySurvev2004 RB 8DecO4.pdf.
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Congolese army and various local militias, however, is still far from over, and Rwanda is still
threatening a renewed invasion, should the Congolese government support of the Hutu rebels not
stop. The disastrous results of the war will probably be felt for many years to come, even if a
political reconciliation is reached. The tremendous death and suffering, the displacement and the
damage to infrastructure and to the fabric of the society will probably take decades to heal.376
The discussion below concentrates on the causes of the Congo War (if one lumps together the
1996 to 2002 period) and its relations with the state weakness and, indirectly, with the border
fixity norm. Specifically, it
a) State Weakness and Civil Conflict in Zaire and Its Neighbors
Emerging anarchy and "internal scapegoating," it was argued in Hypothesis 3, make weak
states much more likely to slide into civil conflicts and internal wars. Both of these factors,
indeed, played a significant role in Congo (and in some of its neighbors), leading, eventually, to
the international conflagration.
I. Emerging Anarchy and Communal Strife
Over the years of Mobutu's rule (1965-1997), low level violent civil conflicts kept on
simmering, though usually away from the public eye. These conflicts erupted several times. The
first two incidents involved the Katangese rebellions in the late 1970's, in which Katangese
rebels, apparently assisted by Angola, twice tried to seize control of areas in the Shaba (formerly
Katanga) region. That Zaire had to use Belgian and Tunisian troops to quell these rebellions
376 Comprehensive sources on the war are still scarce. For a decent beginning, see John F. Clark, ed., The African
Stakes of the Congo War (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).
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indicates the role of state weakness in allowing them to erupt in the first place.377 In addition to
these two incidents, which were highlighted since they involved foreign countries and possible
Cold War connection, Zaire had suffered from continuous tensions between its multiple ethnic
groups. In the early 1990's, these tensions erupted to fully-fledged internal wars. In the two main
peaks of these wars, hundreds of thousands Kasai people were driven out of their home in the
Shaba province, and some 10,000 Banyarwanda378 were killed and 250,000 become refugees in
North Kivu.379 These patterns could not have been happening in a strong state without the
government and military stepping in. But in Zaire, "Three months and several thousand deaths
[after the breakup of violence] the authorities had done nothing."380 As these internal wars came
on the heels of the obvious signs of Zaire's failure and disintegration (as mutinies and collapse of
the army and a crisis of legitimacy in Kinshasa), the Economist thus concluded, they are "a
symptom of Zaire's chronic ungovernment." 381
II. Internal Scapegoating
Yet, these incidents of ethnic wars were not only a result of lack of governmental means to
establish order. One finds plenty of evidence for the use of internal diversionary tactics in
Congolese politics. The ethnic dimension of Zairian politics became more salient as Mobutu lost
popular legitimacy and as external powers repeatedly intervened to prevent secession attempts.
377 Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, pp. 206-09, Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 74-75,
248-75.
378 Banyarwanda is the collective term for North Kivu groups that migrated from Rwanda and Burundi to Congo,
mostly in the pre-colonial era. While technically they include also the Hutu of the same origins, the term
Banyarwanda, increasingly became synonymous with all Congolese Tutsi. In South Kivu, the Tutsi tribes are
mostly referred to as Banyamulenge. See Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of the
Congo/Zaire," p. 120, Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 49-50 and fn. 26.
379 Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 41-43. Chris McGreal, "Zaire Buries the Victims of
Hatred and Expediency," The Guardian, September 24 1993.
380 McGreal, "Zaire Buries the Victims of Hatred and Expediency."
38" "Zaire: Folly by the Numbers," the Economist, August 7 1993.
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While the strategy of demobilizing ethnicity as a political and cultural vehicle was at the core of
Mobutu's declared policy, he came, in practice, to rely more and more on an inner circle of a
rather coherent ethnic makeup. This circle concentrated heavily on Equatorian and Lingala
speakers, to the exclusion of other groups in the Zairian population. This was especially true
within the security apparatus and in the most sensitive financial posts. 382 Mobutu, it is clear, used
the diversionary card to manipulate the (il)legitimacy of his rule. Though "divide and rule"
tactics were commonplace throughout his tenure and across Zaire, these tactics were particularly
pronounced in the North and South Kivu provinces, where a large population of Tutsi
(Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge) resides. Increasingly during the 1980's and 1990's Mobutu
sought to portray these groups as "foreigners" so as to gain the support of other groups in Kivu,
which were competing with the Banyarwanda for resources and land. The 1991 law that
cancelled the citizenship rights of the Banyarwanda and their right to hold public office is a good
example of this policy, and it was done "mainly to create a scapegoat for Zaire's many problems
and to distract the attention of the populace from their real source of misery." 383 The injection of
armed Hutu militia fleeing their defeat in Rwanda in 1994 considerably added to the already
violent civil strife in east Congo, as will be discussed below.
Mobutu's successor, Kabila, exploited similar tactics as well, targeting in particular the
Banyamulenge, and branding them as Rwanda's "internal spies." Although Kabila's policy of
exclusion seem to come more as a reaction to intensified xenophobic feelings what intensified
Kinshasa, they too originated from a lack of alternative ways to gaining legitimacy in a weak
382 Young, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, pp. 152-57.
383 Quote from Jermaine O. McCalpin, "Historicity of a Crisis: The Origins of the Congo War," in The African
Stakes in the Congo War, ed. John F. Clark (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), p. 46. See also Reno,
Warlords Politics and African States, p. 161. Callaghy, "From Reshaping to Resizing a Failing State? The Case of
the Congo/Zaire," pp. 119-24, Kisangany N.F Emizat, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of Un
Peacekeeping Failure and International Law," Journal of Modern African Studies 38, no. 2 (2000): pp. 166-67.
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state, and resulted in international war. By the end of 1997, "the choice [Kabila] faced was either
to hang on to his Rwandan protectors, and suffer an even greater loss of legitimacy, or to free
himself of their embrace and face the consequences." 384 Still, Kabila chose to perform the
"breakout" from Rwanda by not only ordering "all foreign troops" out of the country but also by
encouraging his army to take part in a massacre of hundreds of Tutsi residents of Kinshasa.38 5
Instead of just heeding the public mood, then, he tried to ride this wave of hatred to gain a new
legitimacy. At least in the short run, this was a successful strategy, since Kabila's popularity was
indeed elevated by the new policy.38 6 As will be discussed below, Kabila's new exclusionary
policies greatly affected the outbreak of the second Rwandan invasion.
Zaire's growing weakness in the 1990's, then, generated ethnic conflicts and internal wars, in
particular in the Kivu provinces in the east. Yet, Zaire's weakness and its internal conflicts were
not the only factor at play. Indeed, the key event that triggered the chain reaction that ended with
the Congo War was the genocide in a neighboring state, Rwanda, itself a very weak state.387 The
combination of Rwanda's civil strife and Zaire's weakness is what brought about, eventually, the
Congo War.
384 Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," p. 45.
385 Ibid.
386 David Sharer, "Lines on the Map," The World Today 1998.
387 Since this is not its focus, this paper does not dwell on the question of Rwanda's weakness. Suffice it to say that
Rwanda is ranked as the 12 th weakest state in the "Failed States Index" (see Fund For Peace, Failed States Index
(2005 [cited July 1 2006]); available from http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2005.php.) and that
although its government is fairly efficient in African terms the state is weak in legitimacy and identity terms.
Within Rwanda all the following processes occurred repeatedly, but most prominently in the 1990's: control of
the state by one ethnic group (Hutu and then Tutsi) to the exclusion of the others; intra-ethnic outbidding (because
of the role of ethnicity as almost the sole source of legitimacy); inter-ethnic security dilemma (in the absence of a
strong protector). See Ren6 Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa:
Reflections on the Crisis in the Great Lakes," African Studies Quarterly 1, no. 3 (1997).
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b) Spillover of Internal War
L Armed Refugees and Spillover to International Conflict
The mechanism through which the Rwandan civil war spread into Congo is similar to the one
described in Hypotheses 4: First, the flow of refugees across the border and the Hutu militants'
use of refugee camps as a base for insurgency into Rwanda made these camps a hot contention
point between the host country (Zaire/DRC) and the sending country (Rwanda). Second, the
presence of Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Congo made any
ethnic conflict in one of them more likely to spread to the others. In both of these processes, the
weakness of the states involved (especially that in Congo) made the states both unable and
unwilling to rein in militants who steered cross-border tensions, thus exacerbating the problem
and making it one not only between ethnic groups, but between states as well. Both the
Rwandan-backed rebellion against Mobutu in 1997 and the Rwandan/ Ugandan/ Burundian
invasion of the DRC in 1998 were, to a significant degree, products of these process of conflict
spillover.
In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, a massive flow of Hutu refugees left the
country, fearing retribution at the hands of Tutsis and the government, now controlled by the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The leadership of the Hutu militants enthusiastically encouraged
this fear and massive exodus. 38 8 The Rwandan refugees settled in camps in Zaire, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Burundi. In Zaire, between 1 and 1.5 million Hutu Rwandan refugees were located
in huge camps in South and North Kivu, the easternmost provinces of the country, in close
proximity to the Rwandan border. Among these refugees were some 50,000 to 100,000 former
388 Sarah K. Lischer, "Internal Conflict and International Contagion: Refugees, Rebels, and Humanitarian Aid," in
the Annual Mettings of the American Political Science Association (Boston: 2002), pp. 13-14. For a
comprehensive source on Rwanda's genocide, see Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide
1959-1994 (London: Hurst, 1995).
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Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) soldiers and members of the militant Hutu paramilitary, the
Interahamwe, which was largely responsible for the genocide. These groups were highly
organized and well armed, a fact that made them a classic example of "a state in exile." The
presence of the Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire and their domination by the militant groups seem
to be the primary cause of both phases of the international intervention in this country. Under the
leadership of this militia, "the refugee camps were turned into military bases from which regular
cross-border incursions were launched in order to destabilize the new Rwandan government." 389
A massive exodus of refugees after a military defeat in a civil war is commonplace, and
among these refugees, there are often many guerillas and ex-soldiers from the losing side. These
occasions, however, do not necessarily turn into border wars of incursion and retaliation. If the
host state is both willing and able to prevent refugee camps from becoming bases for insurgency,
these border wars may be avoidable. The Rwandan Hutu refugees who filled the camps of
western Tanzania, for instance, were prevented from using these camps as a base for launching
attacks on Rwanda by forceful policing and efficient sealing of the border by the Tanzanian
military.390 Moreover, Tanzania extended citizenship to these Hutu refugees, thus reducing their
level of resentment and increasing chances of peaceful integration into the local population. 39 1
In a sharp contrast to Tanzania, and despite many similarities in the composition of
population and economic conditions, 392 Mobutu's Zaire was both unable and unwilling to
provide the necessary control of its borders with Rwanda (or any other neighbor, for that matter)
and the adjacent refugee camps. Mobutu not only avoided confronting the Hutu militants and
389 The quote is from Christain R. Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War: The Breakdown of the International
Order in Central Africa," African Studies Quarterley 4, no. 1 (2000): p. 2. See also Emizat, "The Massacre of
Refugees in Congo," p. 165, Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, p. 82, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 90-92.
39o Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, pp. 91-111. Note that the fact that Tanzania has shown some aspect of a
stronger state than Congo does not necessarily contradict the theory advanced here, which argues that states are
less likely to get stronger under border fixity, not that they cannot get stronger.
391 Herbst, States and Power in Africa, p. 238.
392 See Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, pp. 108-11.
187
ignored repeated Rwandan requests to do so, but also allowed (or directed, it is hard to tell) his
army to assist them. Zairian officers facilitated the arms trade of the Interahamwe and cargo
companies related to Mobutu's regime made this trade available. Zaire's army also availed
military camps and headquarters to the commanders of the Ex-FAR forces, and were heavily
involved in the militants' extortion and suppression of the camps' civilian refugees.3 93 Mobutu
regularly met with senior elements of the Hutu militants, including the former Rwandan army
Chief of Staff.394 Although Mobutu never tried seriously to disarm the Rwandan Hutu militia, it
is quite obvious from the rapid crumble of its army in the face of the 1996 rebellion that he
would not have succeeded in that even if he had the motives. Since these militants intended
explicitly to replace Rwanda's regime (and perhaps also further the "unfinished business" of
genocide) and since Rwanda's government largely represented the Tutsi minority, this
insurgency was viewed from Kigali as a grave threat.395 Note, though, that the threat was not to
Rwanda's territory but to the Tutsi population and the Tutsi regime. Thus, Paul Kagame, Vice-
President of Rwanda, told diplomats in early 1996, "if the international community was unable to
stop the delivery of weapons to the ex-FAR and Interahamwe and the military training in the
refugee camps, the Rwandan government could decide to take preventive military action [my
emphasis]."396
393 Human Rights Watch painstakingly documented this Zairian Involvement in the Rwandan Hutu military
activities in Zaire. See Kathi L. Austin, "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the
Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide," (Human Rights Watch, 1995).
394 Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, p. 85.
395 Bruce Baker, "Going to War Democratically: The Case of the Second Congo War(1998-2000)," Contemporary
Politics 6, no. 3 (2000), Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 2,
Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," pp. 1-4, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 90-92.
396 Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," p. 3. See also Emizat, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo.",
Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 168.
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The same dynamics, though perhaps on a lesser scale, worked between Mobutu's Zaire and
other neighbors, such as Burundi, Uganda and Angola.397 For Burundi, where a minority Tutsi
controlled the government and largely excluded the majority Hutu, the story almost resembles
that of Rwanda. Refugee camps around Uvira (in South Kivu), which hosted some 150,000
Burundian Hutu refugees, were since 1995 a breeding place for the Hutu rebellion against
Burundi's government. The Conseil National pour la Defense (CNDD) mounted its attacks on
Burundian soil using these camps as a rear base. Burundi's backing of the war against Mobutu
was largely due to these threats to its regime, and to the efforts to eradicate them.398 Uganda
shared similar concerns. Three of Uganda's armed opposition groups, most notably the Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF), had also found safe havens in Eastern Zaire.399 Again, whether
Mobutu was just allowing these groups to operate from Zairian soil or actively assisting them,
the interests of Uganda in sponsoring a friendlier regime in Kinshasa and a possibility for direct
action in Eastern Zaire against the rebels is clear. This primary concern of Uganda was evident in
its (successful) attempt to obtain official permission to enter the DRC in pursuit of rebels
endangering its borders and population, once Kabila was in power.40
The case of Angola is an even clearer example of intervention in a neighboring state
designed to thwart a domestic foe assisted by this state. The National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) was actively fighting the Angolan government from its 1975
independence until 2002. Mobutu's Zaire was the primary lifeline for UNITA. Zaire served as a
channel for diamond smuggling from Angola (an estimated half a billion dollars annually) and
397 All of them ranked among the 60 states in the "Failed States Index." See Fund For Peace, Failed States Index
(Fund For Peace, 2005 [cited); available from http:/lwww.fundforpeace.org/program/fsilfsindex.php.
398 Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 2, Sharer, "Africa's Great
War," p. 95.
399 John F. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations," Journal of Modern
African Studies 39, no. 2 (2001): p. 271-72, Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in
Central Africa," p. 2.
400 Clark, "Explaning Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 272-73.
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weapons bought with this money. It served as a ground for UNITA's rear bases and, not less
important, as a conduit for the financing of the movement provided by the US and South Africa
(until the early 1990's) against Angola's socialist government. Mobutu himself gained huge
profits from these transactions by playing a middleman and extracting fees for his good services.
Thus, Angola happily supported Kabila's effort to oust the friend of its worst enemy- Mobutu.40 1
Laurent Kabila's accession to power in Kinshasa in 1996 changed the players but not the
structure of the situation. Congo (now DRC) was still an extremely weak state. The DRC was
still unable to prevent all (or even most) attacks on its neighbors arising from its lands. Kabila
certainly did not set this mission as a priority of his regime. The consequences were that almost
the exact same problems that caused the initial burst against Mobutu were now the reason some
of the DRC's neighbors aspired to oust Kabila. His inability and unwillingness to disarm the
Hutu's militia who were operating in the DRC's eastern provinces remained Rwanda's largest
concern. As Rwanda's old ally Kabila turned away from fulfilling its security needs, Kigali
sought to replace him with someone more sympathetic, as it had done with Mobutu before. The
massive invasion, as well as the method of choosing a local ally to head the march to Kinshasa,
was strikingly similar to the first invasion (1996).402 Similar concerns, apparently, were driving
Burundi to participate in this second invasion, attempting to eradicate Burundian Hutu rebels that
were operating along the Tanganyika Lake, endangering the country's borders.40 3
The official Ugandan explanation of the 1998 intervention stressed the need for Uganda to
flush out guerilla bases in Eastern Congo, that served the ADF in its raids on villages over the
401 Reno, Warlords Politics and African States, pp. 151-62, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 96-97, Thomas Turner,
"Angola's Role in the Congo War," in The African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F. Clark (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 75-83, Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," p. 14.
402 Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 45-48, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 92, Weinstein,
"Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," p. 12.
403 Baker, "Going to War Democratically," p. 269.
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Ugandan border. At the minimum, Kabila had done nothing to rid his soil of these rebels. At the
maximum, as the Ugandan government alleged, he allowed Sudanese assistance in arming and
training to the ADF, hoping to get their aid for his army as well. Uganda's claims of finding
"smoking guns" pointing to the involvement of the Sudanese in arming and training the ADF are
quite reasonable too, given Sudan's policy that "any enemy of Uganda is a friend of ours"
(because Uganda assists the rebels of Southern Sudan in their prolonged fight against the
Khartoum government). 404 Uganda, though, was not content with conducting limited operations
against the ADF or even with establishing a "security zone" next to its Congolese border. Its
involvement in the Rwandan initial airlift that intended to take hold of Kinshasa and its
sponsoring of rebel groups in the Equator, more than 1000 miles away from its western border,
testify to its broader goals. Museveni (Uganda's President) apparently concluded that a long-
term solution to his country's security problems was dependent on a friendlier (and more
efficient) regime in Kinshasa.40 5
Angola, an ally of Rwanda and Uganda in their drive to oust Mobutu, found itself this time
on the other side of the war, supporting Kabila and opposing Rwanda and Uganda. It was
Angolan troops., together with Zimbabweans, that managed to save Kinshasa from falling once
again into the hands of Rwandan-backed rebels (the RCD). How can we explain such an unusual
scenario? Again, considerations regarding its internal war seem to account for the Angolan
policy. Kabila disrupted the flow of UNITA's weaponry and diamonds through Congo, and, as
much as Angola was not satisfied with Kabila's handling of his government, this disruption was
404 Ibid.: pp. 268-69, Clark, "Explaning Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 271-73, Sharer, "Africa's Great War,"
pp. 95-96.
405 Clark, "Explaning Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 272-73, 78-81, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," pp. 95-96.
Note that this pattern is consistent with what Tanisha Fazal argued is a post WW-II trend to replace the practice of
territorial conquests with attempts at regime change. See Fazal, "From Conquest to Intervention: State, Regime,
and Leader Exit."
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the critical factor for Luanda. Angola seems to have thought that a new regime in Kinshasa
might give Savimbi a renewed opportunity to establish his supply routes.40 Rumors of UNITA
and Mobutu sympathizers' connections with the rebels and with Kigali fueled Angolan
suspicions even more, eventually bringing about the decision to heed Kabila's request and send
in troops.40 7 That curbing UNITA's activity was the primary factor that prompted Angola's
intervention on behalf of Kabila's government is evident from Angola's prompt withdrawal from
Congo now that Savimbi is dead and UNITA is, at long last, defeated.
II. Kin Relations Across Borders
The other mechanism of spillover described in chapter 2, the "kin-country syndrome,"
worked here as well. Like Rwanda, Burundi, and Western Tanzania, eastern Congo is a home for
both Hutu and Tutsi ethnics (along with other ethnic groups). Yet, unlike Burundi and Rwanda,
until the 1990's there were relatively few tensions between these two groups. Rather, both Hutus
and Tutsis in eastern Congo, known collectively as Banyarwanda, were resented by other ethnic
groups, who thought of them as aliens (although many of the Banyarwanda immigrated to this
area more than 200 years ago).408
The Rwandan genocide and the ensuing refugee flow, however, shuffled the cards in all of
central Africa. Hutu Zairians and Indigenous Zairians allied themselves with the Rwandan
Interahamwe against the Tutsi, both those native to Zaire and those relative newcomers from
Rwanda. Violence was soon forthcoming; the Interahamwe and ex-FAR elements in the refugee
406 Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 95, Turner, "Angola's Role in the Congo War.", Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble
for Africa'," p. 14.
407 On possible connections between the rebels and Rwanda and UNITA, see Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional
War," p. 6, Sharer, "Lines on the Map," p. 295. On Kabila's appeal to Angolan intervention, explicitly promising
to keep pursuing anti-UNITA policies, see Francois Misser, and Rake, Alan, "An African World War?" New
African, October 1998, p. 14.
408 Emizat, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo," pp. 166-67, Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo,"
pp. 49-52, Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 6.
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camps attacked and killed thousands of Tutsi in North and South Kivu in 1996. While the Hutu
and the indigenous groups gained the support of Mobutu, the Tutsi were pushed to find refuge in
the support of the (now Tutsi ruled) Rwandan government. "The 'kin-country syndrome,' then,
asserted itself with a vengeance, driving Hutu and Tutsi, irrespective of other distinctions, to
opposing camps."40 9 This conflagration would not have happened if Zaire was a stronger state,
capable of securing interethnic order, and if its leaders had incentives to prevent ethnic exclusion
as a measure for gaining legitimacy.
The active exclusion of the Tutsi in Zaire was one of the primary causes of the rebellion
against Mobutu and, because of kin relations to Rwanda, of the Rwandan intervention in
Congo.41o In October 1996, after being issued a decree commanding them to "return" to Rwanda
within six days. This situation only exacerbated the fears of the Tutsi in Rwanda, which were
already engaged in violent conflict with Hutu militia and their local backers. The Banyamulenge,
therefore, turned to Kigali for military support. This, together with the Hutu cross-border attacks
described above, led to the massive Rwandan attack on the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire (and,
apparently, also to massive slaughter of civilians), which started the rapid crumbling of
Mobutu's regime.4 '
Similarly, the 1998 Rwandan invasion was a result, in addition to the security problem, of
DRC's ethnic policies regarding the Banyamulenge. Early in 1998, Kabila decided to neglect his
allies in the struggle against Mobutu in order to restore his popularity in Kinshasa. Tutsi
ministers in his government were ousted, and after issuing a decree for all foreign troops (i.e.,
409 Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa," p. 6.
410 Herbst, States and Power in Africa, p. 238.
411 Emizat, "The Massacre of Refugees in Congo," pp. 167-79, Lemarchand, "Patterns of State Collapse and
Reconstruction in Central Africa," pp. 6-7, Manahl, "From Genocide to Regional War," pp. 2-4, Weinstein,
"Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," p. 13.
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Rwandan) to leave the country, a massacre of the Banyamulenge (as well as anybody with Tutsi-
looking features), encouraged by the army, took place in Kinshasa. Furthermore, Kabila failed to
fulfill his promise to Rwanda to bestow citizenship on the Banyamulenge. Again, along with
Kabila's inability and unwillingness to disarm the Interahamwe, the exclusion of their brethren
from the DRC was the "red line" that propelled Rwanda to attempt a second march on
Kinshasa.412
Civil war in Rwanda spilled over through a massive flow of refugees to Zaire. The refugee
camps, in turn, served as a base for Hutu insurgence, as well as stirring up ethnic fighting within
Zaire. This fighting provided even more incentive for Rwanda to intervene on behalf of its Tutsi
kin across the border. The weakness of Zaire/DRC, both in 1996 and 1998, did not allow it to
forcefully intervene in the ethnic conflict and assert the state's monopoly over the means of
violence, which would have prevented the Hutu militia from staging the cross-border attacks.
Moreover, the illegitimacy of Kinshasa's rule made it use ethnic exclusion of the Tutsi as a
vehicle for gaining such legitimacy. This policy left Rwanda little choice but to assert its role as
the protector of the Tutsi, whether they resided on its soil or outside of it. Similar processes,
especially regarding the cross border insurgency and retaliations, were at work in the cases of
Burundi's, Uganda's and Angola's intervention in Congo as well. On a more fundamental level,
as argued above, the border fixity norm makes the creation of a more coherent and inclusive state
identity, one that would take the sting out of the two processes described above, much less likely.
c) State Weakness and Foreign Predation
The ban on territorial annexation that is entailed in the border fixity norm does not preclude
any form of predation across borders. Hypothesis 5 stated that state weakness promotes the
4 12 Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," pp. 45-46, Misser, "An African World War?" p. 15.
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possibility of international conflicts because it creates opportunities for neighbors to intervene in
order to exploit the weak state, economically or politically.
"Africa's 'scramble for Africa,"' Jeremy Weinstein argues, "is a primary cause of the rise of
the interstate war on the continent."41 3 This section explores this outright exploitation of the
collapse of the Congolese state as a cause of the war. Opportunism and greed, it concludes, were
apparently significant factors in the policies of many of the actors involved in the Congo War,
but they do not seem to be the prime reason for going to war, except for the case of Zimbabwe.
Three states involved in the war over Congo stand out as states that have fewer reasons to be
directly threatened by the situation in Congo, either in terms of the spread of a civil war or of
other cross-border security threats. This is simply because Namibia, Chad and Zimbabwe, all
employing troops backing Kabila's regime in the second phase of the war, have no border with
Congo. Their motives for involvement, therefore, have to be sought elsewhere. In the case of
Namibia, evidence of economic interests is obscure, though it is worth noting that the opposition
accused the President of sending troops to defend his family's mining interests in the DRC.414
The case of Chad is also ambiguous, but one can suspect at least two economic inducements for
employing troops in Congo. First, it is believed that Chad got financial benefits from Libya's
Gaddafi who considered this a way to exert his influence in sub-Saharan Africa, in return for
intervention in Congo. Second, Chad might have had its eyes on the gold mines of northern
Congo.415
If some ambiguity resides in these two cases, the same cannot be said about Zimbabwe's
involvement in the Congolese conflict. Harare had three main reasons for intervention in the
413 Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," p. 18. For a similar way of explaining the war, see also Marc Lacey,
"Congo Tires of War, but the End Is Not in Sight," New York Times, July 15 2002.
414 Baker, "Going to War Democratically," p. 274.
415 Ibid.: p. 269, Sharer, "Lines on the Map," p. 295.
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DRC, all of them having to do with opportunism. First, Kabila and his ADFL movement owed
the Zimbabwean government large sums that were lent to it during the rebellion against Mobutu.
Zimbabwe was afraid that if Kabila's regime would be ousted, it would not get its money
back.416 Second, though Zimbabwe, as a state, probably lost money from the Congolese
adventure, the extension of patronage politics from Zimbabwe to Congolese territory hugely
benefited some private interests. President Robert Mugabe openly stated the potential economic
profit in the DRC to be one of the chief reasons for Zimbabwean involvement and publicly
encouraged businesses to exploit the intervention to promote their profits. Both the army as an
organization and his heads as private businessmen were heavily involved in production and trade
of diamonds, gold and copper from the parts of the DRC controlled by Zimbabwean troops,
securing lucrative deals with Kabila's government. Other businessmen associated with the ruling
ZANU-PF party and cronies of Mugabe took their share of the profits as well. The armies of
Zimbabwe and the DRC, for example, were partners in a joint project of mining and selling gold
and diamonds, in particular in the mines of Mbuji Mayi. Another example is the contracts of
supplying the Zimbabwean troops in Congo, which were accorded to a private transportation
company owned by none other than the Zimbabwean Chief of Staff.417 The concentration of the
Zimbabwean troopdeployment around important mining towns, as well, is a testimony to these
interests.4 18 Third, Mugabe also hoped to exploit the Congolese conflict for promoting his own
ambitions of political saliency and regional leadership in Southern Africa (in the face of the
prestige and natural advantages enjoyed by South Africa in this respect).4 19
416 Misser, "An African World War?" p. 14, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 98.
417 Baker, "Going to War Democratically," pp. 268, 74-75, Sharer, "Africa's Great War," p. 98.
418 Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," pp. 15-16.
419 Misser, "An African World War?" p. 14, David Shearer, "Lines on the Map," The World Today 1998, p. 295.
Shearer, "Lines on the Map," p. 295; Misser and Rake, "An African World War?" p. 14.
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The backers of Kabila's government, though, have no monopoly on the economic
exploitation of Congo through military intervention. Uganda and Rwanda apparently had their
hands full in this respect as well. While the exploitation motive apparently played a secondary
role to the security one, at least at the time of the invasion, their entrenchment in East Congo
might have been, at least in part, a consequence of acquired economic interests of civilian and
(mainly) military elites. Suffice it to say that Uganda and Rwanda, like Zimbabwe, have been
registered from 1999 as diamond exporters, despite the lack of this natural deposit in their soil. 420
A 2001 UN report documents the great extent to which Rwandan and Ugandan military forces
and civilian companies exploit their respected occupied territories. The document, as well, traces
the relations between these individuals and companies to the highest echelons in Kigali and
Kampala.4 2 1 However, while greed seems to have played an important role in the escalation of
the war and the prolongation of the Ugandan and Rwandan presence in Congo, it does not seem
to have been the main reason for their first engagement. The fact that both countries left DRC's
territory, eventually, is also indicative that economic greed, while important, was not more
important than security considerations. Congo's weakness served to enable this economic
exploitation, and, as a 2003 UN panel of experts claims, "in the absence of a strong, central and
democratically elected government that is in control of its territory, illegal exploitation will
continue and serve as the motivation and the fuel for continued conflicts in the region." 422
420 Baker, "Going to War Democratically," pp. 275,78. Legitimate and illegitimate trade between Uganda and the
Congolese territories controlled by it flourished, and it seems that high-ranking officers, as well as the Ugandan
president are among the prime beneficiaries of it. Similar accusations, though on a lesser scale, have been brought
against Rwanda as well. See Clark, "Explaning Ugandan Intervention in Congo," pp. 275-78, Turner, "The
Kabila's Congo," p. 217, Weinstein, "Africa's 'Scramble for Africa'," p. 17.
421 "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic
Republic of Congo," (New York: United Nations Security Council, 2001), S/2001/357.
422 "Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic
Republic of Congo," (New York: United Nations Security Council, 2003), S/2003/1027.
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In addition to the economic motives, political predation, encouraged by Congo's weakness,
also played a significant role in facilitating the war. The facts that a regime change was a realistic
possibility and that political allies within Congo were readily available to all the protagonists
greatly enhanced the probability of breakup of the war in both its phases. Simply put, if Kigali
had not perceived the opportunity to change the regime in Kinshasa to one it favors (both in 1996
and 1998), and if it had no potential Congolese allies in this endeavor, it would have to
reconsider, if not the entire invasion at least its extent and ambitions. The aim of Rwanda's 1996
invasion, Rene Lemarchand tells us, was to "wrestle the Mobutist monster to the ground and
make the whole of Congo safe for Rwanda."4 23 Rwanda succeeded in its first attempt and almost
succeeded in its second, precisely because of Congo's weakness as a state. Similarly, the
apparent Angolan involvement in the assassination of Laurent Kabila could also be viewed as
political opportunism to replace a leader of a weak state with a more favorable one.424 Granted,
without the underlying security motivations, these predatory moves would not have been
necessary in the first place, but once security threats are in place, the weakness of the state
(Congo, in this case) provides relatively cheap opportunities for political and economic
predation, and the potential exacerbation of conflict that comes with them.
E. Summary: Congo
To be sure, throughout modern history, some rulers have read wrongly the equation of their
external pressures and domestic constraints, and avoided the risky and costly policy of state
building. In an international environment in which borders are not fixed and states do not have a
safety net, however, such "hollow shell states" could not have survived. They were likely to be
"selected out" of the system by their stronger and more efficient neighbors, or at least lose
423 Lemarchand, "The Democratic Republic of Congo," p. 43.
424 Ibid., pp. 216-17, Turner, "The Kabila's Congo," pp. 52-53.
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significant territories. This, however, is not the case in the current international environment, and
states like Mobutu's and Kabila's Congo remain "alive" and territorially intact even when they
do not function as a state at all. If border fixity results in the perpetuation and exacerbation of
state weakness, one would at least expect that it would curb external conflict. As this chapter
shows, however, this might not be the case, and the consequences could be disasterous.
The case study of Congo largely corroborates the Hypothesis 2-5. Though an indirect proof,
the pattern of Congo's leaders' behavior and governing definitely points to border fixity as a
very significant factor that contributed to the weakening of the state in Congo. Congo's growing
weakness, in turn, was confirmed as a major cause of its internal wars, especially in the 1990's,
and the spillover of these wars (as well as the civil wars in neighboring weak states) were
strongly confirmed as a major reason for the outbreak of the bloody war in the Great Lakes
Region, first in 1996 and again in 1998. Greed, as well, was an important factor in the war: it
played a major role in Zimbabwe's involvement and was an important contributor to the
prolongation of the involvement in the conflict for most of the other actors. Yet, it was not
Rwanda's Burundi's, Uganda's, or Angola's primary reason to go to war.
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Chapter 7: Lebanon, 1943-2005
The case of Lebanon, like that of Congo in the previous section, is intended to study the
effect of the norm of border fixity on weak states. These two cases are very different in nature,
yet the processes through which they are affected by border fixity share many similarities.
Through the lenses of the Lebanese case, this section again examines the validity and strength of
hypotheses 2-5, which taken together argue that in regions where most states are weak, the
border fixity norm is likely to result in more international conflicts. These hypotheses dealt, first,
with the assertion that the border fixity norm perpetuates and exacerbates state weakness;
second, with the argument that weak states are more likely to be the site. of internal conflicts;
third, with the proposition that internal violence in weak states tends to spill over to international
conflicts through mechanisms involving refugee flow and the kin-country syndrome; and fourth,
with the claim that foreign political and economic predation are also more likely in such
circumstances, creating a situations in which violent international conflicts are even more
probable.
The Lebanese case largely corroborates these hypotheses. The norm of border fixity made
Lebanon's socio-political weakness a permanent fixture, and this weakness greatly contributed to
the eventual breakout and continuation of the civil war in 1975. This civil strife spilled over to
involve outside parties, most notably Syria and Israel, with refugees and opportunities for
predation playing an important role in the process. Kin affiliations played a lesser role. This
chapter explores, first, the degree of socio-political strength (or weakness) of the Lebanese state
at independence. Second, it surveys the lack of territorial threats and opportunities, and the way
this absence affected the Lebanese polity. Third, the chapter investigates the role of the state's
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weakness in fostering civil strife; fourth, it discusses the spillover of the conflict to include
neighboring states. I argue that, although a weak state in 1943, Lebanon had nevertheless the
potential to become stronger with time. However, this was not to happen, to a great extent as a
result of the border fixity norm. This state's weakness led Lebanon through numerous crises and,
eventually, to a full-blown civil war. The spillover of the Lebanese civil war to involve both
Syria and Israel was also a fruit of Lebanon's continuous weakness as a state. In the era of border
fixity, this weakness, and the potential for internal and external violence it caries with it, are
likely to persist.
A. Lebanon 1943: Elements of Weakness and Potentials of Strength
Lebanon, like most other states, was born a weak state. It was not uniquely weak, however,
and even possessed some factors that should have given it the potential to become a stronger
state. This section outlines the conditions of Lebanon's starting point as an independent state in
1943, so as to set the stage for the discussion of the persistent weakness, and civil and
international conflict that follows.
The fact that Lebanon was a creation of the French Mandate is well known. Indeed, given the
League of Nations mandate over what was broadly defined as Syria, France decided to divide the
territory into a few smaller territorial segments. Gran Liban, or Grater Lebanon, was the first
such "state" to be established, in 1920. It included the areas of Mt. Lebanon, the town of Beirut,
the southern costal strip of Tyre and Sidon and Jabal Amil to the South of Mt. Lebanon, Tripoli
and its surrounding to its north, and the Beqaa Valley to its East (see Map no. I below).
Structured this way, Greater Lebanon was a political creation that never existed as such before.
Although overwhelmingly Arab in ethnic and linguistic terms, the territory of Lebanon included
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within its borders a large variety of confessional (religious) communities, with diverse
affiliations and various economic and political interests. The communal/confessional diversity of
Greater Lebanon is presented in Table 6 below, which is based on the 1932 census.425 The
creation of a separate political entity of Lebanon was, then, an artificial French act.
Yet to acknowledge Lebanon's artificial borders is not necessarily to agree that these borders
were altogether devoid of logic or that they were completely at odds with the culture and
interests of the local population. Three elements are important to note, in this respect: the
autonomous nature and history of the Mt. Lebanon region, the appeals of the local population,
and the contemporary perceptions of requirements of stateness. First, the core of the Greater
Lebanon territory, the Emirate of Mt. Lebanon, had been an autonomously administrated unit in
the Ottoman Empire since the late 16th century. The Emirate was ruled by a successive of Druze,
Sunni Muslim and Maronite Christian Emirs until the mid 19 th century.426 Since 1861 Mt.
Lebanon had been administered as a special sanjak (district) within the Empire, under the name
of Mutasarrifiyya. The sanjak was given greater autonomy and was accountable directly to
Constantinople, rather than to Damascus or other local centers. The Mutasarrifiyya developed a
very distinct political culture and characteristics, which included the power-sharing of the more
numerous Christian Maronite community and the smaller but more coherent and Druze
community. This order, in place until World War I, was also characterized by its reliance on a
small oligarchy of notable families (zu'ama), both Druze and Maronite. As the Maronite
population grew faster and as their communities exploited European ties to gain more rapid
economic development, the Maronites came to dominate the Mt. Lebanon region by the time of
425 The census was conducted by the Lebanese government and the French mandatory authorities.426 Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence, p. 4.
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the French Mandate 427. This relatively consolidated core, which included a sense of uniqueness,
a Maronite supremacy, but also a formula of power-sharing with minorities, could be argued,
then, to provide the logic behind the French creation of Greater Lebanon.
Figure 8: Map of Lebanon
* Map Source: https://www.cia.gov/cialpublications/factbooklgeos/le.html
427 Ibid., pp. 4-5. Samir Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-
Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
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Table 6: Communal Divisions, Lebanon 1911, 1932
The Druze are included in the Mu slim tally, in accordance with the original statistical pract
** Source: Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000),
p. 7 .
Second, like other communities in the territories occupied by the western powers in World
War I, Mt. Lebanon sent a delegation to the Versailles Conference, which argued for an
independent state status and expansion of territories for this future state. In this limited sense, the
French initiative was also in line with local interests (albeit those of the Maronites in Mt.
Lebanon, and not those in the adjacent areas).428 Third, the addition of other territories to that of
Mt. Lebanon might indeed be perceived as an attempt to augment the power of a local French
428 Kais M. Firro, Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under the Mandate (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003),
pp. 16-19.
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Community Mutasarrifiyya, 1911 Greater Lebanon, Census
(% of population) 1932 (% of population)
Maronites 58.3 29.0
Greek Catholics 7.7 5.9
Greek Orthodox 12.6 9.8
Other Christians 0.8 5.7
All Christians 79.4 50.4
Sunnis 3.5 22.5
Shi'is 5.6 19.8
Druze 11.4 6.8
All Muslinms* 2t0.5 49.1
Jews 0.5
ally, the Maronites, but it could also be seen as consistent with the standard thinking of the
period, which sought sufficient territorial size as a prerequisite for viable states (e.g., the creation
of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia).429
In terms of political institutions, Lebanon was in 1943 weak, but not extremely so. For one,
there was a sense of continuity, as the Mutasarrifiyya embodied the two principles that became
the most important features of Lebanon's politics to this day. The principle of sectarian
representation (or, in other terms, consociationalism) remains the organizing principle of
Lebanon's politics, while the semi-feudal, patron-client character of the society, ruled by
families of zu'ama, is the defining trait of politics within this formal organizing principle. 430
Second, the French mandate indeed attempted, to some extent, to provide the state-in-the-making
with the kind of tutelage that was envisioned in the League of Nations' mandate system.
Lebanon adopted its own unique constitution, written by Michel Chiha, a Lebanese. The
constitution was based on the principles of confessional representation and power--shari g
between the various sects of the society. It had a Parliament and a government, headed by an
elected President, as early as 1926. Lebanon thus did not share a similar colonial experience with
pre-1960 Congo or pre-1810 Argentina. This political system, though, was still subordinated to
French whims, and thus not governing independently. When the French governor thought the
Parliament's work too cumbersome, for example, he dismissed the body. Furthermore, security
or other French interests, of course, overrode those of the Lebanese counterparts. 431
In terms of the development of bureaucratic institutions, the picture was similar: "The
achievement of France was to bring into existence in Syria and Lebanon some of the essential
429 Ibid., p. 16.
430 Farid El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 2000), pp. 50-56, Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism, pp. 146-65.
4' Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (Beirut, Lebanon: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.
180.
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conditions which would make possible a transition form a medieval to a modem society." 432
Thus, law and order were established throughout the territory, a judicial system was erected, a
state system of schools created, and a census conducted. The French-created bureaucracy,
however, still left much to be desired, especially in the areas of taxation and agrarian policy. This
bureaucracy, moreover, enjoyed a very limited legitimacy, based both on relatively poor
performance and ideological objections.433 Lebanon, hence, underwent some political and
administrative development, but an inherently limited one, before its independence.
In terms of legitimacy and identification with the state, Lebanon as a freshly independent
state faced challenges from below and from above. From below, the overwhelming challenge
was created by the expanded definition of Lebanon's borders far beyond the confines of the
relatively tight Muttasarrifiyya. This expansion created a whole new demographic balance,
which greatly contributed to the weakness of the state. While the Christians amounted to almost
80% of Mt. Lebanon population, their share of the population of Greater Lebanon was only
slightly larger than 50% in 1932. The single largest Christian community, the Maronites,
constituted only 29% of the new state's population, as opposed to almost 60% of that of the
Muttasarrifiyya (see Table 1 above). Large segments of the population of Greater Lebanon were
oriented, economically and in terms of identity, toward other centers, rather than toward Mt.
Lebanon. The Sunni Muslim population of Tripoli and its surroundings, for instance, saw
themselves as Syrians, not Lebanese, and were used to serve as the Mediterranean outlet of
Damascus. The Shi'is of the south and the Beqaa, as well, were not affiliated, either culturally or
economically, with Mt. Lebanon. Some of the more prominent figures in Beirut's Christian
community were avid Arab nationalists and/or advocates of Greater Syria, which included
432 Ibid., p. 174.
433 Ibid., pp. 169-78. See also Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism
1920-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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Lebanon (see below).434 Although this sectarian division was not primordial, and not completely
immobile, by the 1943 independence it acquired a fairly stable and "sticky" nature, which would
make the consolidation of a state a hard task.43 5
From above, rival group identities competed with the Lebanese one, and thus with the
legitimacy of the state. On the largest scale, the claim that Islam should have a political
manifestation, and that Muslims should all be a part of a single polity, at least in theory, was a
legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Yet similar notions, so long ingrained in the culture and politics
of the Middle East, still linger. Second, an Arab nationalist movement, starting in the late 18th in
reaction to the decline of the Ottomans and to ideas of nationalism emanating from Europe, had a
strong claim to Lebanon. In contrast to Islam, Arabism was, in the case of Lebanon, inclusive, as
the overwhelming majority of the population was ethnically and linguistically Arab. Most Sunni
Arabs in Lebanon, as well as many Christians, saw themselves, first and foremost, as Arabs.
Indeed, some of the more prominent early Arab ideologues were of Lebanese Christian (mainly
Greek Orthodox) origins.436 Third, together with the pan-Arabic notions, and considered either as
a part of them or separately, an identity of Greater Syria nationalism was very popular at the time
and enjoyed considerable support in Lebanon and Syria. This identity was based, at least
partially, on historical reality. Lebanon, like Syria and the British mandates of Trans-Jordan and
Palestine, were all part of a loosely defined region of Bilad-al-Sham. Again, a considerable
portion of both Muslim and Christian elites in what became Lebanon supported the idea of
434 Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, pp. 33-36, Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Ilndependence, pp. 5-7.
35 Arguably, the ethnically dominated character of the politics in Lebanon since the mid 19 th century is more a result
of an imposition of Ottoman and (mainly) European perceptions of Mt. Lebanon's society then their natural state
of being. Until the peasant rebellion of 1859-60 Mt. Lebanon was more a horizontally, class-oriented society, than
a horizontal one, divided by ethnic affiliations. See El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, p. 117, Samir Khalaf,
Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 67-72, Makdisi, The Culture of
Sectarianism, pp. 59-144.
4 36 Firro, Inventing Lebanon, pp. 37-41, Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle
East
(New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 82-86, Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence, p. 9.
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Lebanon as a part of a larger Syrian identity, which should have a political expression as a single
state.4 37 All of these competing identities added to Lebanon's challenges and augmented its
"external affinity problem." 438
The arrangement that allowed sectarian coexistence in Lebanon was the "National Pact" (Al
Mithaq al- Watani) of 1943, which was essentially a compromise between the seemingly
contradicting identities of Christians and Muslims. The pact was an informal agreement between
the Maronite leader Bishara al-Khoury and the Sunni Leader Riad al-Solh. It contained two
closely related dimensions: the internal and the external. The internal dimension concerned the
distribution of power within Lebanon's polity. In terms of this dimension, the pact was, in
essence, an extension of the Muttasarrifiyya system of Mt. Lebanon to the whole country. This
included the distribution of governmental, political, bureaucratic, and military posts according to
the confessional quota system. The quotas were divided with accordance with the 1932 census,
by a ratio of 6:5 between Christian and Muslims, respectively. In the same manner, the two
leaders verbally agreed that the President of the Republic would always be a Maronite Christian,
the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the House a Shi'a Muslim, and so on.439
The external dimension of the National Pact was at least as important as the internal one. It
concerned not only Lebanon's future foreign policy, but also the identity of the state, defined
against the backdrop of its external environment. In the pact, the Christians agreed to give up the
French patronage and keep a Lebanon with an "Arab face," while the Sunnites consented to
437 Firro, Inventing Lebanon, pp. 19-22, Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, p. 19, Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The
History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
438 On this term, see Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Inter-Ethnic War."
439 A good discussion of the pros and cons of the Lebanese "National Pact" is Latif Abul-Husn, The Lebanese
Conflict: Looking Inward (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 73-90. See also El Khazan, The
Breakdown of the State, pp. 38-40, Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Modernization in Lebanon
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985), Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, p. 36, Arend Lijphart,
Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 44-
46, Walid Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance (Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 87-90.
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]Lebanon's independence and agreed to stop their efforts to reunify Lebanon or some of its
territory with Syria or any other outside Arab entity. In terms of foreign policy, it was agreed in
the pact that Lebanon would join the newly born Arab League, but that it would demand from
the League assurance for its sovereign independence and its boundaries' integrity.440 Thus,
Khoury, the first President of the independent Republic states, "The National Pact was not
merely a settlement between two confessional communities but the fusion of two ideologies: one
that called for melting Lebanon into another state, and the other that called for its retention under
,,441foreign protection."44
Lebanon, then, was a weak state in 1943, but not extremely weak. It enjoyed some basic
political developments and institutions, as well as a measure of established bureaucracy. It was in
some sense an artificial creation of the French Mandate, but it possessed a strong identity at its
core, Mt. Lebanon. The Lebanese identity was challenged from below and from above, but these
challenges were at least potentially mitigated by a political compromise between elites of the
more numerous and influential confessional groups in the Republic. Farid El-Khazan argues that
"at the time of independence...no Arab state, particularly in the Arab East, had acquired greater
power, whether political or military, and had greater legitimacy than the Lebanese state." While
this argument might be somewhat exaggerated, it is certainly true that Lebanon was not in a
particularly bad position in terms of state building as of its 1943 independence.
B. Border Fixity and the Absence of Territorial Pressures in Lebanon
In the wake of World War II, the norm of border fixity began to gain strength in the
international community, as discussed in chapter one. The Arab world was no exception, nor was
4"0 Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, 36; Hudson, The Precarious Republic, 139; Abul-Husn, The
Lebanese Conflict, 62-63.
441 Quoted in Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, 79.
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the Middle East in general, apart from the dispute over Palestine/Israel. The acceptance of this
norm, in words and in practice, created a situation in which Lebanon suffered from no territorial
threats and "enjoyed" no prospects of territorial aggrandizement. Greater Lebanon of the French
mandate became the Republic of Lebanon after 1943, but its borders remained the same. As a
state, Lebanon participated in one international war, in 1948, and it was subject to one short civil
war in 1958, as well as one prolonged conflict, lasting from 1975 to 1989, which involved both
civil war and international (Israeli and Syrian) intervention. None of these conflicts was
territorial in nature, although they often involved the occupation of territory. None of them
changed Lebanon's international borders or created sovereign political entities inside Lebanese
territory.
Lebanon joined as one of the founders of the Arab League in 1945. In the preparatory
discussions that predated the establishment of this Arab organization of states, Lebanon, being
the smallest state and fearing the Hashemite schemes of creating anew the Greater Syria idea,
strongly advocated the acceptance and formal guaranteeing of the territorial status quo. Indeed,
the Arab League Pact emphasized the safeguard of the member-states' sovereignty and
independence, 442 and the Alexandria Protocol, a document issued by the Preliminary Committee
of the General Arab Conference, stated specifically that:
The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee emphasize their respect of
the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, which the
governments of the above States have already recognized in consequence of
Lebanon's adoption of an independent policy, which the Government of that country
announced in its program of October 7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese
Chamber of Deputies.44 3
442 For the pact, see The Avalon Project at Yale Law School:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/arableag.htm [accessed 7/6/2006]. For a discussion on Lebanon's
role in the pact, see Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, pp. 62-63, Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, p.
36, Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence, pp. 97-102.
443 The Avalon Project at Yale Law School: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/alex.htm [accessed on
7/6/2006].
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Despite the efforts among some important Arab figures, chief among them King Abdullah of
Jordan, the unification of the Arab states east of the Mediterranean as Greater Syria did not come
to pass, then. With the support of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Lebanon's independence, and its
borders, gained the formal recognition of the Arab League, Jordan and Syria included. 444 Despite
international interventions and civil wars, these borders (in their formal sense) were never
challenged in any serious way.
As a member of the Arab League, Lebanon officially participated in the 1948 war against the
newly established Israel. While Lebanon was not forced into the war - both President Khuri and
,Prime Minister Sulh actively advocated it - the state's stakes in this war and its participation
were limited. The: Lebanese army stayed in defensive positions as the Arab invasion started on
May 15, 1948, but facilitated the transfer of weapons and arms to the "Liberation Army," a
paramilitary force composed of Syrian and Lebanese volunteers. This war did involve some
limited territorial ambitions and territorial threats. On the one hand, in the first stages of the
conflict, Lebanon entertained some hopes of territorial spoils in the area designated for its
occupation in northern Palestine (although these gains were secondary in the calculus of entering
the war to the desire for acceptance in the Arab world and also to domestic considerations). On
the other hand, when the military fortune turned around, Israeli troops took control of a narrow
strip of southern Lebanon (and were greeted by local villagers, especially the Maronites). Even
then, Lebanese diplomats still hoped to achieve some territorial acquisitions in the (now Israeli)
northern Galilee, or at least some neutralized zone there, in return for their agreement to a
444 Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence, pp. 97-102.
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ceasefire. 44 5 By the end of 1948, however, Lebanon was eager to end the war with a status quo
ante agreement. The 1949 armistice agreement, therefore, simply confirmed the mandatory
borders between the two countries as their international borders, and this agreement was
respected until the late 1960's.446
While Arab states (chief among them Syria and Egypt), the US (the marines were sent to
Beirut in 1958 under the Eisenhower Doctrine) and Israel were involved in subsequent politics in
Lebanon, none of these interventions amounted to a territorial conflict per se. The most
significant foreign interventions were, of course, those of Syria (1976-2005) and Israel (1982-
2000). Despite prolonged periods of direct or indirect occupation, however, Lebanon's official
borders remained intact. In fact, they were never really questioned. As these interventions will be
discussed below, suffice it to say here that neither Syria nor Israel attempted any annexation of
Lebanese territory, despite their actual occupation of it and their military ability to do so and
despite (in the Syrian case) of a readily available ideological argument for such an action."' In
fact, in 1976 Syrian President Hafez Assad confided, in an internal discussion with Syrian
administration functionalists, that among the most important reasons for his intervention in
Lebanon was the attempt to prevent its territorial partition along sectarian lines.448 Israel, on its
part, never erected in Lebanon any form of civilian settlements, as it did in territories it occupied
in 1967 from Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Finally, as of 2005, there were neither Syrian nor Israeli
44 Ibid., pp. 145-57. See also Oren Barak, "Commemorating Malikiyya: Political Myth, Multi-Ethnic Identity and
the Making of the Lebanese Army," History and Memory 13, no. 1 (2001), El Khazan, The Breakdown of the
State, pp. 112-13.
446 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, pp. 112-13.
447 On Syria, see Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon: The 1975-76 War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986). On the Israeli intervention, see Ze'ev Schiff, and Ya'ari, Ehud, Israel's Lebanon War,
trans. Ina Friedman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).
448 Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, p. 65.
212
soldiers on Lebanese soil,449 which strengthens the notion that their occupation of parts of
Lebanon had a non-territorial nature to begin with.
Hence, one can conclude that while Lebanon faced initially some territorial pressures, both in
the inter-Arab arena and in the conflict with Israel, these threats waned as time progressed and an
era of border fixity ensued. The effects of this state of affairs are dealt with in the coming
sections.
C. Border Fixity and the Perpetuation of State Weakness
What kind of effects did the absence of territorial pressures, or the border fixity norm, have
on Lebanon? This section details these effects with regard to the process of state building and
political development (or the lack thereof), and the next section concentrates on the effects on
Lebanon's international relations.
a) Monopolization of the Means of the Violence
Monopolizing the legitimate use of violence in state-owned military and police, this essential
part of any strong state, was lacking in the Lebanese case. Lebanon's army has been, as a rule,
weak, ineffective, and unable to exert its authority over other segments of the society, which
often exercised organized violence as a regular practice. This trend was, of course, most
pronounced during the 1975-76 civil war and in the decade that followed, but it was apparent
long before the war. The weakness of the army stemmed first and foremost from the fact that
449 This excludes the Sheba Farms, a small area under Israeli occupation that is recognized by the UN to be a Syrian,
rather than Lebanese, land.
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Lebanon, between 1949 and 1976, "having no territorial claims to neighboring countries and
having no occupied land to liberate...had no war to wage and no enemy regimes to topple."4 50
The Lebanese Army (LA), like most other state institutions, was inherited from the French
Mandate. 45' After its mainly nominal participation in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the LA
remained a weak institution. The weakness of the LA had, at least until the 1990's, two
important aspects. First, the size and the resources available for the army were very limited. At
independence, it included about 3,000 troops. As late as 1966, the Lebanese armed forces
amounted to a mere 10,800 troops, and, a decade later, by the eve of the second civil war, they
increased only to 15,200 troops.4 52 Such a small force could neither protect Lebanon's borders
from its much stronger neighbors (in 1975 Syria, for example, had 137,000 regular troops). More
important to the current study, however, the small size of the LA prevented it from exercising a
monopoly over the use of violence within Lebanon, as will be demonstrated below.
The second aspect of the LA's weakness was its ethnic structure. The army was initially
dominated by the Maronites, especially in the officer corps. Gradually, the command of the army
was distributed in a more equitable way, although the Muslims were, before the 1975 war never
represented in the officer corps in numbers resembling their share of Lebanon's population.
However, the more acute problem in terms of the army's weakness was its sectarian nature. That
most units were composed of soldiers and officers from a single community played a great role
in the institution's paralysis in terms of controlling civil strife.453
450 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, p. 112.
451 Oren Barak, "Toward a Representative Military? The Transformation of the Lebanese Officer Corps since 1945,"
Middle East Journal 60, no. 1 (2006): p. 78.
452 Owen, State, Power and Politics, p. 207.
453 Barak, "Toward a Representative Military?", R.D. McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and
Future," in The Emergence of a New Lebanon, ed. Edward A. Azar, et. al. (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 82-84,
Owen, State, Power and Politics, pp. 211-13.
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The result was that the army remained "little more than a gendarmerie with limited powers to
keep the peace and to ensure the proper conduct of elections." 454 This fact was not a coincidence.
At least until the 1975 civil war, the consensus among the Lebanese political elite was that the
army should be small and weak, so as not to pose a threat to the civilian political system.4 55 It is
hard to imagine that such a consensus, which placed domestic political considerations over those
of defense and efficiency of the army, would have been preserved in the presence of a significant
territorial threat. The effects of such an absence of threat (or opportunities), and thus of an
absence of a national ethos engrained in the army, could clearly be seen in the attempt of the
Lebanese army to create exactly such an ethos. While the LA, like most national armies,
attempted to build national myths that would portray the army as the savior of the nation's
interest and pride, it had very little substance from which to create these myths. So scarce was
the heroic material that the LA had to draw upon a victory in the relatively marginal battle of the
Malikiyya in 1948, in which the LA was not actually involved directly, and that resulted in
achievements that were rapidly overturned by Israeli forces.4 5 6
The results of the LA's weakness were, in the long run, detrimental to Lebanon's stability
and well-being. When civil strife erupted, the army was relegated to the role of an outside viewer
(as in the case of the political crisis of 1952) or, at most, an arbiter between the opposing (armed)
forces (as was the case in the first civil war, in 1958). The decision of the army's commander,
General Fouad Chehab, to ignore the President's call to intervene in the war, maintained the
LA's position as the holder of the balance between rival political and communal sects. It
neglected, nevertheless, the attempt to retain the monopoly over the means of violence in the
454 Owen, State, Power and Politics, p. 212.
455 Ibid.
456 On the role of the myth of the Malikiyya myth in the building of the Lebanese Army, see Barak,
"Commemorating Malikiyya."
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hands of the state. Large parts of the country were occupied by forces hostile to the central
government (mostly Sunni Muslims), which were supplied from across the Syrian border by kin
and relatives. The opposition forces faced not the official forces of the state, but the Phalanges, a
Maronite paramilitary militia. 457 What eventually enabled Chmmoun to quell the rebellion was
the landing of US Marines in Beirut, in line with the Eisenhower Doctrine.458 On the rare
occasions when the LA tried to exercise its right to impose a monopoly over the use of violence,
it miserably failed. In 1969 the army was unable to impose its rule over the armed Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) in the refugee camps, and was forced to agree to the humiliating
compromise hammered out by Egypt. The Cairo agreement limited the Palestinian activities to
their own camps, but allowed them full freedom of action within these confines. 459 The results
were similar in clashes between the army and Palestinian groups in 1973, after Israeli raids in
Beirut and Sidon.460
By the eve of the 1975 war, then, the LA, devoid of political support, the legitimacy that
comes with a significant role in territorial or defensive wars, and the physical power to overcome
these deficiencies, was hardly poised to prevent the disintegration of the state that followed. In
the early stages of the war, the LA did attempt a limited intervention, but with no positive results.
"The army's protracted passivity in the face of an acute crisis, together with political pressure,
457 See Barak, "Toward a Representative Military?" p. 78, Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 100, Khalidi,
Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, pp. 38-39, Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 26-28.
458 Ironically, it was precisely the refusal of the army to be involved in the 1958 civil war that made it popular,
General Chehab the next elected President of the republic. In the years between the first and the second civil war,
and especially under Chehab's presidency, the LA played a pivotal role in the Lebanese politics, operating mainly
through its intelligence branch, the Deuxieme Bureau. Still, this stronger position of the LA was a precarious one.
Eventually, the Intelligence increasing role in politics created a political backslash against Chehab, which
culminated in the 1970 election of his (and the army's) opponent, Suliman Franjieh. Franjieh further weakened the
military by purging its ranks, an act that left the LA even more helpless as the second civil war approached.
McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and Future," p. 86-91, Owen, State, Power and Politics, p. 212.
459 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, pp. 140-68, Wade A. Goria, Sovereighnty and Leadership in Lebanon,
1943-1976 (London: Ithaca Press, 1985), pp. 105-10, Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, 185-87.
460 McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and Future," pp. 91-92.
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led to the army's disintegration in 1976." 461 Individuals and whole units mutinied and joined the
opposing militias, thus only intensifying the chaos and insecurity. 462
The civil war most intensely raged between 1975 and 1976, but was in effect fought until
1989. This war was, of course, the ultimate opposite of monopolization of the use of force. It
was, infamously, the site of total chaos, where armed militias roamed the country, erected
roadblocks, and murdered and injured opponent combatants and civilians alike. Sectarian
violence went unchecked and unopposed, except by violence from the other communities. Crime
was rampant and pervasive, and Lebanon served as a safe haven for international terrorists.463
Meanwhile, all efforts to recreate the national army turned sour. As described by Itamar
Rabinovich, these efforts led to a vicious cycle: "the army could not be restored without a
consensus, this required political normalization, which could not proceed in the absence of an
effective and credible state system, which needed the backing of an apolitical, militarily effective
army."464
The army consequently remained largely irrelevant to the violence in Lebanon throughout the
later 1970's and the 1980's. Today Lebanon possesses a much larger army (about 72,000 strong
in 2004465) and one that is not organized along factional lines. The officer corps, as well, is
composed of fairly equal numbers of Muslim and Christians.466 The new LA has been successful,
as well, in cracking down on some minor attempts to resist its authority by various groups.
However, when considering this strengthening of the institution of the LA, one needs to take into
account two factors. First, the new LA is a creation of a foreign force, Syria, and thus is not a
461 Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, p. 47.
462 On the LA disintegration of 1976 see McLaurin, "Lebanon and Its Army: Past, Present, and Future," pp. 92-97.
463 The sources that describe the perils of the Lebanese civil war are numerous. See, e.g. El Khazan, The Breakdown
of the State, Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon.
464 Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, pp. 57-58.
465 IISS, The Military Balance, 2005-2006
(London: Routledge, 2006).
466 Barak, "Toward a Representative Military?"
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representative of a stronger Lebanon, but an imposition from outside. This does not mean such
an army cannot be a tool for keeping the country stabilized, but only that this creation does not
contradict the border fixity theory. Second, a large part of Lebanon, mainly its South and parts of
the Beqaa in the East, are still controlled by a paramilitary militia that answers not to the
Lebanese government but to its own leaders, who are influenced by Teheran and Damascus, not
Beirut. Therefore, and until the LA will challenge the Hizbullah, it is still too early to talk about
the Lebanese army monopolizing the means of violence within its territories.
b) Extraction of Revenues
As discussed in chapter 2 and demonstrated in the preceding empirical chapters, taxation
often goes hand in hand with the strengthening of the states' coercive capabilities as a reaction to
external, mainly territorial, threats and opportunities. As discussed above, such territorial threats
and opportunities hardly existed in the case of Lebanon. As expected, therefore, Lebanon's
"government did not have to raise taxes that could have hampered its laissez-faire economy." 467
The level of taxation in Lebanon has been low from the inception of the state, but had hardly
risen thereafter, until the late 1990's.
Because Lebanon is situated in the midst of a conflict-ridden area, and itself subject to both a
protracted civil war and frequent outside interventions, it is hard to explain the country's low
taxation, and, even more so, the relatively low percentage of military expenditures. That is,
unless one takes into consideration border fixity, and its negative effects on the prospect of state
building. The lack of incentive, in the form of territorial threats or opportunities, indeed freed the
state from the need to sustain a large, largely unproductive, military section. Despite the
467 Oren Barak, "Lebanon: Failure, Collapse, and Reconstruction," in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of
Terror, ed. Robert I Rotberg (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), pp.3 14-15.
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significant increase in the number of troops of the LA, Lebanon's military expenditures in 2004,
for instance, amounted to only $540.6 million. This sum was a mere 3.1% of its GDP for this
year. This might be sufficient in a "quiet neighborhood," but hardly in the Middle East.468 Yet,
this character of Lebanon also deprived the state of the tools to overcome local power bases and
create a centralized system that would enable it to extract sufficient revenues. Hence, Joyce Starr
concludes, "the heart of the government fiscal difficulties lies with its ability--or inability--to
levy, collect, and tabulate taxes."469
This trend was, of course, much more pronounced between 1975 and 1989, when significant
parts of the country were controlled by different militia or foreign forces and were inaccessible
to the central government. Such areas were oftentimes subject to the competing (and much
heavier) tax system, of the militias. In addition, the tremendous increase in the size of the illegal
and unofficial economy during these years meant that the state's ability to tax its population was
even smaller than before. This economy was, by definition, outside the boundaries of the regular
economy.4 70
The weakness of the state is expressed also within its revenue structure. The percent of
indirect taxes, which are much easier to control and need much less coercion, are high. In 2003,
for instance, income, capital and property taxes amounted to only 18% of the total revenues of
the government. 471 While this weak tax base does not allow for the maintenance of a strong
military, it also limits the extent to which the civilian bureaucracy can reach and the level of
services the state can provide. These issues are dealt with below.
468 Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html [accessed on 7/10/2006]. Compare to it's
neighbors military expenditures (as percentage of GDO): Israel's 7.7% and Syria's 5.9%.
469 Joyce R. Starr, "Lebanon's Economy: The Costs of Protracted Violence," in The Emergence of a New Lebanon,
ed. Edward A. Azar, et. al. (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 73.
470 Ibid., pp. 73-74.
471 Jonathan Haughton, "An Assessment of the Tax System in Lebanon," (Suffolk University and the Beacon Hill
Institute for Public Policy, 2004).
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c) Bureaucracy, State Institutions, and Services
Political and bureaucratic institutions form the backbone of the state. In examining the
development of these institutions in Lebanon, one encounters the problem of a large gap between
the formal structure of politics and bureaucracy, and its actual functioning. While the former
appears to be modern, centralized, and rational, the latter often resembles more a traditional,
feudal, and fractured society. Moreover, this informal character of the Lebanese government
institutions shows remarkable resilience to change, despite civil war, foreign occupation and
power shifts at the top.
Most of the Lebanese state institutions, as indicated earlier, either were outgrowths of the
Ottoman times' Muttasarrifiyya or were inherited from France. The bureaucracy, in particular,
was built by the French administration, and its formal structure was remarkably similar to that of
France. The hallmarks of the French bureaucracy - extreme centralization, elitist recruitment,
rationality, and functional differentiation - all featured prominently, in theory, in the Lebanese
system.472
In practice, however, the Lebanese model deviated profoundly from this Weberian model.
Underlying the function of the bureaucracy in Lebanon there have been, and still are, two very
prominent traits. The first is communalism, or sectarianism. The whole Lebanese political and
administrative system is built on the principle of sectarian representation, in accordance with the
472 On the Formal structure of the Lebanese bureaucracy, see George Grassmuck, and Salibi, Kamal, Reformed
Administration in Lebanon (Ann Arbur, Michigan: Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, The
University of Michigan, 1964), Adnan G. Iskander, Bureaucracy in Lebanon (Beirut, Lebanon: American
University of Beirut, 1964), Maroun Kisirwani, and Parle, William M., "Assessing the Impact of the Post Civil
War Period on the Lebanese Bureaucracy: A View from Inside," Journal of Asian and African Studies 22, no. 1-2
(1987): pp. 18-20.
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unwritten but highly acknowledged National Pact of 1943. This does not only refer to the posts
of the President, the Prime Minister, and other high government officials, but to the most minor
of bureaucrats. This system is also highly rigid, as the allocation of posts is based on a 1932
census, which dloes not reflect the current demographic or social status, but that can not be
changed because: of permanent political (sectarian) deadlock on the issue. 473 As El-Khazan notes,
"'the outcome of this contradictory mechanism [between formally centralized but practically
decentralized state] translated into a low degree of 'stateness' in Lebanon and a permanent
dependence of the state on the multi-communal structure of power within society."4 74
This aspect of Lebanese governance becomes even more salient when intersecting with the
second informal trait of the bureaucratic system in Lebanon: its highly patrimonial nature. The
concentration of power - political, social and economic - in the hands of a few families of
zu'ama is a permanent characteristic of this system.4 75 These power bases are the channels
through which the government works, and through which taxes are collected and goods are
distributed. This function of the Lebanese system is not surprising, as "the ascriptive ties of
family solidarity and communal loyalties have for a long time provided the only trustable and
meaningful basis for integrating the social order."476 Yet, at the same time, the patrimonial nature
of the bureaucratic process - in essence an exchange of goods for loyalty - perpetuates the
weakness of the state institutions and preserves the communal and clan ones.477
473 Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament, pp. 102-20, Kisirwani, "Assessing the Impact of the Post Civil War Period," p.
20, Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism, pp. 146-65.
474 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, p. 92.
"'5 In the Maronite community, noted families are Al-Khuri
476 Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament, p. 97.
477 This concept is reflected in the Arabic term wasta, "the granting of favorable treatment by bureaucrats on the
basis of political loyalty, family influence, class or sect." See Kisirwani, "Assessing the Impact of the Post Civil
War Period," p. 20. Also see El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, pp. 50-57, Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament,
pp. 73-101.
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The same problems permeate the political system, from the electoral system to the function
of parties to the work of the central government; all issues are translated and carried out through
similar patrimonial patterns.478 It is no coincidence that one often hears the same family names
with regard to Lebanese politics today as in the 1950's, though the first names have changed.
The state, then, although strong and centralized on paper, is weak in reality. The state in Lebanon
can be the arbiter between different segments of the civil society, the mediator between rival
communal groups, or the coordinator of the distribution of spoils among regional strongholds. It
enjoys little autonomy to act on its own, however, without an advance consensus of the strong
societal forces. The executive branch has no enduring, organized power base.479
In terms of services and the provision of public goods the picture is similar. The extent and
depth of the services the government provides depend not on the public demand as a return for
the burden of the state (which hardly exists), but on the ideological position of the government,
on the one hand, and its ability to perform, on the other. Attempts to provide a better and more
extended network of public schools, and to erect a safety net of social security, for instance, were
highly valued by a broad consensus in Lebanon in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The very
limited results of such schemes, however, are a direct result of the inability of even the relatively
strong administration of President Chehab (see below) to execute sweeping policy changes.
The pattern of distribution of those public goods that the state does supply is also revealing.
Despite the formal state of war with Israel and the often-tense relations with Syria, peripheral
areas close to the southern, eastern and northern borders of Lebanon are, as a rule, neglected, in
terms of government investment and services. 480 These practices are understandable in the
context of border fixity, as the central government does not feel the urge to protect its border
478 Hudson, The Precarious Republic, Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament, pp. 73-101.
479 Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 326.
480 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, p. 57.
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regions against territorial grabs and therefore does not need to enhance the support of local
population.
Attempts to reform the bureaucratic and political system, modernizing and rationalizing it,
have generally failed. The most significant pre-civil war attempt was made by President Chehab.
Arriving to the position in 1958, not by the traditional path of zu'ama (though a descendent of a
notable family), and enjoying a wider base of support outside of his own community, Chehab
was able to secure a more autonomous base for the state than his predecessors. The "Chehabist"
exercise included economic reforms (an attempt to close some of the economic gaps while still
retaining a free trade), political reforms (mainly the partially successful attempt to circumvent
traditional politics by the use of professionals, military and civilians), and bureaucratic reforms.
The latter included a very significant increase in the size of the state administration and some
steps toward rationalization and centralization. These administrative reforms had their limits,
though: "During the six years of the General's rule the Presidency grew in power and made
substantial changes in the traditional political practices;" Michael Hudson maintained in 1968,
"but, when it was all over, the question remained whether or not Lebanon could ever break out of
its political stalemate." 481
Indeed, Lebanon did not escape this stalemate, and the consequences were dire - the 1975-
1989 intermittent civil war. Although the political establishment survived, at least ostensibly,
during these years, and although the bureaucracy did not completely disappear, the war's effects
of the ability of these institutions to function properly were devastating. While the office of
President Suliman Farangiah remained nominally intact, its control did not go beyond the
Presidential palace. Although the Parliament kept on meeting and the cabinet kept debating
481 Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 297-25. Quote from p. 97. See also Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, p.
84.
223
policy, these were, for the most part, futile talks. The shots were called elsewhere.482 The
bureaucracy was devastated by the war, with the increasing loss of infrastructure and life, and the
vast majority of civil servants vacated their position, and no new staff were hired for seventeen
years. Of course, the services that were provided by these offices were greatly hampered, when
not terminated completely.483 Indeed, some parts of Lebanon were administered as if they were
independent states by the local warlords.484
Like the late 1950's and early 1960's reforms in the political system and the civil
administration, the post-civil war reforms of the 1990's and 2000's are important but only
partial. The reconstruction concentrated on the infrastructure and the economy, but left almost
intact the political system of proportional (to the 1932 census...) representation and adherence to
broad principles of the 1943 National Pact. Incremental and cautious administrative reforms had
some success (for instance, in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture). The
"flagship" of administrative reforms, however, was a comprehensive program to transform the
civil administration and civil service of the country, under the newly established Office of the
Minister of State for Administrative Reforms (OMSAR). This process, inaugurated by the first
government of Rafik Hariri in 1993, was a complete failure. Sponsored by the World Bank and
foreign donors, the expensive project yielded studies, plans and documents, but was never
implemented, due to the inability of the government to approve the plans.485 Those reforms and
reconstructions that were implemented after the T'aif agreement, mainly confined to the
482 Barak, "Lebanon," pp. 310-26.
483 Fares El-Zein, and Sims, Holly, "Reforming War's Administrative Rubble in Lebanon," Public Administration &
Development 24, no. 4 (2004): pp. 279-80, Kisirwani, "Assessing the Impact of the Post Civil War Period."
484 For an example of the Druze-controlled Shuf region, see Judith P. Harik, "Change and Continuity among the
Lebanese Druze Community: The Civil Administration of the Mountains, 1983-90," Middle East Journal 29, no.
3 (1993).
485 EI-Zein, "Reforming War's Administrative Rubble in Lebanon."
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economic and infrastructure areas, were a result of a stronger government presence, but that of
Syria, not Lebanon.
In terms of administration, bureaucracy and provision of public goods, then, the picture of
state building in Lebanon is one of continuous, though not total, weakness. Although the need for
reform in many areas is clear and the motivations often exist, the ability of the state to pass and
implement such reforms is very limited. What hinders Lebanon's ability to build a stronger state
bureaucracy that can provide better services to its citizens, is the political and social influence of
local, family and communal power bases, that cannot, as a rule, be overcome by the state without
the existence of an overwhelming outside trigger, such the one a territorial threat might
constitute.
d) Ingroup Cohesion
The creation of ingroup cohesion is an important part of state building, in addition to the
monopoly over the use of violence and the bureaucratic and administrative facets of such a
process, as discussed in chapter 2. This section examines the cohesion of the Lebanese society
and the degree to which the legitimacy of the state and identification with the state have evolved
over time. It argues that in terms of ingroup cohesion, by and large Lebanon was and still is a
very weak state. While the possibility of either being annexed to a neighboring country or
forming a smaller more cohesive state is by now realized by most to be unrealistic, the positive
identification of the Lebanese with their state is still very limited.
When the French created Greater Lebanon in 1920, many of its inhabitants, understandably,
resisted this idea. Many of the Sunnite elite incorporated into the new state were invested in the
project of Arab nationalism and, in particular, in its variant of "Greater Syria." The brief period
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of Hashemite control of Damascus, before the French occupation, made it even harder for them
to submit to what they saw as unnatural separation from their nation: "The Muslims position was
that they has been stripped of their majority states by being detached from the wider community
of Islam and grafted onto a small country under Christian domination."486 Nor were the Sunnis
the only community in Greater Lebanon with such a perception of identity. Manny in the Greek
Orthodox elite, for instance, favored either Arab unity or a larger Syrian state to a Lebanon
dominated by Maronites. Within the Maronite community, some elements advocated a smaller
and more homogenous state in the Mt. Lebanon, either independent or as autonomous part of
Syria, and many Druze initially also supported such a smaller state (in which they would
constitute a significant faction, not a small minority). 487
Since the Sunnite community was more or less similar in size to that of the Maronite
community, and comparable also in terms of wealth and rates of education, Maronite-Sunnite
relations came to be the main axis around which the sectarian politics of Lebanon after 1920
focused.488 By the early 1940's, and in no small measure as a result of the changing international
context, the major factions within the Maronites, lead by Bishara al-Khuri, and the Sunnites, led
by Riyad al-Sulh, arrived at the National Pact. To the extent that this agreement stipulated the
principle of confessional representation in the government, it proved to be a practical and
essential compromise that shaped the political face of Lebanon for years to come. The National
Pact, however, no less than a political arrangement, was a search for a common identity. The
new Republic of Lebanon was proclaimed a sovereign country with a separate identity but "with
486 Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, p. 77. On the other hand, in pre-independence Lebanon not all Muslims
rejected the idea of an independent Lebanese state. The Shi'a community, gradually came to embrace independent
Lebanon, in which Shiites at least were granted the position of a recognized minority, which they did not receive
in Sunni ruled Arab countries. See Augustus R. Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon
(Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1987), pp. 73-75.
487 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, Firro, Inventing Lebanon, pp. 15-67, Pipes, Greater Syria, pp. 100-06,
Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence, pp. 37-38.
488 Khazan, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 37-38.
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Arab face." 489 As such, the pact supplied only a limited and temporary solution, somewhat
cosmetic, to the problem of Lebanese identity. The problem of identification with Lebanon, or
lack thereof, would resurface, therefore, time and again. In the absence of a sufficiently strong
glue to forge the Lebanese into one coherent group, the bonds of their common identity remained
precarious, at most. As stipulated by Michael Hudson, "the Pact, however, is a remedy for the
symptoms of sectarian strife rather than a cure." 490 This weakness of Lebanon in terms of the
lack of a common identity remained a constant feature of the state and, of course, erupted
fiercely in the civil war.
The Lebanese reaction to foreign invasions by Syria and Israel was both an indicator of this
lack of common and, as we shall see below, an exacerbation of these divisions. Both the Syrian
and the Israeli interventions were not territorial in nature, even though they involved a conquest
of territory. Syria had a variety of motivations for intervening in Lebanon, concerning regional
hegemony, transnational concerns over Lebanon's instability, and domestic reasons (discussed
below). Territorial expansion was not among them. 491 Because of its non-territorial nature of
Syrian intervention, the Lebanese reactions did not create the same sort of internal cohesion
expected in the ingroup-outgroup theory discussed in chapter 2. Different protagonists perceived
this intervention in the Lebanese scene not as a threat to Lebanon as a whole, but as a threat to
particular actors in the civil war. Since the Syrians changed sides during their intervention, we
can see the Lebanese reaction shifting as well. The leftist and anti-establishment parties, which
489 On the National Pact, see Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 44-45, Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of
Independence, pp. 57-67.
490 Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 44.
491 For discussions of the Syrian intervention, see, e.g., Fred H. Lawson, "Syria's Intervention in the Lebanese Civil
War, 1976: A Domestic Conflict Explanation," International Organization 38, no. 3 (1984), Weinberger, Syrian
Involvement in Lebanon.
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initially supported the intervention, came to deny it as a threat to Lebanon's sovereignty.492 The
Maronite leaders and the Sunni establishment, initially opposing the intervention, came to
embrace it once the Syrians switched their position in their favor.493 The intervention, then, was
not perceived as a national Lebanese matter but as a sectarian one. Such a reaction would not
have been likely if Syria had invaded Lebanon, claiming openly that it came to annex its
territories. 494
Similarly, different groups within Lebanon perceived the 1982 Israeli invasion differently. If
the Syrian position on the territorial issue was somewhat vague, the same could not be said about
Israel. South Lebanon was never part of the Biblical land of the Israelites, and, accordingly, it
was not a part of the Zionist settlement plan, which was confined to the lands of the British
Mandate. Unlike other territories taken by force in Israel's wars (the West-Bank, Gaza Strip, the
Golan Heights and the Sinai Desert), Jewish settlements were not established in Southern
Lebanon, and the area (unlike East Jerusalem and the Golan) was never annexed to Israel or
claimed by it. Accordingly, the reactions of the Lebanese to the Israeli invasion differ with
political and confessional affiliations. While most Sunni and some Christians opposed the Israeli
move, some segments of the Maronite community, as well as both Christian and Shi'is in the
South supported it, either tacitly or openly. 495
Although the 1989 T'aif agreement and the reconstruction of the state in its aftermath again
tried to sweep the sectarian identities under the rug, they are still very much part and parcel of
492 The Aramun Summit, traditional Muslim leaders and Lebanese National Movement (LNM), including the Druze
leader Kamal Junbalat, requested Syrian assistance in their fight against the Maronites in January 1976, which led
to the Syrian intervention through the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and Saiqah. See Later, when Syria
shifted alliances, Junbalat was taking the opposite stand. See Weinberger, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, pp.
180-92; 206-08.
493 See, for instance, the changes in Camil Chamun's position, Ibid., p. 187.
494 Interestingly, Kata'ib Party leader Pierre Gemayel endorsed the Syrian intervention sighting specifically its
foreign minister's commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Ibid., p. 211.
495 Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue (London: Croom Helm,
1987), pp. 163-66.
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Lebanon today. To an important extent, the problem is that the same political principle that
allows some measure of compromise in Lebanon: the basing of the state institutions on the
principle of consociationalism, or power-sharing between the various communities, also
perpetuates the sectarian identities. 496 In the absence of territorial pressure these identities are
unlikely to fade and a more cohesive Lebanese identity unlikely to appear.
To return and examine the validity of Hypothesis 2a, indicated above, the hypothesis
stipulated an argument that the border fixity norm is likely to perpetuate or even exacerbate the
weakness of already weak states. The Lebanese case largely confirms this hypothesis. It is, of
course, only speculative to determine what could have happened in Lebanon if borders were not
:fixed, by virtue of the international norm. Nevertheless, it is clear that through the presence of
such a norm, and the absence of territorial threats and/or opportunities, Lebanon's weakness was,
and still is, perpetuated. In Lebanon, the state never managed to gain a monopoly over the use of
violent means. It never managed to create authoritative state institutions, political, social, or
economic, which could penetrate beyond and across communal differences, and it never
produced the social cohesiveness, the mutual identity that would sustain and legitimate such
institutions. Lebanon was a weak state at independence in 1943. Today, more than sixty years
later, it is no less, and arguably more, weak. The next two sections explore the consequences of
such perpetuated weakness in a world of fixed borders.
I). State Weakness, Civil Strife, and Conflict Spillover in Lebanon
This section will explore the proposition drawn in hypotheses 2b, 2c and 2d. In essence, these
hypotheses (discussed in chapter 2), relate state weakness to international conflicts, through
496 For such an argument, see Michael C. Hudson, "The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why
Consociationalism Failed," in Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus, ed. Nadim Shehadi, and Mills,
Dana H. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988).
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spillover of internal conflict. Such a process, in a way somewhat similar to the case of Congo,
although perhaps more complicated, indeed took place in Lebanon, and brought repeated foreign
intervention. State weakness was a prime condition for the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in
1975, and a major factor in the causes of the Syrian direct intervention (1976-2005) and the
Israeli one (1982-2000), with smaller scale violent actions before and after these dates. This
section outlines the process of the spread of the Lebanese civil war over the state borders and
explains why the weakness of the state, combined with the norm of border fixity, facilitated this
process.
a) State Weakness and Civil Conflict in Lebanon
The discussion in chapter 2 highlighted two important factors that, in a weak state, create
conditions that make civil strife more likely: "emerging anarchy" and "internal scapegoating."
Both of these elements were certainly present in Lebanon prior to the 1975-6 civil war. This
section deals first with the effects of the weakening state, or the emerging anarchy, on the
internal communal conflict and then with its effect on the exacerbation of the conflict that
resulted from the presence in Lebanon of an armed Palestinian refugee population. Lastly, it
discusses the extent to which practices of "internal scapegoating" further exacerbated internal
tensions.
I. Emerging Anarchy and Communal Conflict
State weakness in Lebanon created, in the 1970's, a situation that more and more resembled
an emerging anarchy. The basic tenet of the Lebanese society is that of "a collection of
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traditional communities bound by the mutual understanding that the other cannot be trusted." 497
The weakness of the state and its inability to create a legitimate authority in Lebanon and to
equip such authority with a sufficient coercive force that could secure the implementation of
policy decision and prevent the emergence of rival power bases was discussed above. This
inability of the state to monopolize the use of force resulted, indeed, in the militarization of the
communal relations of distrust in the 1970's. Proliferation of armed militia was easily observable
anywhere in the country. This proliferation was partly a reaction to the armed presence of the
Palestinians, as will be discussed below, but certainly not solely so. In the wake of the 1969
confrontations between the LA and the Palestinians, and especially after 1973, almost all
political parties, and many of the confessional and tribal groups, armed and trained themselves
and established militias. In the absence of a leviathan, in other words, the fish felt the need to
fend for themselves.
In the Maronite camp, the Kataeb Party, already organized in a paramilitary fashion, was the
first to militarize, but other groups, such as that of former President Chamoun, did so as well.
Leftist/Muslim parties, like Kamal Junblat's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), did not lag behind
and, largely with Palestinian assistance, prepared themselves for a military confrontation as well.
In a significant development in the Lebanese landscape, the Shi'a community was militarized
and mobilized for the first time. In a huge 1974 gathering in the eastern Beqaa region the Shiite
Imam Mussa Al-Sader, called for an armed mobilization of his community.498
Fears and ambitions were obviously mixed in the motives of the various Lebanese players.
That the Muslims had much to fear was obvious. The Christians, and the Maronites in particular,
had controlled the presidency and the command of the army, as well as most institutions in the
497 Ibid., pp. 34.
498 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, pp. 224-25.
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state, by virtue of their slightly superior stand in the National Pact. Armed and mobilized, and
perhaps with the backing of the LA, the Maronite militia could have posed a great threat to the
Muslim community. Those groups that had less to lose and more to gain from a possible war -
the Druze and the Shi'a - were, of course, more mobilized. While the Sunni Muslim
establishment was less mobilized at the start of the war, it got more and more involved as the war
was prolonged.
It takes a keener eye to understand the Christian fears. It is easy to assume that a group that
controls a state's highest civilian and military posts should not be the one that feels threatened.
Yet, under the circumstances prevailing in Lebanon, the Maronites were feeling exactly that.
These fears emanated not so much from the position of the Maronites in Lebanon itself, but from
their position within the larger regional setting. The logic of these fears is well articulated by one
of the most prominent Maronites leaders, Pierre Gemayel: "For the Christian in Lebanon,"
Gemayel asserted, "a Christian President is a symbol. Among twenty one Arab countries, only
Lebanon does not have Islam as a religion of state; therefore Lebanon's presidency is a guarantee
for Christian's fears."4 99 The Maronites, for instance, often invoked the marginalization of the
once-important Coptic Church in Egypt as a symbol of their fears.500
499 Quoted in Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism, p. 103. To be sure, Arab nationalism should not be confused
with Islam. While the first is a modern project (rooted in ancient myths as it is) intends on political mobilization
of the society, the second is a long lasting and widespread organized religion. In theory, therefore, both Christians
and Muslims have equal place in an Arab state. Yet, the majority of Lebanon's Christians feared being
"downgraded" to minority status under Muslim rule, whether it was called Arab or Muslim per se, Their view of
the inevitable parallelism between Arabism and Islam was, with the hindsight of time, well founded. As argued by
Bernard Lewis, "as the [Arab] nationalist movement has become genuinely popular, so it has become less national
and more religious- in other words, less Arab and more Islamic." (Quoted in Gabriel Ben-Dor, State and Conflict
in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post Colonial State (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 35-73.Thus, Michel
Aflak, the founder of the Baat'h party, which now rules both Syria and Iraq, declared that "Islam is to Arabism
what bones are to flesh," (Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism, p. 15. and King Hussein of Jordan maintained
that "we are Arabs but the idea of Arab Nationalism is meaningless... other than in its religious context, because
Islam and Arabism are like hand to glove." (Avraham Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East
Politics and the Quest for Regional Order (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 1. In a direct
application of these perceptions of Arabism to Lebanon, Libya's Muamar Kadafi had stated that the Christians of
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The two (or more) sides of the Lebanese equation, then, felt threatened, and felt even more so
as the state's strength declined: " [the Christians] believed that a union with the Arab world
would destroy their independent identity and threaten their existence as a nation. The Muslims
position was that they has been stripped of their majority status by being detached from the wider
community of Islam and grafted onto a small country under Christian domination."5 0' These
perceptions were much aggravated by the injection into the Lebanese political scene of the most
prominent pan-Arab factor of the era, the Palestinian resistance movement, which is discussed
below.
While fear was indeed a primary motive in most quarters of the Lebanese society, it was not
the only one: opportunism and predation were also well represented. As Oren Barak observed,
"much of [the ethnic cleansing], and particularly the massacres of civilians (e.g., in Tal al-Zaatar
and Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, the town of Damur, and the Shuf area), was predatory in
nature, not inspired by grievance." 502
State weakness breeds internal conflict. In Lebanon, ultimately, it brought the 1975 outbreak
of the civil war. While the domestic security dilemma and the motives for communal predation
were subdued after 1989 under the Syrian influence (and its iron fist), they did not go away.
Many Christians, for instance, felt even in the new century increasingly insecure and
disadvantaged in the still precarious and complex Lebanese political equation. 50 3 Although it is
certainly too early to assess the implication of the Syrian 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon to the
renewed anarchy in the country, the potential for renewed communal violence is there.
Lebanon had no option but either conversion to Islam or submitting to Islamic-Arab rule (Hadad, Lebanon, the
Politics of Revolveing Doors (Washington, D.C.: Praeger, 1985), p. 44.
50 Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism, p. 15.
501 Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, p. 17.
502 Barak, "Lebanon," p. 317.
503 Farid El Khazan, "Lebanon- Independent No More: Disappearing Christians of the Middle East," The Middle
East Quarterly 8, no. 1 (2001).
233
II. Emerging Anarchy and Palestinian Refugees
In Lebanon, there exists another factor that has made all these internal communal tensions
even more intense. While the relations between the Palestinian refugees' actions and external
intervention are discussed in the next section, this section deals with their effect on the internal
Lebanese relations, under conditions of state weakness and emerging anarchy. As a result of the
1948 war in Israel/Palestine, between 100,000 and 150,000 Palestinian found a refuge in
Lebanon, concentrated mainly in fourteen camps.504 In a country the size of Lebanon, and one
that holds such a precarious confessional balance, this number is significant. As the refugees
were overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, their mere presence served as a threat to other parts of the
population, and to the Maronites in particular.50 5
More than the Palestinian religious affiliation, their national status served to greatly polarize
the Lebanese landscape. The question of Palestine has been one of the core issues of modern
Arab nationalism, from the early phases of this idea.50 6 It has been a litmus test to one's "level of
Arabism" and, at the same time, an often-used tool in the inter-Arab power struggles.50 7 Thus,
after 1967, Palestinian came to symbolize for Lebanon's Maronites what was to them the pan-
504 Without entering the emotional land mind of the causes of the creation of the 1948 refugee flight, it is prudent to
assume that both forceful expulsion and simple flight out of fear joined to produce this massive tragedy. For such
a view, see Baruch Kimmerling, and Migdal, Joel S., The Palestinian People: A History (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003, 2003), pp. 156-66.
505 Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, pp. 60-61.
506 For discussion of early Arab involvement in the Palestine conflict see, for example, Philip S. Khouri,
"Factionalism among Syrian Nationalists During the French Mandate," International Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies 13, no. 4 (1981), Gabriel Sheffer, "The Involvement of Arab States in the Palestine Conflict and British-
Arab Relationship before World War Ii," Asian and African Studies 10 (1979).
507 Palestine served as one issue that could, supposedly, unite the Arabs, as it was a struggle of Arab population
against what was (and is) perceived as a direct penetration of Western agents (Israelis), alien to the region and its
inhabitants. This question was, at the same time, a base of disunity. Palestine was the utmost weapon of inter-Arab
rivalries, where some leaders often used the other's inactivity or inability in this case to undermine rival regimes
or gain hegemony over them. Thus, the issue of Palestine was, at one and the same time, the symbolic raison-
d'6tre of pan-Arabism and the practical raison-d'dtat of the particular Arab states. For similar reasoning see Sela,
The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 9-10.
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Arab nightmare. "The Palestinian involvement in Lebanese internal politics strengthened
irredentist claims for pan-Arabism. This gave the Maronites strong ground to claim that they
were the only community that could truly guarantee Lebanon's sovereignty."50 8 Therefore, Farid
El Khazan writes, "Of all the variants of pan-Arabism that swept Lebanon, particularly
Nasserism in the late 1950's, the PLO constituted an overwhelming threat to the average
apolitical Maronite. To the extent that the PLO was perceived as a menace to communal interests
and security, it provoked a populist reaction commensurate with that threat perception." 509 The
Lebanese Muslims, on the other hand, "found [in the PLO] a vehicle to communicate their
demands for political reforms ... Acting on the surging Palestinian power in Lebanon, they were
able to challenge existing confessional arrangement and the National Pact itself."510
The different reactions to Israeli retaliation strikes that came after Palestinian guerilla raids
into Israel reflected this polarization. Israeli attacks in Southern Lebanon created waves of
refugees, predominantly Shiites, who then populated the shantytowns in the western outskirts of
Beirut. 51 Furthermore, the Israeli retaliations created a permanent challenge to the legitimacy of
the Lebanese government and Army. Too weak to (and not interested in) confronting Israel, the
army was constrained from acting against the PLO by local Muslim and inter-Arab opposition.
One outstanding example of such a dynamic was the 1968 Israeli raid on Beirut airport, which
provoked a heated controversy in Lebanon, with the Muslims and the left demanding action
against Israel and the Maronites and the army demanding action against what they saw as the
source of Israeli reprisals: the Palestinian commando operations. 5 12
508 Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, p. 61.509 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, pp. 82-83.
510 Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, p. 63.
"I Ibid., pp. 61-62.Abul-Hudn, The Lebanese Conflict, 61-62.
512 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, pp. 140-41.
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The Palestinians were a threat to the Maronite Christians (and, to some extent, also to the
establishment's Sunnis) also in a more direct way. Paralyzed by the enormity of their plight, the
Palestinians, those in Lebanon included, were not fast to mobilized after their 1948 defeat. The
Fatah organization was established in the late 1950's and the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), the umbrella organization for Palestinian resistance, was established in 1964. It was the
1967 Arab-Israeli war, however, that propelled the PLO to a key role in the conflict. The Arab
defeat in the war was a proof of incompetence of the regular Arab armies and, therefore, the need
for a "Palestinian revolutionary struggle." Yet the PLO had not found easy access to Arab bases
of operation. The reasons were quite clear (though not openly expressed): fears of Israeli
retaliation and fears of the destabilizing effects of Palestinian ideas of Arab revolution. Thus,
Arab states that possessed sufficient power, like Egypt and Syria, used it to curtail PLO
activities within their territory and greatly constrained it. Weaker states, like Jordan and
Lebanon, had to bear both these destabilizing effects. 513
The first serious showdown with the Lebanese army came in 1969, when the LA and
Palestinian commandos confronted each other throughout the country. This confrontation
involved more than six months of armed struggle between the Army and the PLO. The political
scene was divided, with the Maronites strongly backing the Army and the Muslims standing, to a
greater or lesser degree behind the PLO. This polarization notwithstanding, however, the battles
were largely confined to the Lebanese Army and to the PLO guerrillas and did not involve many
Lebanese civilians directly. The Cairo agreement, signed in November 1969 under Nasser's
auspices, ended the confrontation with the government making formidable concessions to the
PLO. While the Palestinians were promised freedom of action in their struggle against Israel and
513 Ibid., pp. 106-08.
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in handling the refugee camps, their only obligation was a vague promise to coordinate these
activities with the government and to abstain from involvement in Lebanese internal politics. 51 4
The relative success of their 1969 show-down with the LA, and the resulting Cairo
Agreement, further proved to the Palestinians that the weakness of the state in Lebanon was a
valuable asset for their interests.5 t5 The early 1970s saw a few crucial developments in the
Middle East that further made Lebanon the mainstay of Palestinian resistance. First, in "Black
September," 1970, the Jordanian army cracked down on PLO fighters in refugee camps in Jordan
and effectively banned their armed incursions into Israel. This move left Lebanon as the only
Arab "front-line state" that "allows" (in fact- unable to resist) Palestinian guerrilla war in its
territory. Second, the 1973 October war was perceived, regardless of the final military outcome,
to be a great Arab victory. This victory was considered first and foremost an Egyptian
achievement. This allowed Egypt sufficient internal legitimacy to start carving its own way to a
separate peace with Israel. 516 The interim Egyptian-Israeli agreements served as a polarizing
factor in the Arab word, mainly between Egypt and the radicals, including Syria, Libya, Iraq and
the PLO. The Palestinians, who had no part in the victory, found themselves during the 1973-5
period in a strange situation: on the one hand, they were frustrated by their exclusion from peace
discussions in Geneva and elsewhere. On the other hand, fears of marginalization led them to
mount a diplomatic attack that bore some significant fruits, most notably Arafat's address in the
UN and the Arab League conferences in Algiers (November 1973) and Rabat (October 1974),
which declared PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." 517 The
.4 See the English translation of the "Cairo Agreement" in Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, pp. 185-87.
For a thorough discussion of the Cairo Agreement and the clashes preceded it, as well as the agreement's
repercussions, see El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, pp. 140-68, Goria, Sovereighnty and Leadership, pp.
105-10.
515 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, pp. 140-68, Goria, Sovereighnty and Leadership, pp. 105-10.
516 Ben-Dor, State and Conflict in the Middle East, pp. 150-51.
517 El Khazan, The Breakdown of the State, pp. 218-23, Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 153-88.
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combined results of these developments seemed to be a more confident and more organized PLO
that was, at the same time, more determined to show its effectiveness in the armed struggle with
Israel. By the eve of the civil war, then, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon developed a capable
military organization and a significant degree of autonomy from the weak, and further
weakening, Lebanese state. By taking these actions, the armed Palestinian Resistance also
contributed very significantly to the rising tensions and polarization between the varies Lebanese
groups and, ultimately, to the outbreak of the war.
III. Internal Scapegoating
Campaigns of exclusion and internal scapegoating took a different shape in Lebanon than in
the Congolese case, discussed above. Since the identity of the state was itself contested, different
actors often attempted to draw the lines between inclusion and exclusion in different places, in
order to gain more legitimacy within their own community. The Maronites tended to see
themselves in the role of the barer of the Lebanese identity, and often implied that other
communities were much less loyal to Lebanon. For them, it was the easiest to target the
Palestinian as outsiders: "By redirecting their hostility towards the Palestinians, the Christians
managed to gain some release of internal tension." 518 Among the Muslims and the Sunni
community in particular, on the other hand, the Christians were often accused of being oblivious
or even hostile to the Arab cause. As the inter-Arab arena in the 1970's got hotter (as a result of
Egypt's "defection" after 1973), "[t]he resultant tension sought and found an outlet in the open
society of Lebanon, where the Maronites ... were cast in the role of villains, irrespective of their
motivations or the grounds of their grievances against the Pan-Arabists and the Palestinians." 519
518 Abul-Husn, The Lebanese Conflict, p. 61.
519 Khalidi, Conflict and Violence, 94.
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Still, internal scapegoating had probably only a relatively minor and not independent role in
instigating the war. It was only adding oil on the already burning fire.520
Lebanon's weakness, then, played a crucial part in the development of communal strife and
ultimately the eruption of the civil war. In the absence of a state capable of monopolizing the use
of violence and thus providing the common good of security, distrust between Lebanon's various
communities mounted, the political parties became militarized and hostilities began. The
injection of the Palestinian armed presence into the already tense Lebanese picture further
polarized Maronites and Muslim's views of each other (and their disrespect of the state). While
internal scapegoating was apparent in Lebanon prior to the civil war, it seems to have been
squarely marginal to the main factors - mutual insecurity and the Palestinian role. Border fixity,
of course, does not affect any of these factors in a direct way. Yet, as we have seen in the
previous section, border fixity played a central role in perpetuating and exacerbating the
weakness of the Lebanese state, thus indirectly also enabling internal conflict. Furthermore, in
the absence of the border fixity norm, the end result of the war would not have been, in all
probability, a continuation of the same weak institutions and the same weak state.
b) State Weakness, Border Fixity and Spillover of Internal War
State weakness in an age of border fixity had, however, even wider results than instigating
the civil conflict in Lebanon. The mechanism through which the Lebanese internal conflicts were
internationalized and involved - directly and militarily - in both Israel and Syria are, in many
ways, reflected iin hypotheses 2c. The dynamics of the spread of the civil war involved some
520 One of the factors that might have restrained inter-communal scapegoating before the war was the structure of the
Lebanese voting system. This system was built in a way that politicians were voted to fill a confessional quota,
but were voted on by all the people in the region, regardless of their communal affiliation
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degree of what might be seen as kin relations across borders. But more importantly, they also
involved an armed Palestinian refugee presence, insurgency and retaliation.
L Kin Relations Across Borders
Modern Lebanon, one will recall, includes large territories and populations that were part and
parcel of Syria before the 1920 establishment of Greater Lebanon. Most of the confessional
communities in Lebanon, like Sunni, Druze, Greek Orthodox and Maronites, have counterparts
across the border in Syria. Many families have actual relatives across the borders. These relations
did play some role in escalation of relations within Lebanon, as depicted in the kin-country
theory. In the 1958 crisis, for instance, a supply of arms and ammunition poured across the
border from Sunnis and Druze in Syria to their corresponding kin in Lebanon, as they were
perceived to fight a Maronite (and pro-Western) domination.521 Similarly, in later periods, Iran
was (and still is) the greatest supporter of the Shiite Hizbullah militia, a fact that can be
attributed, at least in part, to their religious affinity.522
Nevertheless, it seems that kin relations did not play a major role in the two most glaring
interventions of outside forces in the Lebanese civil war, those of Syria and Israel. Israel, of
course, did not have any kin to intervene on their behalf in Lebanon. The Syrian intervention, as
well, had very little to do with ethnic or religious affiliation. This can be inferred from one
important fact: while the initial Syrian intervention did support the largely Muslim anti-
establishment movement, this position soon changed, and Syria stood for a while as the protector
of the Maronites. Although the Syrian ruling elites are overwhelmingly Alawis and see
themselves as related to the Shi'a community, their support for the Shi'is was also not
521 Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 100.
522 Judith P. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 29-41.
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consistent. 523 Another counter-intuitive fact is that some of the moderate Arab regimes were
backing the Christians, at least partially, rather than their "fellow Muslims." 524 These facts,
therefore, cast much doubt at the proposition that kin-country dynamics played a major role in
policy decisions. In essence, it seems that outside powers were putting the logic of their state
above that of Arab or Muslim brotherhood, while the fighting sectarian groups in Lebanon were
simply desperate to get help from any possible source.
II. Armed Refugees and Spillover to International Conflict
A much more important component in explaining the spillover of domestic strife across the
borders, and in making sense of foreign intervention in the Lebanese case, has been the role of
refugees, insurgency and counter-insurgency, as stipulated in hypotheses 2c. These dynamics
were not present in relations between Syria and Lebanon. Although Syria was somewhat
threatened by Lebanon's political radicalization and disintegration, there was no direct
security/military threat. With regard to relations between Lebanon and Israel, however, this
mechanism played a major role.
The armed presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which was dealt with above in the
domestic context, exacerbated the conflict in yet another way. By using Lebanese soil a base for
training, preparing, and activating cross-border attacks against their "sending country" - Israel -
the Palestinian armed resistance initiated a cycle of insurgency and counterinsurgency that,
ultimately, contribute much to the Israeli invasion of 1982. Lebanon as a state had neither the
coercive wherewithal to prevent the Palestinian activity nor the means to reach a political
523 Weinberger, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, pp. 139-43.
524 Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, pp. 86-87.
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consensus that would enable such a course of action. The Lebanese government therefore
became a bystander to a game that it was to pay for with its own blood and treasure. 525
The gradual escalation of this cycle of violence points to its resemblance to the mechanism of
conflict spillover outlined in hypothesis 2c: from the Israeli side, the policy in Lebanon from
1968 to 1982 was not, overall, a well-thought-of long-term policy with some ulterior goals. It
was largely a reactive policy in response to a situation that was perceived as increasingly
dangerous to Israel.5 26 During the late 1960's and the early 1970's the PLO used its increasingly
immune status in the refugee camps of southern Lebanon to recruit, train, and set up military
bases in the area. Soon it started to use these bases as a springboard to its penetration to Israel,
which started in earnest in 1968.527 For strategic reasons - the long-term costs and the expected
international reaction - an all-out reaction of militarily occupying southern Lebanon was not a
viable policy to Israel. At the same time, for tactical reasons -the nature of terrain and domestic
politics - a totally defensive mode was unlikely to succeed as well. Israel, therefore, decided to
retaliate by air strikes or commando operations against the PLO in the Lebanese south. This form
of relation retained its primary characteristic of the insurgency-counterinsurgency cycle, while
constantly escalating. On May 1970, for instance, PLO fighters ambushed a bus carrying school
children in northern Israel. As a response, Israel briefly occupied an area in southern Lebanon
and attacked PLO bases in the area. In the year 1974 terrorists infiltrating from Lebanon killed
525 For such an argument, see Barak, "Lebanon," p. 315, Avner Yaniv, and Lieber, Robert L., "Personal Whim or
Strategic Imperative? The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," International Security 8, no. 2 (1983). A related argument
could be made about the weakness of Lebanon as a state and international terrorism. Lebanon's weakness
(together with its open nature as a society) made it in the 1970's a safe haven for various groups of international
terrorists, such as the German Baader-Meinhof, the Japanese Red Army and Northern Ireland's IRA. While the
activities of such groups might also result in international intervention, the study of such dynamics is beyond the
scope of this dissertation, as they do not touch directly on relations between neighboring states.
526 This is not to argue that the PLO position in Lebanon was indeed a serious strategic threat to Israel's survival.
Yet, non-strategic threats, such as threat to the lives and livelihood of the northern part of Israel, are still threats,
and one should not assume that a reaction (or even overreaction) to such threat is not defensive in nature.
527 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York: Vinrage Books,
2001), p. 449.
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sixty-one Israelis, most of them civilians. Israel's retaliation, as well, became more severe. 5 2 8
After a respite during the heyday of the civil war, the PLO resumed activity on Lebanon's
southern border after 1976, getting increasingly bolder and more successful in its operations.
"All this amounted to an ever-escalating chain of engagements which rather than solving the
problem made it worse." 529
In March 1978 a Palestinian commando squad, setting out from Lebanon and landing on
shore in Israel, hijacked a civilian bus and was only stopped on the outskirts of Tel-Aviv, where
the ensuing battle claimed the life of most passengers. Israel, feeling that moderate retaliation
was not working, felt compelled to act in a bolder way; thus it prepared for a temporary land
invasion, the "Litany Operation." This turned out to be yet another short-term solution. Israel
was forced (by the United States) to withdraw, and the United Nations peacekeeping force that
was deployed to the area proved incapable of either halting PLO operations or preventing IDF
retaliations. 530 As the PLO started to fire artillery on towns and villages in the Israeli north, Israel
again retaliated by bombing the Lebanese south through artillery and air raids. A cease-fire was
achieved in the summer of 1981, but both sides held no illusions about its durability.53 1
As this account shows, then, from 1969 and until the eve of the 1981, a pattern of ever-
escalating attacks and counter-attacks characterized the relations between Israel and the PLO in
Lebanon. While the government of Lebanon, its army, and its private militias played little direct
role in this "game," they were certainly a part of both side's calculations. Israel's retaliations
were aimed at two objects. First, and more obvious, were the direct attacks against PLO bases,
headquarters and ammunition reserves. By retaliation, however, Israel tried also to convey a
528 Ibid., p. 499, Yaniv, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?" pp. 122-26.
529 Yaniv, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?" p. 130.
530 Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, pp. 106-07, Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the
Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 64-75.
5 Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security, pp. 75-85.
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subtler "message," not to the PLO, but to other parties in Lebanon. Israel recognized Lebanon's
weakness, but its decision makers thought that by applying a steady and increased pressure on
Lebanese elite, and especially the Christians, it would make them, eventually, face the PLO head
on. This was, for example, the logic behind the December 1968 operation. After several
Palestinian attacks in northern Israel and on Israeli civilian airplanes, Israeli commandos raided
Beirut's airport and exploded thirteen Lebanese carriers on the ground. The Israeli hope was that
the audacity of the action and the damage to Lebanese property and to its economy would propel
the government or, alternatively, the Christian militias, to face the PLO. Indeed, the reaction had
some role in the 1969 showdown between the Lebanese Army and the PLO. Yet the Lebanese
government proved, not surprisingly, unable to bare the political pressure, and bowed to the
PLO's and other Arab states' demands in the Cairo agreement. 532
Was the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, as well, a part of this cycle of escalating violence,
and in this sense a part of the mechanism described in hypothesis 2c? The answer is positive, but
only in a limited sense. While the motives of some in the Israeli leadership were far wider than
securing northern Israel from PLO attacks (to be discussed below), this basic security motive
was a necessary component. Without the establishment of "Fatahland" - the PLO's controlled
enclave in southern Lebanon - and therefore without Lebanon's weakness, the whole rationale
for the invasion would have vanished. The war in Lebanon could not have gained the approval,
either of the cabinet or the public, without the background of the repeated guerilla and terrorist
attacks from across the border.533 Indeed, the first phase of the invasion, in which the PLO was
driven out of its position within Katyusha missile range from Israel, gained broad support from
532 Ibid., pp. 42-46.
533 For the broad argument see Yaniv, "Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative?" For the
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the Israeli public. After the IDF kept advancing north, and so going beyond the 40 kilometers of
immediate security imperative, the war became extremely controversial. 534
Nor were the dynamics described above to end with the Israeli invasion. As long as Israeli
forces were directly controlling parts of Lebanon, until May 2000, the fight against them, either
by Palestinians or by Lebanese, could have been seen (and partially was) as a struggle to free
Lebanese territory. Once Israel retreated to the international border, the dynamics of relations
were astonishingly similar to those of the 1970's. Again, the border area was controlled and
administered by a politico-military organization that could not be controlled by the weak central
Lebanese government. Even though the ability of the Syrian-made Lebanese military force is
probably much stronger today, the political will to activate it against the Hizbullah, at the risk of
renewed civil war, is not there.535 The one crucial difference is that the Hizbullah, in contrast
with the PLO of the 1970's and 1980's, is not an external force, but one deeply ingrained in the
Shi'a population, the largest Lebanese community. This fact would make any attempt to subdue
it an even harder task. The cross-border dynamics, with insurgency infiltrations and missiles and
massive IDF retaliation, however, is strikingly similar. In the fall of 2003, for instance, Israel and
the Hizbullah exchanged fire along the mutual border in a manner that certainly resembled past
occurrences. The future, no doubt, will see more such conflagrations.
The vicious cycle of cross-border clashes that entangled Israel in the internal strife of
Lebanese communities, from the late 1960's through the 1982-2000 occupation, and beyond, is
clearly a direct result of the Lebanon's weakness as a state. The state has been unable, politically
534 Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, p. 170, Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign
Military Intervention Decisions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 335-36, and fn. 89.
535 A clear indication of the Lebanese state's weakness, in this context, was the objection of the Lebanese
government to the Israeli withdrawal. This objection clearly served the Syrian interest, but could hardly be
justified in terms of the interests of Lebanon as a state.
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and militarily, to exercise its sovereign authority over the PLO, the Hizbullah, and other
organizations, which, in turn, has involved the state in a war not of its own choosing.
c) State Weakness, Border Fixity and Foreign Predation
Hypothesis 2d maintains that the weakness of states in a world of border fixity brings foreign
intervention not only because of spillover of domestic strife across the borders but also for
predatory reasons. Socio-politically weak states are often also weak militarily and unable, either
in terms of means or of political consensus, to mount a successful defense and resistance to
outside penetration. Moreover, the state's weakness and incohesivness enable foreign actors to
find (or at least think that they will find) domestic allies, which could serve as proxies or
dependents. The weak state is therefore a likely victim of external attempts to politically
dominate it, or economically exploit it. Predation, in the sense of gaining political dominance of
the Lebanese decision process, was probably the most important goal of the Syrian direct
intervention in Lebanon, and the primary motive behind the Israel 1982 invasion. Some
economic interests and economic exploitation probably were present as well, although these
were secondary for Syria and very marginal for Israel.
Syria's direct military intervention in the Lebanese civil war, which took place in a few
phases in 1975 and 1976, and lasted until 2005, was primarily a result of Syrian ambitions of
regional hegemony and their fear of Lebanese disintegration. Although Syria had never hidden
its irredentist claims on Lebanon, it was deterred from acting upon them, primarily as a result of
the norm of border fixity. Syria's territorial ambitions were centered on the idea of a "Greater
Syria" - the partially correct notion that under the Ottoman rule, the territory of bilad al-sham
that incorporated Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine were all an integral administrative
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"national" whole.536 Syrian pretensions for regional hegemony were never too far from the
surface, but they were greatly enhanced by Nasser's death in 1970, Sadat's abandonment of pan-
Arabism, and Syria's "success" in the 1973 war. As a result, the Syrian leadership became more
and more vocal in their claims during the seventies. Thus, Hafiz Assad's proclamation in 1972
that "Syria and Lebanon are a single country," was a surprise to no one.537 Nor were the Syrians
confined to words. Since independence, Syria had never established diplomatic relations with
Lebanon, so as to show the temporality of the Lebanese state. In the 1970s, it also put much
pressure on other countries to remove their delegations from Beirut and move them to
Damascus. 538 Yet Syria's goals in its 1976 intervention in Lebanon were much more restricted.
Syria realistically recognized the limits of its powers and therefore strictly avoided any official
claim to Lebanese territory.
Rather than bluntly pursuing ideological aspirations, Syria's had four more realistic (and
compatible) goals in its Lebanese intervention: First, it strived to prevent any one side from
decisively prevailing in the civil war in Lebanon. Such a victory, by either side, could have
radicalized the Lebanese scene and possibly have had severe side effects for Syria's political
stability as well. Second, by intervening Syria sought to supply the Christians with an alternative
to Israeli support and deny Israel the pretext of intervention against a PLO-dominated Lebanon.
Such an intervention could have potentially created a second front on Syria's flank and created a
grave threat to its security. Third, Syria had also an economic interest in Lebanon's stabilization,
and one that was very important for the preservation of the ruling coalition in Damascus. Fourth,
536 Raymond Hinnebusch, "The Foreign Policy of Syria," in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, ed.
Raymond and Ehteshami Hinnebusch, Anoushiravan (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 141-44.This
was only partially true, as Mt. Lebanon, Jerusalem area and Lebanon's costal area were separated for the
administrative center in Damascus for much of the Ottoman rule.
537 Pipes, Greater Syria, 119-121.
538 Pipes, Greater Syria, 121-125. See also Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986).
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and most important, in order to fulfill all these interests; Syria needed to gain hegemony over the
decision-making process in Lebanon. 539 This it finally achieved only after the Tai'f agreement
of 1989.540 While in Lebanon the Syrian army, or some elements within the army, certainly
engaged in large-scale racketeering, drag trade, and other profitable projects, there is no
indication that such endeavors played any role in the Syrian intervention decision.54 1
Clearly, the weakness of the Lebanese state was the factor that created or facilitated all these
incentives for Syrian intervention, and the factor that enable such intervention. Lebanon's
weakness, as we have seen, crippled its military ability to object to any incursion on the side of
its neighbors, be they Syrians or Israelis. Lebanon's weakness, especially the weakness of the
state's legitimacy, in turn, created opportunities for every invader to find local allies. Indeed,
Syria did not lack in Lebanese allies, although these alliances, as discussed above, shifted
widely. In the first, limited, phase of the intervention (through the Syrian-dominated Palestinian
forces of Saiqa and the PLA), Syria was allied with the PLO and the leftist anti-establishment
coalition. Later, after its June 1976 massive direct intervention, Syria found in the largely
Christian Lebanese Front and the pro-establishment Sunnis enthusiastic allies.54 2 Alliances kept
on shifting, but Syria never found itself devoid of local supporters in Lebanon. Even as both
domestic pressure in Lebanon and external pressure on Syria to withdraw mounted in 2005,
Syria still enjoyed wide support of many elements of the establishment, Christian and Muslim
alike and, importantly, of Hizbullah. While Syria ostensibly strengthened many of Lebanon's
539 For discussions of the Syrian objectives in Lebanon, see Hinnebusch, "The Foreign Policy of Syria," pp. 155-56,
Lawson, "Syria's Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War.", Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, pp. 49-56, Karen
Rasler, "Internationalized Civil War: A Dynamic Analysis of the Syrian Intervention in Lebanon," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 27, no. 3 (1983), Weinberger, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, pp. 176-290.
540 On the degree to which the Syrian controlled the Lebanese politics after that date, see El Khazan, "Lebanon-
Independent No More."
541 See Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, pp. 252-53.
542 Weinberger, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, pp. 176-290.
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civilian and military institutions, then, it made sure that Syria would always be perceived as
indispensable for the continuation of security and development of Lebanon.
Lebanon's weakness played a crucial role in Israel's predatory invasion as well. Securing
itself from Palestinian attacks from the north was indeed a necessary component in Israel's 1982
invasion of Lebanon, and one without which the government could not have hoped for the public
support, as argued above. In the year prior to the invasion, however, the PLO adhered to the
unofficial ceasefire and was not firing rockets at the Israeli north or sending infiltrators through
the borderline. While the PLO's hardened position in southern Lebanon could have caused
problems in the future, the assumption in Israel was that the IDF could fairly easily disarm the
organization's military ability in southern Lebanon once it took such steps. What, then, caused
Israel to invade in the manner and at the time it did? In essence, the Israeli decision to invade
Lebanon in the summer of 1982 stemmed from a combination of four factors. The first was that
the strategic situation was very favorable to Israel: with the peace agreement with Egypt, Iran-
Iraq war going on, and the rest of the Arab world weakened and divided. Israel was as stronger
as ever.543
Second, the Israeli Likud government, in many senses unlike its predecessors, did not have
reservations about the use of its military power for political goals, and at least some of Israel's
leaders had far reaching strategic goals in mind. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, and probably
also Prime Minister Menachem Begin, wanted to take advantage of this strategic window of
opportunity to engineer a new order in the Middle East; an order in which all other states were
either cooperating with Israel or too weak and fearful to challenge her. A cornerstone of this new
order would be the strengthening of the Israeli grip on the territories it occupied in 1967 in the
543 Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon, pp. 105-07.
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West Bank and the Gaza Strip.44 One thorny problem stood out as a major challenge to such a
design, though, and this problem was the third important factor in the Israeli equation: the PLO.
The PLO was such a problem not so much because of its Lebanese presence but because of its
influence in the West Bank and Gaza. Standing as a symbol of Palestinian nationalism, the PLO
was for the Likud leadership an element that had to be disposed of should they want to proceed
with their plan. Breaking the Lebanese military force of the PLO, Sharon reasoned, would enable
an alternative, and cause more Israel-friendly Palestinian leadership to emerge in the West
Bank.545
The fourth factor, and one that was essential for Sharon's plan to succeed, was the weakness
of the state in Lebanon. This weakness enabled the Israeli perception that it would not face much
resistance in Lebanon beyond that of the PLO and possibly Syria, that it would find in the
Phalanges of Bashir Gemayel a strong and loyal ally, and. that with the IDF's assistance, the
Phalanges would have no difficulties gaining the upper hand in Lebanon and establish in it a
regime friendly to Israel.546 All of these assumptions, it turned out, were true in the short run but
far from it in the long run. While Israeli troops did engage, like their Syrian counterparts, in the
looting of Lebanese property, this activity was much more limited and the profits did not play
any role in the Israeli decision-making. 547
544 Schiff, Israel's Lebanon War, pp. 11-97, Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking, pp. 362-82.
545 Sharon, in fact, has tried to promote such alternative leadership in the occupied territories, the so-called Village
Associations, without much success. For the PLO's role in the Israeli plans and perceptions see Evron, War and
Intervention in Lebanon, pp. 362-82, Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking.
546 Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon, pp. 112-16, Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, pp. 121-34, Schiff,
Israel's Lebanon War, pp. 11-61, Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking, pp. 325-86.
547 See Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, p. 253.
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E. Lebanon: Summary
The study of the Lebanese case confirms most of the hypotheses that are relevant to a weak
state in a world in which the norm of border fixity prevails. The evidence as to the mechanisms
revealed in hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d, though, do not weigh the same. The norm of border
fixity played a crucial role in the fact that, after its 1943 independence, Lebanon did not
significantly strengthen as a state and, in many senses, was actually further weakened. The
absence of territorial threats and/or opportunity denied Lebanon the ability (or the need) to create
and maintain a strong army that could have monopolized the legitimate use of force. Other state
institutions, in turn, were suffering from the lack of a central body that could enforce its will on
the divided political and social arena. This exacerbating weakness was the sin-qua-non of the
escalation to a long and protracted civil war in the mid 1970's, mainly because of a situation of
"emerging anarchy" and the mutual insecurity that adjoining such a situation. Internal
scapegoating played only a secondary role.
One important factor in Lebanon that was not suggested by the theoretical discussion in
chapter two is the role that the Palestinian refugees and their actions played in aggravating the
tensions between the different communities and political groups in Lebanon. The refugees and
their incursions into Israel have been also a main motive for Israel's repeated retaliation against
Lebanon since the late 1960's, and a necessary condition in the calculation of the 1982 Israeli
invasion. The main motives for the Israeli invasion, nevertheless, were more predatory in nature,
and involved Israel's desire to create a new and more favorable order in the Middle East, which
included Israeli dominance over Lebanese government and reduced influence of the PLO in the
West Bank and Gaza. Similar calculations were also the source of the Syrian intervention, from
1976 to 2005. Kin relations seem to have played very little role in either of these states'
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involvement in Lebanon, and so do considerations of economic exploitation. Lastly, it is
important to note that the Israeli and Syrian occupation of Lebanese territory did not enhance
Lebanon's strength as a state precisely because it avoided a territorial challenge to Lebanese
presumed sovereignty.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions
The individual case studies provide many insights into the theoretical argument of this
research. A comparison among them, however, will help to strengthen the argument and extend
its validity. This concluding chapter, then, begins with a comparison of the four case studies. It
utilizes the data of the case studies to conduct a broad comparison of the cases of Brandenburg-
Prussia, Argentina, Lebanon, and Congo. This analysis proceeds along the same lines of inquiry
as in the cases, i.e., the level of territorial threats faced by each state; the degree to which this
territorial pressure, or lack thereof, was translated into state strength or weakness; the relations
between weak states and internal violence in a world of border fixity; the degree to which, in
such a world, internal strife could spill across the borders through kin relations and through
dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency; and the degree to which this state weakness
enables and encourages external, non-territorial, intervention, for predatory reasons. The chapter
then continues with a short summary of the findings and a discussion, and concludes with an
examination of theoretical and policy implication and with suggesting further research needed.
A. Comparing the Cases: Norms of Borders and Territorial Pressures
The conditions in place in the four cases studied, as explored in Chapter 3, did not predispose
some of them to success and the others to failure in terms of state building. Yet, Brandenburg-
Prussia and Argentina did create a much stronger state than Congo and Lebanon by the end of
the period studied here. One is compelled, therefore, to look for explanations for these
differences in the processes that these countries have undergone. This section compares the level
of territorial threats faced by the state in each of the cases studied above. The differences
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between the levels of territorial pressures the four countries faced are very substantial. Clearly, a
broad division can be observed between the two "older" cases - Brandenburg-Prussia in the 17th
and 18th century and Argentina in the 19 th century - and the two "newer" cases - Lebanon and
Congo since their independence. As was argued in Chapter 2, the Post War World II world has
seen a sea change in the way we treat international borders and, though gradually, this change
has amounted to an ever-stronger international norm of border fixity. Accordingly, while the
former cases faced repeated and often severe territorial threats, the two latter cases encountered
nothing of the sort. While the former had the potential for territorial aggrandizement through the
conquest of territories of neighboring states, these opportunities were not available to the latter.
Some differences are also apparent in the level of threats and opportunities within each pair of
states, however, placing Argentina and Lebanon closer, in a sense, to the imaginary dividing line,
and Prussia and Congo at extreme opposites.
In 1640 Brandenburg-Prussia was situated, together with other German principalities, at the
core of a violent maelstrom that swept the entire European continent, the Thirty Years War. It
faced enormous territorial threats. These threats persisted at a very high level for the better part
of the 17th century. While subsequent territorial threats seem to subside somewhat in the late 17 th
and early 18 th century, the potential was always there and the Prussian King and his advisors
were continuously on guard for these threats. The strong military they built was, to an important
extent, an insurance policy against exactly such an eventuality, as their international environment
provided no such instrument. At the same time, Brandenburg could, and did, expand its own
territories, with no serious normative impediments. The same ruthless international environment
created both territorial threat and territorial opportunities. Argentina, in the same manner, was
engulfed in war, both internal and external, for most of the 19 th century. Many of these wars
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were territorial in nature. In the earlier stages, the center of the new state at Buenos Aires was
forced to relinquish demands for territories extending from the Banda Oriental (Uruguay),
through Paraguay, to Upper Peru (Bolivia). Subsequent wars involved these as well as other
Argentinean territories. Not until the later years of the century could Argentina feel secure within
its international borders. The level of territorial threat, however, was not as intense as in
Brandenburg-Prussia case, once the wars of independence subsided. At least partially, this
reduction of territorial threat was owed to a loose regional normative framework that was
established in South America in the second part of the century. The acceptance of the principle
of uti possidetis did not end territorial wars completely, but circumscribed their scope.
Alternatively to the story of territorial threats and contraction, the process Argentina went
through in the 19 th century can be seen also as one of territorial expansion. From the small core
around the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina's actual territorial control extended to include the
vast territories of the current state. This expansion, though, was again limited by the same
principles. While Argentina could gain (or regain, depending on one's position) territories
disputed between itself and Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance, it could not annex the
entire state, and could not act in a way completely at odds with the uti possidetis principle.
Congo, in contrast, faced no serious external territorial threats. In its earlier days as an
independent state, it did face a serious secession attempt (of Katanga), but once this was put
down, with substantial external help, the territories of this vast state were virtually assured,
despite the lack of means to defend them, to control them, or to serve them. While the state was
invaded repeatedly in the 1990's and the 2000's, and while foreign armies roamed the country at
will, no attempt was made to question its borders. Similarly, no territorial acquisitions were
available for Congo, as the international community, and the African one in particular, precluded
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such practices from the political menu of choice. For Lebanon the picture was not as clear at
first, as it faced some territorial opportunities and threats in its 1948 war with Israel, and the
subtle but menacing threat of Syrian irredentism. Nevertheless, as the Post-World War II Middle
Eastern international system stabilized, it became clear that Lebanon's borders were practically
fixed. When Syria invaded the country in the 1970's and when Israel did the same in the 1980's,
territorial acquisitions were out of the question. Political domination was not.
In general, then, it is easy to differentiate between the two cases in which the state faced
significant and continuous territorial pressure, Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina, and the two
cases in which the state faced no such challenges and opportunities, Lebanon and Congo. A
closer look, however, reveals some differentiation within each category, with Brandenburg-
Prussia and Congo approaching more the ideal types of success and failure in state buiding,
respectively, while Argentina and Lebanon revealing more of a mixed case.
B. Comparing the Cases: Border Fixity and State building
The discussion in chapter 3 suggested that, judging on a whole, there is no reason to think
that Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640 or Argentina in 1810 were better positioned than Lebanon in
1943 or Congo in 1960 to succeed in the project of state building. All, at their starting points,
were equally weak. All had some potential to get stronger, but none had too much potential. This
section draws on the data from the case studies to compare the process of state building, or the
lack thereof, in the four cases. It examines the way in which differing norms regarding
international borders created different pressures and incentives for states, elites, and masses, and
the ways in which these differences affected the process of state building. It concludes that while
territorial threats and opportunities in Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina led them, gradually
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and often reluctantly, to create socio-politically stronger states, the lack of these pressures
enabled the elites in Congo and Lebanon to avoid this costly and cumbersome process. The
section examines these processes in terms of the same categories analyzed in the case studies.
a) Monopolization of the Means of Violence
What have been the effects of territorial pressures, or lack thereof, on the process of state
building? The first aspect to be examined is whether the level of territorial pressure a state faces
affects its willingness and ability to gain a monopoly over the use of legitimate means of
violence within its own territory and across its borders. The argument made in chapter 3 is that
persistent territorial threats and opportunities, first, create the incentives for the central authority
to vie for forming a stronger military force, and second, that the establishment of such a force
then serves as a vehicle for extending the government's ability to prevent any opposing centers
from physically challenging the state's authority.
The picture presented by the case studies is compatible with these predictions. In
Brandenburg-Prussia and in Argentina, there was a gradual (though not always linear) process of
state monopolization of the means of violence, while in Lebanon and Congo we see no such
process. Moreover, the process itself often resembled the one predicted. The center in
Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina used territorial threats to create, acquire, and sustain a
stronger army and then used this army to suppress any armed opposition (and oftentimes non-
armed political opposition as well). The center in both Lebanon and Congo, on the other hand,
was wary of creating a strong military establishment because, first, it was not needed for the
defense of the territory and, second, it was a power center in potential competition with the
civilian government. External threats that were not territorial in nature, such as the 1976 Syrian
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intervention and 1982 Israeli intervention in Lebanon and the 1996 and 1998 multiple
interventions in Congo, did not result in a similar process because territorial threats were invoked
in the two other cases.
Here as well there are differences within each category. In Brandenburg-Prussia, the process
of monopolization of the use of force had been fairly linear and very much followed the logic
presented in chapter 2. It was a process that, essentially, looked like a ratchet effect: with every
new territorial threat, the center demanded - and either was given or used coercion to secure - a
larger and stronger military. When peace eventually came, the level of troops was not
considerably reduced, and these troops were often used, in opposition to their initial purposes, to
extend the control of the state. Ultimately, with town militia and private armies abolished and the
army nationalized, a true monopoly over the use of legitimate force was achieved. The process in
Argentina was not quite so linear but it resulted in a fairly strong monopolization of the use of
force as well. If one treats Buenos Aires as the center of gravity in Argentina, one can observe a
process that begins with a shrinking of territorial control. Only slowly, beginning with the
province of Buenos Aires and gradually extending to include the entire Argentina of today, did
the center achieve the goal of monopolizing the use of legitimate force. This process corresponds
with what was argued above, that the levels of territorial threat and territorial opportunities in
19th century Argentina were somewhat more limited compared to the 17th century Europe.
In both Lebanon and Congo the military was never viewed as an instrument needed to defend
the state's border against foreign territorial ambitions or to expand the state's own territorial
positions. It was, instead, either an instrument to preserve the prerogative of a minor elite (as in
Congo) or to perform a delicate balancing act between different groups in the society (as in
Lebanon). In both cases, however, it was also seen as a potential threat to the civilian
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government and, therefore, one that needed to be restricted and contained. While Lebanon's
army was rebuilt after the end of the civil war and the Taif agreement of 1989, it was done under
the auspices of an occupying power, Syria. Moreover, the current Lebanese army, while stronger
on paper, still lacks the internal cohesion and, more importantly, the political will to enable a true
monopolization of the use of violent means by the state.
b) Extraction of Revenue
The logic of the development of a state's ability to extract resources from its population is
fairly similar to the one of monopolizing the use of force. As discussed in chapter 2, the
existence of a persistent territorial pressure creates very strong incentives for the state to extract
more resources from its society. It also legitimizes such an activity. The availability of a strong
military force, at the same time, enables the state to coerce those elements that oppose taxation.
As the state is unlikely to relinquish the high level of taxation once the war is over (especially if
another one might be coming soon), taxation remains high, even in times when territorial threats
have subsided.
The division of the cases here is somewhat different than what described above.
Brandenburg-Prussia followed the above predictions closely. The need for the state to extract
resources from its population followed directly from the level of territorial threats it faced.
Gradually, though persistently, the right to tax was wrested from the hands of local authorities in
towns and manors, often by the use of force, and was vested in the state. As it faced formidable
territorial threats, Prussia managed to extract a very substantial level of resources out of its fairly
poor population. Such a level of taxation enabled it to sustain a military that matched those of
states with much larger and wealthier population base.
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Both Congo and Lebanon sustained a system with much lower levels of taxation, and an
emphasis on indirect taxation. For Congo, the imposition and collection of taxation was well
beyond the ability of its inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy. It opted, instead, to rely on proceeds
from foreign-owned mining enterprises, which were then nationalized by the state. In Lebanon,
the defining factor seems to have been ideological. Based on the ideas of laissez-faire, the
Lebanese government was reluctant to establish a permanent level of high direct taxation (This
has changed somewhat under the Syrian-controlled Lebanon in the 1990's). Nor did it need to.
Both Lebanon and Congo could resort to strategies that imposed little tax burden on their
populations (since they did not need the resources to fend for their territories) and build a strong
military for that purpose. Both, as well, did not have the sufficient power to enforce such a
policy.
In terms of revenue extraction, contrary to the prediction, Argentina looks more similar to
Lebanon and Congo than to Brandenburg-Prussia. Although Argentina faced territorial threats,
these were not as formidable as in Prussia, and therefore required less means. In addition,
Argentina was able to utilize three important tools to avoid the need for heavy direct taxation. It
levied taxes on imports and exports (indirect taxation) and borrowed money from abroad. It also
used induced inflation to finance its wars.
c) Administration and Bureaucracy
The administrative and bureaucratic capacity of the state is the third element of state building
related to the level of territorial threats and opportunities. In contrast to the monopolization of the
use of force and to revenue extraction, the relationship to state building here is somewhat more
complex. On the one hand, territorial war provides the incentives for the initial development (to
260
create a better organized military) and the means to expand the state administration's
geographical reach (by ensuring compliance through coercion). On the other hand, the logic of
the expanding military and the increasing need for funding also compels the state to expand the
depth of this military bureaucracy to include more spheres of action.
Like in the previous areas surveyed, the case of Brandenburg-Prussia follows closely the
model. The bureaucracy was created because of military needs, and it expanded its authority to
all the Hohenzollern's territories protected by the military bayonets, and gradually deepened its
reach to include more and more authority and responsibilities. Interestingly, while much of the
bureaucracy went through a process of "civilization" (i.e., passed from the direct rule of the army
to that of civilian government), it retained its military character and was staffed predominantly
with veterans and retired army officers. In this area as well, Argentina reveals a more mixed
reality. The overall picture resembles that of Prussia, in the sense that by 1880 the geographical
reach and the breadth of the tasks carried by the state's administration and bureaucracy were
greatly improved and showed fairly strong capacity. These processes, however, seem to be only
partially connected to Argentina's territorial wars. To be sure, the expansion of this aspect of the
state would not have been possible without the monopolization of the use of force, which was
itself, as we have seen, a function of territorial threats and opportunities. Similarly, the need for a
better organization stems, at least partially, from military needs. In contrast to the Brandenburg-
Prussia case, however, the degree of spillover from the military administration to the civilian one
is limited. Again, one can attribute this last fact, at least partially, to the lower level of territorial
challenges that Argentina had to face.
The administrative capacity and reach of the state in both Lebanon and Congo were (and still
are) very limited. In Congo, even in the height of Mobutu's era, when the country was ostensibly
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under a centralized rule, the capacity of the state to affect the daily life of its citizens was very
limited, and its bureaucracy was inefficient and corrupt. The early attempts at developing
seemingly strong institutions were mostly for propagandistic purposes, and were soon abandoned
as it became clear that Congo's territory was guaranteed by the international community against
both internal succession and external territorial predation.
In Lebanon, the reach of the state, very limited to begin with, was severely crippled by the
lengthy civil war and the militia rule in different parts of the country. Programs of reforms after
the war has ended hardly improved the situation. In the late 1950's and early 1990's, when the
army had much influence on the government, through the presidency of its former commander,
General Chihab, administrative reforms were attempted, indeed, but with only limited success.
The army, which was not developed to protect or expand Lebanon's territories, was hardly a
strong enough institution to affect such reforms.
d) Provision of Public Goods
A fourth aspect of state building suggested in chapter 2 as one potentially related to territorial
threats and opportunities, is that of the provision of public goods. The logic of this argument is
that a state that inflicts a heavy burden on its society - because of the demands created by
territorial pressures under a flexible border system - needs, over time, to somehow compensate
them. Coercion alone can be a vehicle for governing only to a limited extent, and in the long run
the state needs at least some degree of legitimacy to sustain itself. Presumably, such legitimacy
could come from supplying public goods in return for the burden of blood and taxes.
In the two more "extreme cases," Brandenburg-Prussia, on the one hand, and Congo, on the
other, these assumptions seem to fit the reality. As compared to the norms of its own time,
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Brandenburg-Prussia had done very well in terms of public goods supply. The construction of
roads and water systems and the provision of public safety measures, especially in towns, were
quite remarkable for this period. Congo, on the other hand, did a very poor job in providing
public goods to its citizens. Generally speaking, areas such as infrastructure, public education
and public health only deteriorated with the passing of time. The spatial distribution of goods and
investments, as well, is telling. Congo invested the lion's share of its budget (the part that did not
go directly into the pockets of the small governing elite, and especially Mobutu himself) in the
capital Kinshasa and the mining-rich area of Shaba. Other regions, with more population, gained
very little of these investments. In both Lebanon and Argentina, in contrast, the supply of public
goods seem to correlate more with the ideologies of the incumbent than in the prospects of
territorial threats. In Lebanon, of course, the provision of the public goods, itself was a casualty
of the civil war and only slowly recovered.
e) Group Cohesion
The fifth and last aspect of state strength affected by the prospect of territorial wars, or the
lack thereof, is the cohesion of the states or, in other words, the level of identification of the
population with their state. The results here are apparent on the negative side (i.e., fixed borders
leads to low cohesion), but only mixed on the positive side (a flexible border system might lead
to some degree of cohesion).
The evidence from the case of Brandenburg-Prussia is weak but still existent. Coming before
the age of nationalism, this case should not indicate popular identification with the state.
However, at the level of the politically relevant strata, the nobility, cohesion certainly increased
with time. While in the mid-1700's one could still hear, for instance, Brandenburgians refer to
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other Hohenzollern territories as "foreign," the same could not be found in the 1 8th century. It is
certainly not the case, moreover, that the Prussians felt themselves to be "German" in any
political sense before the Napoleonic Wars. While there is no direct evidence that the cause was
territorial threats, the Junkers, although initially ambivalent or outright opposed to the project of
state building, gradually came to espouse it and, in a sense, even "possess" it. In Argentina, the
process of achieving "national" (or state) cohesion was partial. Despite the periods of political
separation some modicum of a sense of being Argentinean still prevailed with most people, and
eventually trumped local and regional (i.e., Latin American) identities. Here again it is hard to
find evidence that such creation and preservation of Argentinean identity was a reaction to
territorial pressures, but this is perhaps the nature of this subject.
In both Lebanon and Congo, however, the absence of a unifying theme - such as territorial
threat- is very clear. The absence of such common threats, or common opportunities, perpetuated
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other cleavages in the society, and greatly inhibited the ability of
the state to achieve national cohesion, Mobutu's public relations campaigns notwithstanding.
The population of Congo and Lebanon remain very divided to date. International conflicts and
foreign invasions that had no territorial ambitions even worsened this disunity, as different
segments in the population supported the invaders or were oblivious to them. They were not
perceived as a threat to the whole body politic, but to a certain faction of this body, and thus not
generating a significant level of ingroup cohesion.
This section, then, has examined the effects that norms regarding international borders exert
on the process of state building and on the prospects of states to become stronger in a socio-
political sense. It has examined, in other words, the suppositions of Hypothesis I (which is
relevant to the cases of Brandenburg-Prussia and Argentina) and Hypothesis 2 (relevant to
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Congo and Lebanon). Combined, these hypotheses suggest that a world in which there is no
prohibition on territorial conquest and annexation is one in which surviving states are likely to
get stronger over time; and that in a world in which such prohibition (i.e., the norm of border
fixity) exists, weak states will remain weak or even get weaker.
This section, like the case studies, has compared the four cases in terms of various
components of state strength, examining the monopolization of the use of legitimate violence,
the extraction of resources, the building of state institutions and bureaucracy, the provision of
public goods, and the degree of internal cohesion. The study of Brandenburg-Prussia
corroborates the premise of Hypothesis 1 in all of these aspects, with the possible exception of
last (in which there are not sufficient indications in either way). In Argentina, the overall picture
corroborates Hypothesis 1 as well, although the details are often not as clear and strong as in the
Prussian case. The processes of monopolization of the use of legitimate violence and of creating
state institutions and bureaucracy follows the theory fairly well, although in a less linear way. So
does the level of internal cohesion, in a limited sense. Both the extraction of resources and the
provision of public goods, however, seem fairly unaffected by Argentina's territorial pressures.
The study of both Congo and Lebanon corroborates Hypothesis 2. The absence of territorial
pressures resulted in weak states in all the dimensions explored here. Congo was, in most
categories, more extremely weak.
f) The Duration of State
But perhaps, one might suggest, all of the differences noted above between the success of
state building in Brandenburg-Prussia and in Argentina and its failure in Lebanon and Congo are
simply a matter of the time factor. After all, did it not take Brandenburg-Prussia a full century to
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create the fairly strong state which the Frederick the Great inherited in 1740? And did it not take
Argentina the better part of the nineteen-century to reach the point at which it was a fairly
cohesive and socio-politically strong state? And is it not, therefore, too early to judge whether
the state building project in current-day states of the developing world is a failure or a success?
This argument has a point. It did take European states longer time to build their states to a
reasonable level than the most states in Africa today exist as independent political entities.
However, one needs to take into account two important factors: First, one should look not
only at the start and end point, but also at the trajectory of the state building process. Is the state
at all moving in the direction of creating stronger institution and gaining greater legitimacy as a
state? Even if the process of state formation is far from complete, one would expect it to move in
the right direction. Both Congo and Lebanon, as we have seen, do not show significant signs of a
positive trajectory of this sort, while in Argentina and (especially) in Brandenburg, these signs
were clear well before their first century of existence as states elapsed.
Second, and not less important - there is no reason to assume that a similar process should
take a similar time under different conditions. Technological and ideational advances should
have both make the process of state building faster rather than slower. Technological advances in
communication and transportation should have created better conditions for the penetration of
the central government into its society, and the ability of the government to create an
infrastructure that connects various regions of the state. Faster communications should make the
state more governable, as it should be much faster today, even in the remote parts of Africa, to
communicate between the central authority and its representatives in the periphery. Advances in
transportation should enable the government to move its agents (military, bureaucrats, etc.) at a
faster pace, and thus better control its territory. The availability of "ready made" models of
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administration, moreover, means that a state does not have to "invent the wheel," like
Brandenburg-Prussia did, when establishing governing administration. Therefore, the time
needed for a state to create a strong entity out of a weak one, in theory, should have been shorter
in the 20 and 2 1st centuries than in the 17 th century.
That one cannot see a positive trajectory in the cases studied here, and that the process does
not take a shorter time, therefore, suggests that the problems are real - not an artifact of
insufficient time. A simple "wait and see" approach, then, is unlikely to produce much better
results of state building, then, a fifty or a hundred years down the road. Given the general
trajectory of development and the advances of transportation and communication were we do not
see a significant process of state building by now we are unlikely to see it in the coming decades.
C. Comparing the Cases: Border Fixity, State Weakness and International
Conflict
a) Weak States, Border Fixity and Violent Civil Strife
Hypothesis 3 maintained that weak states in a world in which border fixity is the norm are
rife with internal violence. This section considers this proposition with regard to the two case
studies of weak states in the contemporary world, in which, indeed, the border fixity norm
reigns. Both cases corroborate the hypothesis. Both Lebanon and Congo deteriorated into lengthy
periods of internal violent strife between different segments of their populations. In both cases
the weakness of the state was a major factor in the outbreak and continuation of violence, and in
both cases, as we have seen above, border fixity played an important role in perpetuating and
exacerbating this weakness. Both cases included, as well, a factor that was not considered in the
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original theory - the role of refugees in instigating internal strife (as opposed to external conflict,
which will be dealt with below).
The processes that led from a weak state in a world of border fixity to internal violent
conflict were hypothesized in chapter 2 to encompass two separate mechanisms. The first
mechanism is that of state weakness creating conditions of "emerging anarchy." In this
condition, groups' security concerns are on the rise and opportunities for gain from violence
increase as well, as the aggression goes unchecked by the state. This mechanism was crucial in
understanding the causes of both the Lebanese Civil War in the 1970's and the late 1990's
rebellions in Congo. In Lebanon the state was perceived as sometimes biased towards the
interests of one community (the Maronites) and always ineffective and unable to supply the most
basic of public goods: security. Clans, communities, and political parties started to arm
themselves. The security dilemma soon increased dramatically, as each militia was perceived,
rightly or wrongly, not only to be the defender of its own community, but also a threat to other
communities. Similarly, in the 1990's Congo, as the state deteriorated into complete chaos,
ethnic groups were facing a situation in which there was no arbiter in conflicts between them and
neighboring groups, and in which there was no security but that which one provided for oneself.
Rising tensions erupted in communal wars, leading to a very large number of dead, casualties,
and refugees in several parts of Congo, even well before the rebellion of 1996.
The second mechanism that connects weak states in a world of border fixity to civil wars and
internal strife is what I have termed "internal scapegoating." Although rhetoric against this or
that community has been found in Lebanon, there is little evidence that this sort of rhetoric
played a very significant role in instigating the civil war. In Congo, on the other hand, much
evidence exists to this effect. Both Mobutu and Kabila have used internal scapegoating
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frequently and in a way that promoted internal hatreds, fear, and discrimination - setting off
processes that greatly contributed to Congo's inflammation in internal wars. They were
compelled to do so in the absence of state institutions that could have provided more inclusive
means of gaining legitimacy. They were allowed to do so, since this action would not have been
resulted, in all likelihood, in secession or annexation of the lands of the excluded people to their
kin across the border.
In both the Congolese and the Lebanese cases, a third factor, one that was not included in my
initial model, also contributed decisively to the outbreak of violent internal strife. In both these
cases an injection of refugees, fleeing conflict in neighboring countries (themselves weak),
greatly exacerbated existing tensions and made violence much more likely to erupt. The refugees
would have had no such effect had the state been stronger and able to prevent them from turning
the camps into armed bases. The refugees' change in the local balance of power, moreover,
would not have been that harmful if a leviathan, a strong and capable state, had been present.
b) Weak States, Border Fixity, and Spillover to International Conflict
Hypothesis 4 stipulated the argument that internal conflict in weak states in a world
characterized by fixed borders is more likely to spill over to involve neighboring states. It further
suggested two mechanisms that might make such a prospect more likely: the development, under
these conditions, of armed insurgency movements among the refugees, and the kin-country
syndrome.
Spillover of internal strife has created international conflict in both Lebanon and Congo. It
engulfed Israel and Syria in the Lebanese case, and Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola,
Zimbabwe, and a few smaller forces, in the Congolese conflict. The dynamics of the kin-country
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syndrome have played significant role especially in the case of Rwanda's intervention in Congo.
As its kin in eastern Congo - the Banyamulenge - were excluded by the Congolese state (as part
of the tactics of internal scapegoating described above) and targeted by rival groups, Rwanda felt
compelled to take on the role of their defender. This position was very much influenced by the
proximity of these dynamics in eastern Congo to the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994. In
the Lebanese case, on the other hand, the kin-country syndrome appears to have played a much
more marginal role. The potential does exist: there are numerous connections, religious, ethnic,
and clan-based, between some groups in Lebanon and their counterparts across the Syrian
border. Yet, while these relations were a factor in the first, and brief, civil war of 1958, they did
not have such an influence in the much more serious war of 1975-6. Syria, now a stronger state
itself, picked its allies and enemies in accordance with its raison d'etat, not its ethnic affinity.
In contrast, the dynamics of armed refugee insurgency and retaliation played a major role in
the escalation and spillover of the conflict across borders both in Congo and in Lebanon. In
Lebanon it was the insurgency of the Palestinian armed struggle, conducted mainly from its
bases in the refugee camps in the South, that ignited the cycle of attacks and retaliation. While
these actions were apparently not the primary motive of the 1982 Israeli invasion, they were a
necessary component, without which it is hard to imagine Israel embarking on the invasion. In
Congo, armed refugees operating across the borders of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Angola
were all instrumental in these countries' intervention in Congo in 1996 and again in 1998. In
both cases, the state was too weak to enforce its control over its territory and had to acquiesce to
the presence of armed refugees on its soil, as well as to the other side's retaliation. The
Congolese government under both Mobutu and Laurent Kabila not only was unable to reign in
the militant refugees. In fact, it tried to use them to promote its own agenda, since its territories
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were immune from territorial punishment by an angry neighbor. Moreover, in both the Lebanese
and the Congolese cases, there are examples of neighboring countries that were able to absorb a
large number of refugees without letting them lash out at their own country - compare Syria to
Lebanon and Tanzania to Rwanda.
c) Weak States, Border Fixity, and External Predation
In addition to spillover, weak states in a world espousing the norm of border fixity are more
likely to be involved in international conflict that arise out of predatory motivations of
surrounding states. The state's socio-political weakness is often translated, over time, into
weakness in terms of its capacity to defend itself against outside powers. Neighbors can abuse
this state's weakness in order to gain political and economic control. Neighbors can also take
advantage of the incohesivness of the state's society in order to lure potential internal allies to
their side. In both the Lebanese and the Congolese cases, these sorts of motivations were
factored into the intervening states' calculations (more so in Lebanon).
Both Syria's 1976 intervention and Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon stem, to a considerable
degree, from a desire to influence, and in fact dictate, Beirut's policies. It is often very hard to
differentiate security considerations from predatory, opportunistic ones. Both were included in the
calculus of Israel and Syria alike. Yet, as the goals of their interventions went well beyond that of
securing a quiet border with Lebanon, one is compelled to view their actions essentially as political
predation. Economic interests, although existing, apparently played a secondary role in Syria's
decision and none in Israel's.
Economic gain, on the other hand, was the prime motivation for Zimbabwe's 1998 intervention
in the Congo War. Not bordering Congo, Zimbabwe had little to fear in terms of its security. The
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pattern of its operations, furthermore, fit well that of economic predation. In addition, acquiring
powerful positions in influencing Congo's government was certainly an important stimulus to the
interventions of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Angola. Yet, apart from Zimbabwe, all had interests
in controlling Kinshasa precisely because it exported such grave threats to their countries or
governments. Political predation per se seems to have played a secondary role to security concerns
and kin solidarity in these cases.
D. Summary and Discussion
Despite obvious differences resulting from temporal, spatial, cultural or other variables,
weak states across time and space share many similarities. Among other things, they are
unable to seize and maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and are unable to
extract sufficient resources from their population (especially if this requires direct taxation).
Weak states cannot extend their administrative reach as far and as deep as strong states do,
and they are usually unable (and sometimes also unwilling) to supply their citizens with basic
public goods. Lastly, weak states suffer from low levels of legitimacy as a state among their
politically relevant strata.
Yet, with regard to the outside world, weak states in the post WW-II era have faced a
very different world than the one faced by their counterparts in previous eras. In short, weak
states in today's world, most of them young states, have been "born" into a world in which
foreign conquest and annexation of one's homeland territory is banned as a legitimate
practice in world policy; i.e., into a world of border fixity. This is supposedly a very positive
factor that should save many states, and much blood and treasure. The border fixity norm,
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however, also has some severe "side effects," as the cases of Congo and Lebanon show.54 8
This section, first, lists again the five hypotheses of this dissertation; second, it presents a
summary of the findings of the case studies and discusses these findings; and third, in light of
the empirical findings, it suggests a few modifications to the original model.
It is time, to reiterate the five hypotheses presented in Chapter 2:
Hypothesis 1: A world in which there is no normative prohibition on conquest and annexation is
likely to result, over time, in socio-politically stronger states.
Hypothesis 2: The border fixity norm is likely to perpetuate or even exacerbate the weakness of
already weak states.
Hypothesis 3: Weak states in a world with the border fixity norm are rife with internal violent
conflicts because they create conditions favorable to "emerging anarchy" and to "internal
scapegoating."
Hypothesis 4: Internal conflicts in weak states in a world with the border fixity norm tend to
spillover and turn into international conflicts and possibly international wars, through the
mechanisms of refugee insurgency and kin-country syndrome.
Hypothesis 5: State weakness in a world with the border fixity norm promotes the possibility of
international conflicts because it creates opportunities for external non-territorial predation.
How well do these hypotheses withstand the scrutiny of the case studies? Table 8 presents a
summary of the findings:
548 As mentioned before, one needs to consider the fact that, at the same time, the norm of border fixity has
been a very positive force in enhancing peace and stability in regions where most states are socio-
politically strong, such as in Europe (save the Balkans), North America and South America.
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Table 8: Summary of Findings in the Case Studies
Hypothesis Relevant cases Confirmed?
1 Brandenburg-Prussia, Strongly
Argentina Moderately
2 Congo, Lebanon Strongly for both
3 Congo, Lebanon Strongly for both
(Primarily through the mechanism of "emerging anarchy." In
Congo, the mechanism of "internal scapegoating" also important)
4 Congo, Lebanon Strongly for both
(Primarily through the mechanism of refugee insurgency. In
Congo, the mechanism of "kin-country" also important)
5 Lebanon Strongly
Congo Moderately (primary motivation only for Zimbabwe)
In general, then, most of the hypotheses have been confirmed for most cases, although there
are some differences in the effects and the order of importance of the different mechanisms at
work. A world in which there are no restrictions on foreign occupation and annexation of
homeland territory proved to affect positively the development of a strong state both in 17th and
18 th century Brandenburg-Prussia and in 19 th century Argentina. While the first case followed
closely the mechanisms suggested in Chapter 2, however, the second has done so only in some
respects, and usually not to the same extent as in Prussia. The reason might be, as hinted at
before, at least partially related to the norm of border fixity as well. In Latin America, and
especially in South America, international norms regarding the fixity of borders, started to
develop earlier than in other parts of the world. Although week and devoid of practical
enforcement ("teeth"), the principle of uti possidetis, ita possidetis ("as you possess, you may
possess") has been an important component of the continent's international politics. The
principle, discussed and confirmed in three inter-American Conferences and Congresses, and in
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numerous multi-lateral and bi-lateral treaties in the region, slowly gained traction in regulating
relations in the continent. To be sure, territorial conflicts still occurred in 19 th century South
America, as some of the colonial boundaries were disputed or ill defined, and as different states
referred to different interpretations of this norm of international law. 54 9 Yet, as this principle
anchored the borders of the Latin American states to the borders of their predecessor colonies, it
set limits on the flexibility of borders in the region. One could argue, then, that a weak version of
the border fixity norm did exist in 19 th century Latin America and affected, to some degree, the
level of territorial pressures faced by Argentina.550
Thus, one can think of the border fixity norm not as an abstract dichotomous variable, as
presented in the original model, but as a continuous variable, in which the norm can take several
different values. This notion is also compatible with the other side of the spectrum, where the
norms of border fixity in the Middle East, especially before the 1950's, were apparently weaker
and less stringent than those presented in the Congo case. A revised conception of the relations
between border fixity and state strength, therefore, is presented schematically in Figure 9 :
549 An example of the former is the dispute between Argentina and Chili over the possession of Patagonia. See
Escude, "Argentine Territorial Nationalism." An example of the latter is the difference between the Brazilian
tendency to interpret the principle as uti possidetis defacto, as opposed to the Spanish American countries
preference for uti possidetis de jure, see Kacowictz, The Impact of Norms in International Society, p. 77.
55o For a thorough discussion, see Kacowictz, The Impact of Norms in International Society. See also Korman,
The Right of Conquest, pp. 234-38.
275
Figure 9: Border Fixity and State Building as a Continuum
State Building
*L Brandenburg-Prussia
Argentina
* Lebanon
Congo
Strength of Border Fixity Norm
Another variable that is not included in my theory and apparently had some affect on the
willingness of states to embark on the costly and risky process of state building is the availability
of other financial sources. Unlike Brandenburg-Prussia, Argentina had the options of borrowing
more and of relying on export and import tariffs instead of direct taxation. These options did not
preclude the process of state building as a reaction to territorial pressure altogether. Argentina
still gained a monopoly over the use of legitimate force and still developed stronger state
institutions. Yet, in the long run, the state was not as independent in terms of its policies and not
as strong as in the Prussian model, partially because of a lack of an efficient system of direct
taxation. This observation is compatible with the existing literature, and could plausibly fit into
the same general theoretical framework.551
While Hypothesis 1 dealt with state building in a world of flexible borders, Hypothesis 2
concentrates on the same process in a world in which the border fixity norm prevails. By the
nature of this hypothesis, the evidence here is not direct evidence, as it deals with the effects of
551 See, e.g., Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America.", Hui, "Toward a
Dynamic Theory of International Politics.", Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992.
276
the absence of a phenomenon, territorial pressure, rather than with its existence. Nevertheless,
both Congo and Lebanon present a clear picture of continuous and exacerbated weakness, which
was shown to be related to this absence. To reiterate, the argument is not that states in the area of
flexible borders could not avoid a due process of state building; because they could, and many -
Poland is one example - did. They had, however, to bear the consequences, by losing territory or
even being eliminated. Neither Lebanon nor Congo had to face such consequences. Despite
debilitating state weakness and despite prolonged periods of foreign control over much of their
land and/or political power bases, they remain nominally independent and territorially intact. Nor
is the argument that weak states in the border fixity era are destined to stay weak. Some states,
by virtue of good leadership or other factors - Botswana in one Sub-Saharan African example -
do manage to become significantly stronger. Unfortunately, however, these are the exceptions.
Hypothesis 3 was also confirmed strongly for both Congo and Lebanon. In both, the main
mechanism through which state weakness was translated into internal civil strife was what has
been termed here "emerging anarchy." In the absence of a Leviathan, the fish had to fend for
themselves, and in so doing they created intense security concerns and opportunities for gain in
the struggle between different groups within the state. One factor, which lay outside the original
framework presented here, but which has been shown to have an important exacerbating effect
on internal strife, is that of the influence of refugee flows from neighboring countries. Armed
refugees not only entangled the state in external conflicts but also greatly enhanced the chances
of conflagration of internal fights. This factor, then, needs to be added to the original theory.
On the other hand, one element included in the theory as leading from state weakness in a
world of border fixity to civil strife, is confirmed to be important only in the case of Congo. The
politics of internal scapegoating did not seem to constitute a major reason for the deterioration of
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Lebanon into a civil war, while it did play a significant (though secondary to emerging anarchy)
role in Congo. Further research is needed, then, to determine the conditions under which one
should expect internal scapegoating to cause damage to inter-communal relations in a state.
Hypothesis 4, which dealt with the spillover of internal strife into international conflict, was
also confirmed in both the Lebanese and the Congolese cases. Here, as well, there are some
differences in the mechanisms at work. The key, in both cases, was the existence of armed
refugees from conflict in neighboring countries, which, through their cross-border insurgency
campaigns against their country of origins, created an ever-escalating cycle of retaliation and
counter-retaliation. This was true for Lebanon's relations with Israel and for Congo's relations
with Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola. The other mechanism specified in the original
framework, that of the kin-country syndrome, had significant effects only in the case of Congo.
The conditions for the working of this mechanism, then, should also be further researched in
future studies. On the other hand, Hypothesis 5, dealing with the relations between state
weakness and foreign political and economic predation, turned out to be more relevant to the
case of Lebanon - where both Syria's and Israel's interventions presented such features - than to
Congo, where only Zimbabwe, of the major actors involved, was primarily motivated by greed.
To conclude, then, one cannot but be puzzled by the negative effects on international
relations that such a seemingly positive international norm has created. Indeed, for socio-
politically weak states, good fences often make bad neighbors. In regions where states are weak,
I argued in this dissertation, the norm of border fixity - the prohibition of foreign conquest and
annexation of homeland territory, regardless of any internal or external conditions - increases the
incidents of international conflicts. In such situations, fixed borders perpetuate and exacerbate
the weakness of the state, which, in turn, is a major cause of internal wars. Under the border
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fixity norm, the:se internal wars tend to spillover and become international conflicts. These
theoretical propositions were tested and largely corroborated (though with some reservations and
,differing emphasizes) in the comparison of cases before and after the ascendance of this norm, at
the aftermath of World War II.
E. Theoretical Implications
The argument presented and tested in this dissertation offers five major theoretical
contributions to the study of international politics. The first contribution is the recognition of the
difference between intentions and results. This is, of course, not a new theme in the study of
politics. Yet, in the specific area of studying international norms, the tendency has been to
assume away the possibility that "good norms" can have negative consequences. The current
research shows that such an approach is imprudent, and that when studying international social
norms, one has to explore not only their positive influences but the negative as well.
Second, and closely related, is the observation that the same structural factor, an international
norm in this case, might have very different consequences for different sort of actors. The idea
that the norm of border fixity has been a positive force in the relations between socio-politically
strong states is not studied here, but is probably not very controversial. That the same norm
exerts profoundly different effects on actors of a different sort, weak states, however, is a major
finding of this study. The more general point is, therefore, that one should not assume that all
actors are affected in the same way by similar structural features. The internal attributes of actors
filter external inputs in ways that produce diverse outcomes. Our task as social scientists is to
decipher the ways in which these filters work and thus understand the mechanisms that translate
external, structural conditions into policy outcomes.
279
Third, this study contributes to our understanding of the interplay between normative and
rational variables in international politics. It shows, specifically, how rational calculations might
operate within, and be affected by, an overall normative framework - of border fixity, in this
case. This study therefore shows that the often polarized debate between the rational choice view
of politics and the more constructivist, or normative based, view, is somewhat superfluous. Both
norms and rationality affect political decisions and political outcomes. Our task as researchers is
to delineate the way in which these broad modes of action work and interact in different settings
and under different conditions.
Fourth, this work contributes to the study of territoriality and borders, which was dormant
for several decades but has been reinvigorated since the end of the Cold War. More specifically,
the dissertation points to the subjective and changing nature of our perceptions of borders, and
how and whether they should be legitimately changed. It also directs our attention to the
consequences, some of them unintended, of such changes.
Lastly, this work contributes to the debate regarding the causes and consequences of state
weakness, in its various manifestations (failed states, collapsed states, etc.). It emphasizes the
role of a set international structure in the perpetuation of state weakness in many of the regions
of the developing world: not a material structure (i.e., the global balance of power or the World
Capitalistic System), but a normative one. It also shows how the logic of international relations
for weak states is profoundly different than that of strong states, as domestic politics, relations
between groups within the state, and transnational relations between elements within the state
and those outside of it play a much larger role than they do in strong states.
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F. Policy Implications
"The greatest threats to our security," US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked in a
2005 op-ed, "are defined more by dynamics within weak states than by the borders between
strong and aggressive ones." 552 Though the current dissertation was not concerned in particular
with US security, it is, in a sense, an inquiry into the puzzle that this statement poses: it attempts
to increase our understanding not only of the reasons why security threats increasingly emanate
from weak states, but also how these threats are related to the issue of borders.
In regions where states are weak, as this dissertation has shown, the norm of fixed
international borders increases the incidents not only of civil wars, but of international conflicts
as well. In such situations, fixed borders perpetuate and exacerbate the weakness of the state,
which, in turn, has been a major cause of wars in the last 50 or so years, especially in the
Developing World.
The policy implications of these findings, nevertheless, are far from simple and are bound to
be controversial, to say the least. This is so mainly because of two important aspects. First, while
I find that the border fixity norm to have negative effects on regions in which most states are
weak, I also believe that it has very positive effects elsewhere. In regions where most states are
strong, or at least sufficiently strong, good fences indeed make good neighbors. To rid the world
of this norm would be, therefore, to throw the baby out with the bath water. Second, war is never
a good solution to problems: it is costly, in blood and treasure, cruel, and seldom truly solves the
problems it sets out to solve. It would be both imprudent and unwise, therefore, to recommend a
return to the age of territorial wars.
552 Condoleezza Rice, "The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom Is the Only Realistic Path to
Security," Washington Post, December 11, 2005.This sentiment also echoes the .2002 US National Security
Strategy. See President George, W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002
(Washington. D.C.: The White House).
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On the other hand, one should not avoid a discussion of a problem if there are no easy
solutions. To ostracize and ignore the positive effects territorial war has had in the past on state
building would be equally dangerous. The mere understanding of this hitherto unstudied
phenomenon is important by itself. That a norm that intends to create conditions of stability and
peace actually produces the opposite consequences is a fact worthy of our attention even without
immediate policy implications. Nonetheless, I do cautiously offer here two such implications:
1. The international community should also consider some means of applying pressure
that might compel states to reform and improve in a way similar to the pressures exerted in the
past by territorial wars. The threat of dismemberment from the UN and other international
organizations (such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO) might wield some such pressure.
As it stands today, even states that cannot be considered states by any positive measure (such as
Somalia and the DRC) still retain their seat in these organizations, with all the economic and
prestige benefits it entails. Such a threat might induce some of the states in question to attempt a
more sincere project of state building (although it will probably still be a weaker incentive than a
real territorial threat). 553
2. If indeed border fixity is sometimes a cause of international conflicts, we do have to
consider revising this international norm. As stated above, I do not recommend deliberate
creation of territorial wars as a cure to the ills of weak states. Yet, under some circumstances, the
international community (as well as the great powers as independent actors) should consider
revisions of existing borders to adjust them to reality (of both control and legitimacy), whether it
means accepting secession or even (in rare occasions) annexation of land by a neighbor. In
effect, what I recommend here is a returning to the practice of recognition of states on a positive
553 For similar recommendations, see Herbst, "Let Them Fail."
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basis, a practice that was the prevalent rule of international law for many decades. 554 This
practice, though, should be clearly demarcated and implemented only in cases where there is a
total collapse of the legitimacy and control of the state, and little prospect of reconstruction
through conventional means.
Some might argue that these measures would open a "Pandora's box" of terrible potential. I
would counter, however, that in many parts of the world, and in Sub-Saharan Africa in
particular, matters could not be much worse than they are right now. Weak and impotent states
are the site (and the main cause) of civil wars, famines, epidemics and, as we have seen in this
dissertation, also international conflicts. In terms of casualties, direct and indirect, the Congo
War is the worst international conflict since World War II, and is still simmering. Though on a
smaller scale, the combined effects of the civil wars, invasions and international interventions in
Lebanon are just as devastating. Territorial wars, as bad as they are, are usually easier to control
and to end. In the long run, they could immensely increase the strength of the states in these
regions, a fact that would lead to more secure states, both from within and from without. Ideally,
in most cases the mere threat of territorial losses or loss of international recognition would be
sufficient to motivate the process of building stronger states. Even if it should fail, however, the
consequences could hardly be worse than those of inaction.
G. Recommendations for Further Studies
I wish to conclude this dissertation by proposing a few avenues for future research, avenues
that are suggested by this study. First, the most natural extension of this study is to study the
554 For an argument to that effect, see Jackson, "Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa." See also Chaim
Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (1996).
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effects of the border fixity norm on strong states. As indicated above, this norm seems to have a
very positive effect, enhancing peace and stability in areas like Europe and the America's. Yet
these casual observations have to be anchored in substantial research. Another task that should
be taken in this context is the analysis of the relative effect of the border fixity norm, as
compared to other pacifying influences in areas such as Europe, North America, and South
America. It is also possible that our fell understanding of the effects of the border fixity norm
will be illuminated by such variables as the timing of adopting this norm; differences that were
noticed here in the Argentinean case. In particular, the study of the relations between the
strengthening of the uti possidetis norm555 and the positive effects strong states had on the 2 0 th
century international relations in South America, 556 could be fruitful. Attention should also be
given to devising workable solutions to the problems created by the border fixity norm without
destroying the whole system, or undermining the positive effects. As indicated above, this is not
likely to be an easy task. The importance of this undertaking, however, means that is should be
taken on nevertheless, as the benefits are potentially enormous.
Second, the border fixity norm, as studied here, is defined narrowly to include only a
prohibition against foreign conquest and annexation of homeland territory. Yet, at a lesser degree
of strength but at a much broader context, norms of borders include also a norm against
secession and partition. Very few such reorganizations of space were allowed since the 1950's.
Even when empires collapse, as was the case with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, their
successor states are comprised along the same, often arbitrary, administrative lines. A serious
inquiry of the effects of such practices and conventions of international politics, as well as into
555 Noted by Kacowictz, The Impact of Norms in International Society.
556 Noted by Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War.
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their relation to the norm of border fixity, as defined in this dissertation, could therefore be
highly fruitful.
Lastly, the norm of border fixity is related to, yet different from, other norms that have to do
with borders and international relations, such as the norms of sovereignty, the norm of non-
intervention, and the norm of self-determination. The relations and the cross-influences of these
norms, however, are potentially a very important topic, that has not yet received sufficient
attention. What might be, for instance, the combined effects of the border fixity and the non-
intervention/respect of sovereignty norms on relations between states? Is the apparent rise in
interventions designed to achieve "regime change" a logical product of the normative prohibition
of territorial annexation? 557 Are we likely to see the norms of border fixity coming back a full
circle as the international community attempts to reverse their negative consequences in weak
states? Is there a way to reverse a course of state collapse without resorting to such apparently
contradictory measures? And how can the international community uphold, at the same time, the
norm of border fixity and the right of people for self-determination? 558 All of these questions
should be on our research agenda in a world that becomes increasingly "smaller," and one in
which the outcomes of state weakness and failure increasingly affect everyone's security.
5•7 This argument is, indeed, suggested by Fazal, "From Conquest to Intervention: State, Regime, and Leader Exit."
5'8 1 owe much of the insights into these questions to discussions with Kenneth Oye.
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